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For Lauren

The word intellectual strikes me as odd. Personally, I’ve never met 
any intellectuals. I’ve met people who write novels, others who treat 
the sick. People who work in economics and others who write elec-
tronic music. I’ve met people who teach, people who paint, and 
people of whom I have never really understood what they do. But 
intellectuals, never.
On the other hand, I’ve met a lot of people who talk about “the intel-
lectual.” And, listening to them, I’ve got some idea of what such an ani-
mal could be. It’s not difficult—he’s quite personified. He’s guilty about 
pretty well everything: about speaking out and about keeping  silent, 
about doing nothing and about getting involved in everything. . . . In 
short, the intellectual is raw material for a verdict, a sentence, a con-
demnation, an exclusion . . .
—Michel Foucault interviewed by Le Monde,  
April 6–7, 1980
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Preface and Acknowled gments
This book grew out of a sociology graduate seminar that I took more than twenty-
five years ago at the University of California at Berkeley. Titled Intellectuals and 
Politics, the course was inspiring not only because it included different research 
approaches and fascinating studies, but also because none of the writings seemed 
to be equipped conceptually to illuminate the dynamics leading up to the most 
violent episode against intellectuals in contemporary Chinese history. During the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution initiated by Chairman Mao in the mid-
1960s, countless intellectuals were attacked by student Red Guards. The victims 
included every conceivable type of person found in the literature on intellectuals 
produced inside and outside academia, such as reputed scholars and writers, uni-
versity deans, state officials, and factory managers as well as primary school teach-
ers, journalists, and performing artists. Although the precise number of fatalities 
would never be known, tens of thousands at least were beaten to death or hounded 
to suicide. The rest of the victims endured various combinations of corporal pun-
ishment, coerced labor, and public humiliation. Besides college, secondary, and 
even primary students, the attackers included peers of the victims. Some of these 
peer assailants placed themselves at the forefront of the assaults; some plotted 
behind the scenes; some joined unfolding attacks to keep themselves safe. The 
boundaries between attackers and the attacked shifted back and forth while a reign 
of terror consumed property, dignity, and lives nationwide.
During the last sixteen years, I published a series of articles that explore the his-
torical background behind the brutality against intellectuals during the Cultural 
Revolution. The articles focus on two things. First, the evolution of zhishifenzi (the 
intellectual or intellectuals) from a little-known expression in China during the 
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1920s to a primary social identity of a heterogeneous population of people after the 
1949 communist revolution. Second, the postrevolutionary struggle across state 
and society to define the roles and responsibilities of intellectuals as well as the 
social composition of this population. I trace how “intellectuals” as individuals and 
a population were constructed under the Chinese Communist Party, in contradis-
tinction to conventional approaches that predefine the subject as critical thinkers, 
professional experts, or other kinds of persons. The articles reveal that individuals 
and organizations encountered the intellectual increasingly on many levels. As a 
subject matter, the intellectual turned up in party policies and leadership speeches, 
bureaucratic rules and personnel reports, newspapers and textbooks, government 
notices and pamphlets, radio shows and theatrical performances, and other medi-
ums. As a person, the intellectual was eventually locatable across a wide range 
of circumstances: during high-level assemblies, political reeducation classes, land 
reform activities, and registration drives as well as within the state, the neighbor-
hood, the family, and all sorts of workplaces. Under the party, the intellectual was 
woven into the fabric of everyday life, carrying in bodily, literary, aural, artistic, 
and other forms meanings and symbolisms inscribed upon the subject. Although I 
tried to connect the articles together thematically and analytically, what remained 
elusive was a genuinely coherent picture on how the intellectual was constituted, 
let alone one that clarifies twists and turns of the process and its implications for 
the violence of the Cultural Revolution. Each of the articles had been developed 
as an independent publication. They were not published in the order of the events. 
The study as a whole was always a work-in-progress.
Building upon those articles, this book investigates the intellectual in twen-
tieth-century China first and foremost as a classification of people deployed by 
the Chinese Communist Party on behalf of its revolutionary project. The latter, 
which I call Chinese Communism, was inspired as much as any other contem-
porary project of communism by Karl Marx’s understanding of class struggle as 
the motivating force of history. Launched with the party’s formation in the early 
1920s, Chinese Communism grew in fits and starts before maturing into a national 
military takeover led by Mao during the mid-century. The revolutionary project 
became a state pursuit and produced shortly afterward a nationwide elimination of 
private ownership and changes of governance at all levels. The party’s emphasis on 
class struggle fluctuated, reaching feverish heights during the Cultural Revolution 
before fading by the early 1980s, not long after the Chairman’s demise. From begin-
ning to end, Chinese Communism nonetheless involved a top-down reordering of 
people into class subjects based on Marxian thought or, as Mao stressed early on, 
as a revolutionary separation of friends from enemies. “Capitalist” and “landlord” 
were major classifications of those identified as members of the exploiting classes; 
the markers each cast the individual as a target of economic expropriation and 
political suppression. “Worker” and “poor peasant” defined those so categorized as 
victims of class exploitation and part of the backbone of the revolutionary project. 
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In comparison, “intellectual,” which became the primary classification of many 
writers, officials, schoolteachers, technicians, and others, signaled that they each 
were situated somewhere between the exploiting and the exploited classes, pos-
sessing knowledge and skills valuable to Chinese Communism as well as values, 
beliefs, and habits harmful to its development. The deployment of this marker 
by the party, unlike the other Marxian classifications, captured its modernizing 
as much as revolutionary impulses or the intention to achieve an industrialized 
China through class struggle.
The main message that runs through this book is the mutually constitutive rela-
tionship between the intellectual and Chinese Communism—that is, their power 
to influence politics and governance, work and leisure, association and identity, 
and other aspects of life through influencing each other. Scholarly as well as official 
accounts have long maintained that Chinese Communism arose because of the 
efforts of revolutionary intellectuals and then encountered support and resistance 
from intellectuals with different persuasions. The studies have illuminated politi-
cal, organizational, and experiential features of the revolutionary project, but have 
also greatly simplified its relations with the intellectual. As Chinese Communism 
grew, the methods and measures of revolution and governance promoted by the 
party, along with its Marxian accounts of Chinese society, nurtured, supported, 
and ultimately normalized the intellectual as a classification of people. An ever-
increasing number of men and women appeared locally as “intellectuals,” or visi-
ble subjects who allegedly possessed similar class characteristics and hence similar 
political, moral, and economic influence on Chinese Communism. An even larger 
number of people found themselves potentially within the scope of the classifica-
tion, because of its ambiguity and fluidity in terms of conceptualization and appli-
cation respectively. At the same time, how to harness the knowledge and skills 
of such a diverse, dispersed, and growing population of intellectuals and to limit 
their adverse impact on class struggle became a constant concern of the party. 
Intense efforts at forging revolutionary theory, governing approaches, adminis-
trative arrangements, and mechanisms of mobilization and regulation persisted. 
The outcomes of representation, organization, and negotiation shaped patterns of 
authority and opportunity, workplace makeups and priorities, and social interac-
tion and individual calculus, or the collective and individual experience of the 
revolutionary project.
Put differently, this book shows that the intellectual as an analytical object has 
significantly more to offer with regard to understanding contemporary Chinese 
society than previous studies have demonstrated. Under Chinese Communism, 
the intellectual was not simply a political visionary, an outspoken writer, a brow-
beaten schoolteacher, or any kind of person pushing for or coping with unprec-
edented change. The revolutionary project turned the intellectual into a primary 
classification of people. The spread of the classification critically redefined ways 
of thinking, seeing, feeling, and acting, and therefore the structure and culture 
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of Chinese society. This book is about the historic voyage that the classification 
and Chinese society traveled together—until it was on the verge of the Cultural 
Revolution.
My desire to reexamine the intellectual in contemporary Chinese society arose 
while I was a graduate student. I received encouragement and advice from Peter 
Evans, Thomas Gold, Neil Fligstein, and Wen-hsin Yeh. For more than two decades, 
Wen-hsin supported my zigzagging effort and interrogated my half-baked claims 
and ideas. Helen Dunstan is an exceptionally generous scholar. She read and com-
mented on earlier versions of some of the chapters. She provided hundreds of 
in-depth comments on how to refine the book manuscript. Stephen A. Smith’s 
insightful reading of an early draft of the opening chapter left me with no choice 
but to revise the content dramatically. Robert J. Culp read the revision and ear-
lier drafts of chapters 3 and 5 and helped me improve the substance. Frederick 
Teiwes has shared his thoughts with me on how to improve the research. A global 
authority in the study of China’s intellectuals, Timothy Cheek has been especially 
kind with his unflagging encouragement. Even before he invited me to spend a 
month at the Peter Wall Institute of Advanced Studies at the University of British 
Columbia during the early 2000s, he knew perfectly well that I was exploring an 
analytical approach different from how he and his teachers had studied the intel-
lectual in China. Richard Madsen and another reviewer of the manuscript offered 
excellent advice.
I have been fortunate in getting advice and encouragement from scholars in 
various disciplines. Neil Diamant, Xiaomei Chen, Thomas Mullaney, Andrea 
Goldman, Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Allison Rottman, Bruce Haynes, John Hall, Kwai 
Ng, Ching Kwan Lee, Rana Mitter, Luo Suwen, Julia Strauss, Kate Lawn Chouta, 
Michael McQuarrie, Linus Huang, David Gundry, David Faure, Brian DeMare, 
Derek Herforth, Michael Schoenhals, Yiyan Wang, Edmund Fung, and the late 
Glen Dudbridge offered helpful suggestions. Ming-cheng Lo, Thomas Beamish, 
and Stephanie Mudge repeatedly asked me to rethink my assumptions and the 
research’s significance. I am grateful to the participants in the China seminars 
at the University of Oxford, the University of California, Los Angeles, and the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. I thank the participants in the sociology 
seminars at the University of California, San Diego and at Nanjing University and 
in the cross-disciplinary workshops at Tsinghua University and Peking University. 
I benefited from the history seminar organized by Xu Jilin at East China Normal 
University. I thank the participants of “Organized Knowledge and State Socialism 
in Mao’s China” held at the University of California, Berkeley. I enjoyed the hos-
pitality of Jimmy Chan, Pui Shan Li, Bao Xiaoqun, and Zhao Nianquo when I was 
conducting research in Shanghai.
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Many institutions supported the research and writing of this book. During 
the mid-2000s, I received a multiyear fellowship from the Chiang Ching-kuo 
Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange that allowed me to travel to 
pertinent historic sites, talk to people, and collect documents. I am grateful to 
the University of California, Davis, the University of Sydney, the University of 
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vention from the UC Davis Library, this would not have been an open access book. 
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and his staff at University of California Press. He has been very supportive of the 
project. He shepherded the manuscript through review and production with care 
and advice that exemplifies the utmost professionalism of a veteran editor.
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Reexamining the Intellectual and 
Chinese Communism
Bian Zhongyun (1916–1966) is notable in contemporary Chinese history for a 
ghastly reason. On August 5, 1966, this Beijing schoolteacher, a “bourgeois intel-
lectual” according to the increasingly belligerent ideology of the state, became 
one of the first of many victims beaten to death by student Red Guards during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Her ordeal had started weeks before with 
forms of severe humiliation and violent abuse once meted out to rural landlords 
expropriated under Chinese Communism, the revolutionary project initiated by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) when it was founded in the early 1920s. 
The torment culminated in a brutal beating that lasted between two and three 
hours, while onlookers were too fearful to intervene on her behalf. The irony in 
her murder is obvious in retrospect. Bian was an ardent supporter of Chinese 
Communism. She joined the party during the early 1940s while it was still wag-
ing revolution from the countryside, or daringly earlier than most others did. 
Upon graduating from college a few years later, she began to work full-time for 
the revolution. After the CCP seized power in 1949, she was assigned to teach at 
the girls’ secondary school attached to the Beijing Normal University, a privileged 
appointment insofar as schoolteachers were concerned. Located less than a mile 
from Zhongnanhai, where Chairman Mao and other party leaders worked, the 
campus was attended by their daughters and those of other senior officials. Thanks 
to her excellent work as an educator and a party cadre, Bian was promoted repeat-
edly. By the late 1950s, she had become the vice principal and the party secretary 
of the renowned campus. She met some of the leaders and even received words of 
appreciation from them for educating their daughters. On the eve of her demise, 
however, Bian was known to her attackers, among other things, as a “vanguard of 
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opposition to the party,” a “bastard of the capitalist class,” a “leader of black gangs” 
seeking to restore class exploitation, a “despotic dog,” and a “poisonous snake,” 
and by names circulating in the official media in support of a hunt of class enemies 
within state and society.1
To objectify, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is to express some-
thing abstract in a concrete form, identify a person with a stereotype, or degrade 
a person or a class of people to the status of an object.2 As Chinese Communism 
grew, the intellectual became extraordinarily objectified in each of these manners. 
The CCP leadership drew on the political thought of Marx and Lenin to identify 
intellectuals as an integral part of the class structure and the political reality of 
Chinese society, along with capitalists, poor peasants, and other social categories. 
The leadership broadcast what it considered to be the class characteristics of intel-
lectuals beneficial as well as harmful to the revolutionary project, or their previ-
ously acquired “petty-bourgeois” or “bourgeois” approaches or attitudes toward 
life. Through a myriad of activities in multiple areas of revolution and governance 
(such as propaganda, political training, economic reorganization, and workplace 
surveillance), the party turned notable as well as ordinary people into locally and 
even nationally recognized “intellectuals.” The affected, who were then used and 
abused in particular ways, included party leaders and state officials, scientists and 
artists, office workers and industrial technicians, military officers, college students, 
housewives, former workers, and others. Like Bian, some of them did not survive 
the objectification of the intellectual under Chinese Communism.
Even more remarkable is how rapidly the objectification of the intellectual 
spread across China after the 1949 revolution. Zhishifenzi, the Chinese equivalent 
of “intellectuals,” was a neologism of the early twentieth century with strong for-
eign roots. For more than two decades after its appearance, the term remained as 
one of many expressions used within literary and political circles to refer to edu-
cated persons or the educated population.3 The debate on the intellectual within 
those circles was not unlike what occurred then and later in other societies, as 
the relatively small number of interlocutors focused on defining what intellectuals 
were and their moral and political responsibilities to the nation. Shortly after the 
revolution, however, residents in urban areas could generally identify intellectuals 
within the local population with little difficulty, before such subjects were virtu-
ally locatable everywhere across the nation. Otherwise perfectly ordinary people 
considered themselves intellectuals and supported, accepted, or challenged official 
evaluations of their class characteristics. How did “intellectuals” evolve from an 
obscure expression to a term for readily identifiable subjects? How did individu-
als and organizations handle this objectification of the intellectual? What was the 
impact of the objectification on Chinese Communism?
To address these influential yet underexamined changes in Chinese society, 
this book begins with an unconventional conception of the intellectual—that is, 
as a classification of people used across different cultures since the late nineteenth 
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century for political control, social analysis, moral intervention, status struggle, 
or other purposes. Research has typically defined intellectuals as “persons with 
advanced educations, producers or transmitters of culture or ideas, or members 
of either category who engage in public issues.”4 The definitions have anchored 
insightful studies of the impact of such people on revolution, modernization, 
democratization, and other historic processes. Within research on twentieth-
century communisms, however, the use of the definitions has obscured what, 
precisely, was distinct about the intellectual under such systems of rule. For the 
communist regimes constituted a rare breed in global political history that relied 
on Marxian thought to define, identify, and govern individuals and populations 
formally as “intellectuals.” In the epigraph of this book, Michel Foucault speaks 
of the intellectual as a fictional yet recognizable person as well as raw material for 
orchestrating punishment and assaults. He asks us to reconsider what the intel-
lectual is. He probably had in mind the ferociousness with which “intellectuals” 
were attacked during the Cultural Revolution, if not also the widespread denun-
ciation, reeducation, and persecution of those identified as such under the Soviet 
Union and elsewhere.5 This book takes Foucault’s crisp insight on the intellectual 
to an analytically logical conclusion, one that recounts the rise of the classification 
under Chinese Communism and how the process devolved toward fatal outcomes 
on a mass scale.
This book is therefore about social classification and its consequences under 
Chinese Communism. How the CCP or other communist regimes categorized 
individuals, families, and occupations based on Marx’s understanding of class 
struggle, or established what Christopher Browning and Lewis Siegelbaum call 
“frameworks for social engineering,” has long invited analysis of the dynamics.6 
Overall, the studies focus on what I call conception, administration, reorganiza-
tion, and negotiation, or more concretely the origins and meanings of the clas-
sifications, the execution of classification campaigns, the reconfiguration of local 
society, and the tactics and strategies used by individuals to deal with their own 
classification and those of others.7 I extend this analytical tradition in two distinct 
directions. First, this book uses a diachronic study that involves multiple sites as 
a method to illustrate the rise of the intellectual as a classification of people under 
Chinese Communism, or how ordinary people were objectified as “intellectuals.” 
That is, I treat the study of the intellectual as the study of social classification, 
because little is known about how the CCP or other regimes deployed this cen-
tral marker in Marxian ideology in their reclassification of the general popula-
tion when compared with “landlord,” “rich peasant,” or other labels. Second, this 
book describes the impact of the party’s use of the intellectual classification on 
Chinese Communism, that is, the institutions and practices as well as outlooks 
and feelings that flourished. I am interested in how the classification’s deployment 
affected social and political life, similar to what others have illustrated with respect 
to the spread of “capitalist” and other labels under communist regimes. From the 
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beginning to the end of Chinese Communism, the intellectual was arguably the 
most important, most ambiguous, and thus most intriguing classification adopted 
by the party to reinterpret, reorganize, and reinvent China.
The following section explains the analytical framework that I have assembled 
to examine anew the relations between the intellectual and Chinese Communism. 
I rely on insights from studies of social classification, including those related to 
communist societies. Because the ruling regimes of such societies can be “best 
construed as mutations of a single genus” formed on the basis of Marxian ide-
ology,8 the framework is appropriate for exploring the intellectual classification 
under other communist systems, although their political and other characteristics 
must be taken into account. Readers who wish to skip specialized debates on clas-
sification and communism are welcome to skip the discussion. I then summa-
rize the central argument of this book, namely that the intellectual and Chinese 
Communism were mutually constitutive. As the revolutionary project expanded, 
a mixture of discursive, organizational, and interpersonal practice transformed 
the intellectual into a major classification of people. As the number of “intellec-
tuals” multiplied under the project, top-down programs and measures designed 
to address their conflicting presence flourished and shaped official governance, 
workplace structures, social relations, and individual consciousness. The final 
section explains my strategies for investigating this interlocking development of 
the intellectual and Chinese Communism. I discuss the themes and arguments of 
the following chapters and stress that an abundance of events, organizations, and 
people as well as ideas, interests, and motives were involved in what was a multi-
layered and contentious process.
AN INSTITUTIONAL-C ONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH
Studies of the intellectual and Chinese Communism, a major subfield of research 
on Chinese society, tend to treat their relations primarily as being between peo-
ple and regime. Three lines of inquiry are especially prominent. On the level of 
elite politics, emphasis is given either to how CCP leaders as intellectuals devel-
oped and promoted Chinese Communism or challenged its direction, or to the 
political, ideological, and aesthetic choices the leaders made at various junctures 
of the revolutionary project. In terms of organization, the emphasis is on how 
the party mobilized and dominated writers, scientists, and others qua intellectu-
als, using propaganda, privilege, and punishment to further revolutionary goals. 
With respect to political reactions, the accounts have described active support of 
the party as well as calculated accommodation, public dissent, and other behavior 
on the part of intellectuals and have traced these responses to Confucian tradi-
tion, professional ethics, contemporaneous social movements, and other sources. 
Such scholarship furnishes an invaluable window into Chinese Communism 
through illuminating ideas and controversies, rivalries and alliances, institutions 
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and practices, and public and private experiences that made up the project.9 Like 
the broader interdisciplinary literature on intellectuals, however, the accounts as 
a whole portray their central subject as little more than a population of relatively 
educated people.
My approach to reexamining the intellectual and Chinese Communism is 
built upon a distinct tradition of social inquiry that runs from French sociologist 
Emile Durkheim to Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu and, more broadly, to 
the study of racial, ethnic, and gender classification across sociology, history, and 
other disciplines. Accounts in this tradition purposefully refrain from using offi-
cial, folk, or other preexisting conceptions of groups or peoples as the analytical 
point of departure. The studies, instead, focus on the relations of power and the 
work of classification underlying the shared belief that a certain group exists due 
to its own properties and on why a particular system of partitioning and grasp-
ing the social world is adopted in the first place. Some of the accounts document 
resultant changes in the values, interests, and behavior of individuals or organi-
zations. The scholarship reveals social structures, relations, and practices other-
wise unaccounted for and analyzes how they serve to produce or reproduce the 
social order.10 Historian Sheila Fitzpatrick has advanced this analytical tradition 
in the study of twentieth-century communisms as much as anyone else, through 
her research on the rise of categories of people based on Marxian ideology (e.g., 
rich peasants and petty bourgeoisie) in Lenin’s and Stalin’s Russia as “a matter of 
classification” orchestrated by the state, and on “self-reinventions” as individuals 
coped with unprecedented patterns of risk and opportunity.11
A small number of studies have highlighted the intellectual as a social clas-
sification. Historians have recovered dynamics that engendered the classification 
in France during the 1890s, or amid the Dreyfus affair regarding whether a Jewish 
army captain had been wrongly convicted of treason. Although the term intel-
lectuel antedated the affair, it only entered into common usage then as a classifica-
tion of people. Novelists, artists, lawyers, scientists, politicians, and students used 
the term to refer to themselves or to insult others. They supported their views by 
building upon entrenched assumptions about social differences and by probing 
or alluding to heated political issues. State support of higher education, freedom 
of the press, and print capitalism sustained a network of journals and salons that 
served to introduce the classification to a broad audience, along with intense argu-
ments about French society. As a result, the classification acquired meanings and 
symbolisms that had little to do with issues of fairness and justice in the legal 
system. The narratives and imageries associated with the intellectual included 
incorruptible masculinity, hysterical femininity, and subhuman personality as 
well as poignant references to declining national health, military failure, crowd 
psychology, and social disorder.12 A new social type, however inchoate its features 
were, entered the French popular consciousness. Other scholars have examined 
the intellectual in Europe, Russia, and elsewhere as a form of “self-definitions,”13 a 
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“cultural myth,”14 “a relationship of attribution,”15 and “a weapon in the intellectual 
field,”16 or a social classification for establishing identity, claiming difference, gain-
ing authority, or achieving other purposes.
In this book I regard the intellectual as a classification of people deployed by the 
CCP for the purposes of remaking Chinese society, a marker of the class location 
of the individual based on the Marxian ideology of the party. I define institutions 
broadly as rules and regulations as well as regular and regulated practices found 
under Chinese Communism. This is necessary for capturing the wide range of 
patterned activities that served to normalize the classification while being affected 
by its normalization. Examples of the institutions were top-level announcements 
and instructions, state policies and programs, official reports and statistics, liter-
ary works and cinematic productions, and recurring patterns of social association 
and individual conduct. In other words, the first half of my analytical approach 
emphasizes the institutions of classification that objectified the intellectual and 
their institutional consequences for Chinese Communism. In comparison, the 
constructivist half of my approach highlights the values, ideas, and meanings 
as well as the symbolisms and boundaries associated with the intellectual clas-
sification. Where did they come from and how did they change across time and 
space? How did they inform the use of the classification? I also draw attention to 
the thoughts, interests, and calculations of individuals and organizations as they 
responded to the objectification of the intellectual, or the impact of those views on 
the revolutionary project. In short, the second half of my approach takes the politi-
cal, moral, and demographic interpretations of the intellectual and their implica-
tions as an object of analysis.
My analytical approach is therefore set up to address both the objective and 
subjective dimensions of the objectification of the intellectual under Chinese 
Communism. This objectification was part of the reordering of Chinese society 
by the CCP elites according to their images, or their progressive and spectacular 
reduction of the massive population of an industrializing society into a relatively 
small number of social categories based on Marxian thought. The objectification 
presupposed, as well as engendered, decisive changes in social structures, dis-
positions, and behavior. More concretely, my investigation proceeds along three 
distinct axes: official representation of the intellectual, local identification of the 
subject, and informal negotiation of the classification. There are three reasons 
behind these choices. First, official representation, local identification, and infor-
mal negotiation are major themes in the research on social classification; they have 
been shown to be vital to understanding this ubiquitous process. Second, research 
on social classification under communist rule has spotlighted each of the activities 
when illustrating the local formation of landlords and other Marxian categories of 
people. Third, existing studies of the intellectual and Chinese Communism have 
largely bracketed these activities from analysis, through treating the intellectual as 
one or another type of person.
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Official Representation of the Intellectual
Representation, as Stuart Hall has noted, is the use of “signs and symbols” to “stand 
for” concepts, ideas, and feelings, a central process in the production and repro-
duction of shared understandings.17 Political regimes and other establishments 
(e.g., churches, universities, professional associations), Pierre Bourdieu indicates, 
commonly exploit their legitimacy, authority, and resources to represent people, 
things, and events—on behalf of their own dominance. Their representations 
influence the way people see, think, feel, and act, partly because of the already 
accepted and unequal “relations of meaning and communication” between the 
establishments and those whom they govern, lead, or serve.18 Bourdieu calls this 
“power of constructing reality” held by the establishments “symbolic power,”19 the 
exercise of which can “make appear as natural, inevitable, and thus apolitical, that 
which is a product of historical struggle and human invention.”20 The systems of 
social classification of the establishments signal how they assign attributes and 
differences to people and organizations, allocate roles and authority, and develop 
methods of governance. The classifications and their underlying values and mean-
ings tend to extend across textual, visual, oral, architectural, and other substrates. 
Bourdieu stresses that no establishment, however organized or admired, has com-
plete control over the reception of its representations or over how society is imag-
ined or acted upon. To have the accounts or classifications accepted as true or 
valid, they must be “backed up by the order of things,”21 that is, they must reflect 
existing viewpoints or resonate with social conditions already experienced to be 
real or accurate. To paraphrase Bourdieu, representations alone do not produce 
shared beliefs; any agreement with the representations happens within the rela-
tions between those who exercise symbolic power and those who submit to it.22
From the beginning, representations of Chinese society by the CCP were as 
challenging as they were necessary to the development of Chinese Communism. 
Not only was the party’s vision of remaking China based on Marxism, a foreign 
ideology that claims society is composed of antagonistic classes of people; the 
vision also turned the contemporary understanding of status and prestige upside 
down. The party leadership considered those industrial workers and other manual 
laborers who were disadvantaged, deprived, and therefore often disparaged to 
be the most noble and valuable section of the Chinese population. Research has 
addressed how the CCP discourse of class struggle spread, through stressing the 
leadership’s political, literary, and aesthetic ingenuity in combining history with 
ideology, narrative with emotion, and socialist ideals with traditional thought.23 
The scholarship delves into the broader context under which the representations 
spread, or the twentieth-century ecology of war and revolution that nurtured 
Chinese Communism,24 as well as how the party used theater, cinema, and other 
channels to promote its views.25 Building on these works, the first layer of my anal-
ysis focuses on what I call the methods, milieux, and mechanisms of the CCP’s 
representation of the intellectual. How did the party elites combine historical, 
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cultural, and other symbolic resources with Marxist theory to define and rede-
fine the intellectual? How did existing political and social conditions influence 
the conceptions? And how did the party deploy offices and people and utilize the 
media and other channels to publicize its understanding of the subject?
In other words, I illustrate how the CCP integrated words and things to rep-
resent the intellectual, or the tactics of symbolic power deployed by the party. In 
her book on the Chinese socialist revolution, Elizabeth Perry suggests that cul-
tural positioning conducted by the party leaders, or their “strategic deployment of a 
range of symbolic resources (religion, ritual, rhetoric, dress, drama, art, and so on) 
for purposes of political persuasion,” was critical to the uprising’s success.26 From 
early on, the leaders skillfully appropriated traditional and other values, mores, 
and practices as means to rally support from underprivileged and other popula-
tions. This book extends the investigation of cultural positioning of the CCP elites 
to their representations of the intellectual, or how they synthesized intellectual 
assumptions, political sentiments, and social analyses as well as mobilized institu-
tions and organizations to promote a Marxian view of the subject. The fact that 
the party ultimately succeeded in constituting people who occupied distant social 
spaces, or who had little similarity or interaction with one another, as comparable 
subjects identified locally and nationally as intellectuals warrants an examination 
of the role of official representation in this historic achievement.
Local Identification of the Subject
By local identification, I mean what Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper call 
external identification, or “the formalized, codified, and objectified system of cate-
gorization” developed by powerful establishments for governance or management 
purposes.27 Research has made great strides during the recent decades in illustrat-
ing the workings of local identification, which is vital to any influential system of 
social classification. Local identification is often led by bureaucratic organizations 
with full-time officials, experts, and staff. These persons conduct documenta-
tion, assessment, and other investigative tasks. They separate otherwise continu-
ous populations into discrete social categories, through registration, certification, 
enrollment, or other acts of differentiation.28 Such work of bureaucracy supports 
division of labor, partition of space, allocation of privilege, imposition of restric-
tions, and other practices that reinforce recognition of the delineated categories. To 
use a pair of well-known concepts, authoritative establishments often successfully 
convert the symbolic boundaries that they use to divide a population conceptually 
into various sections to readily perceptible social boundaries that separate those 
sections in everyday life.29 Sooner or later, the scholarship indicates, members of 
the various sections thus produced will develop values, interests, and habits cor-
responding to their unequal experiences because of the inequality enforced by the 
establishments. Such thinking and behavior will in turn reinforce the prescribed 
divisions further.30
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Chinese Communism ultimately evolved into a nationwide project of local 
identification: the CCP turned virtually everyone into a legible subject based on 
Marxian thought. Research has stressed this process and its consequences. During 
land reform campaigns, official documentation of property ownership and fam-
ily connections, public announcements of land partition, and carefully planned 
spectacles of class struggle were channels through which party cadres and villagers 
learned the assigned class and political statuses of families and individuals. The 
emergence of “landlords” and other visible categories of people led to new forms 
of structure, behavior, and mentality that reinforced the introduced taxonomy, for 
example, the formation of “poor peasant associations” and the removal from party 
cells of those whom the local authorities regarded as undesirable elements.31 Yet 
other than the broad picture of its classification schemes, exactly how the party 
turned city and town residents into identifiable class subjects remains murky. At 
the same time, research has alluded to institutional changes that both presupposed 
and reinforced the differentiation of such populations into capitalists, workers, 
and other Marxian categories, changes such as the expropriation of private enter-
prises, class-based enrollment in colleges, punishment of “counterrevolutionaries,” 
and attitudinal changes in the matters of spousal selection and social association.32 
Specific events, for instance what the party called the thought reform of intellectu-
als, could not but lead to local identification of such subjects.33
The second layer of my analysis highlights the mechanisms and outcomes of 
local identification of “intellectuals” under the CCP. Compared to the landlord 
and other classifications of the party, the intellectual was conceptually elastic. The 
leadership frequently noted that intellectuals were part of the petty bourgeoisie, 
whose members focused on their own achievement and the welfare of their family. 
It stated that some intellectuals embraced the values and ideas of the exploiting 
classes, others endured hardships identical to those suffered by workers, and a 
small number were pioneers in advancing Chinese Communism. The classifica-
tion, furthermore, was deployed across urban and rural areas, along the occupa-
tional hierarchy, and inside and outside the party. What were the official measures, 
procedures, and arrangements that served to distinguish “intellectuals” from other 
kinds of class subjects? Who were the people identified as intellectuals, and what 
did they have in common? What were the local practices and conditions that rein-
forced the local identification of the subjects? In short, I illustrate how the CCP 
representation of the intellectual was translated into formal methods of counting 
and accounting as well as informal institutions of categorization, or local instru-
ments that produced and reproduced visible “intellectuals.”
Informal Negotiation of the Classification
In their seminal work on social classification, Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh 
Star state that no system of categorization, however established or elaborate, pro-
vides “total coverage of the world it describes.”34 Spaces and crevices of ambiguity 
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and indeterminacy are inevitable for conceptual, organizational, and other rea-
sons. This is especially true with the categorization of people. Individuals pos-
sess many attributes as well as change or grow, and hence do not always fit into 
predefined systems of classification. Standards and criteria of classification often 
involve ambiguities and even contradictions and are periodically revised by the 
authorities. Frontline agents of classification do not interpret or apply the stan-
dards or criteria uniformly, due to differences in their training, interests, and other 
factors. The agents work around, alter, or ignore guidelines and even introduce 
their own measurements. As a result, they sometimes classify people with similar 
characteristics differently and sometimes place those with different traits in the 
same category. Furthermore, as Brubaker and his colleagues have observed, “the 
categorized themselves are chronic categorizers.”35 Individuals usually recognize 
the potential consequences of classification for their own well-being and those of 
others. They deploy “self-interested strategies of symbolic manipulation” to influ-
ence how they are categorized.36 They use the classifications to characterize and 
comprehend friends, colleagues, and others in ways that reproduce, revise, or con-
test official use of the markers. In practice, “classification systems from different 
worlds meet, adjust, fracture, or merge.”37
Research on Chinese Communism has highlighted the variability, capricious-
ness, and individual manipulation of official classification. In a study of land reform 
in a village, Edward Friedman and his colleagues found that assignment of class 
labels to families and individuals occurred three separate times because of policy 
change as well as unevenly across the area. Official reliance on local consultation 
and memory and the presence of favoritism and political strife engendered chal-
lenges to the assignments, as they often contradicted local understandings of fair-
ness and justice.38 Xiaojun Zhang discovered in his research on another village that 
party cadres sometimes omitted the distinction between two official markers, and 
sometimes created their own labels to fit their understanding of the class location 
of the individual.39 Evidence is available on self-reinventions as means of coping 
with safety, career, and other concerns. Physical relocation, job change, alteration 
of appearance, concealment of background, self-criticism, and vocal cooperation 
were common, though not foolproof, tactics to fend off onerous labels.40 Ip and 
Perry have shown separately that even CCP leaders were not immune to the impli-
cations of the Marxian classifications that they had introduced. These otherwise 
privileged men employed physical, narrative, and other strategies to craft images 
conducive to the maintenance of their own authority within what they proclaimed 
to be a proletarian revolution.41
My third layer of analysis focuses on the myriad ways in which CCP leaders 
and cadres as well as ordinary people negotiated the intellectual classification. 
Under Chinese Communism, every relatively educated person confronted a pre-
dicament at some point in a typical day because of the meanings and symbolisms 
that the party inscribed upon the intellectual and other markers in its schema 
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of classes—or how to navigate this fateful grid of classification given their own 
background and the social location they occupied. On the one hand, I emphasize 
the conceptual ambiguities embedded in the CCP’s understanding of the intel-
lectual and challenges associated with the official identification of the subject, or 
gaps and pathways in which the affected persons could navigate. On the other 
hand, I highlight the tactics and strategies used by these individuals to deal with 
what they saw as risks and opportunities. Put differently, existing accounts on how 
party leaders, professors, artists, and others qua intellectuals supported, accepted, 
or resisted Chinese Communism have captured merely a small slice of their con-
duct of political negotiation, which quickly became an everyday performance of a 
class or a political identity vital to achieving authority, mobility, security, or other 
purposes valued by the individual.
In a nutshell, my institutional-constructivist approach brings together two 
main threads of research on Chinese Communism. Studies of intellectuals have 
illustrated the behavior of writers, schoolteachers, and others, but not how they 
were incorporated into the intellectual category of the party. Accounts of social 
classification have described dynamics surrounding the local appearance of land-
lords, counterrevolutionaries, and other subjects, but not of intellectuals. My syn-
thesis stresses the institutions that objectified the intellectual and ways of seeing, 
thinking, feeling, and acting that followed. The approach promises an original 
account of the intellectual and Chinese Communism as well as a deepened under-
standing of the CCP’s remaking of China.
THE ARGUMENT
This book contends that the intellectual and Chinese Communism were mutu-
ally constitutive. That is, the revolutionary project turned the intellectual into a 
primary classification of people as much as its deployment shaped how the project 
was organized and hence experienced. To put this in even stronger terms, one 
cannot fully understand either Chinese Communism or the intellectual without 
understanding their impact on each other. Entirely intertwined were their origins, 
extension, and even decline. This book hence contains two analytical movements, 
as it were. The first movement illustrates how the revolutionary project produced 
and altered the meanings, symbolisms, and boundaries that constituted the clas-
sification as well as its extension to various levels of Chinese society. The other 
movement describes how the deployment of the classification transformed author-
ity relations, organizational structures, social identities, and individual conduct, or 
the impact of the objectification of the intellectual on Chinese Communism.
Reinterpreting the intellectual
My account begins with the May Fourth movement of the early 1920s, the heady 
days in Chinese politics when a variety of political activists grappled with foreign 
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encroachment, warlord rule, mass poverty, and other national crises. The term 
zhishifenzi had yet to enter political debate, let alone the vernacular. The leadership 
of the newly founded CCP would skillfully recombine assumptions, arguments, 
and sentiments from three influential discourses to support its interpretation of 
the intellectual. The first of these discourses was the traditional understanding 
of social hierarchy, which saw the level of education and type of vocation of the 
individual as natural bases of social division. The second discourse was the heated 
contemporary debate on reform and revolution, which promoted the political 
participation of educated people but blamed their self-centeredness, apathy, and 
cowardice for the crises mentioned above. The third of those discourses was the 
spreading Marxist-Leninist view of class struggle, which suggested that scientists, 
accountants, technicians, and other white-collar or skilled personnel constituted 
a population of intellectuals between the exploiting and the exploited classes in 
modern societies. Once zhishifenzi entered the CCP lexicon, possession of for-
mal learning, a self-centered personality, and resistance to revolutionary change 
became core meanings of the term. Together with “capitalist,” “landlord,” and 
other markers, the intellectual became a major component of the Marxian system 
of social classification of the party.
As Chinese Communism expanded, the organizational programs and measures 
of the CCP extended the intellectual classification to the local level, while news-
papers, meetings, reports, and other events and arrangements organized by the 
party promoted its interpretation of China’s class structure. Two types of programs 
and measures, in particular, penetrated a widening sphere of activities even as the 
leadership’s understanding of “intellectuals” fluctuated. The first type was aimed at 
harnessing the knowledge and skills of these persons for economic development, 
educational growth, political propaganda, and other purposes of organization. The 
other type sought to curb the harmful influence of these individuals on the revo-
lutionary project or rein in their “petty-bourgeois” and “bourgeois” approaches to 
life and politics. The programs and measures involved many kinds of bureaucratic 
routines with classification effects, such as promulgation of instructions and regu-
lations, verification of qualifications, recruitment and appointment, assignment of 
responsibilities, stipulation of rights and privileges, political reeducation, inves-
tigation and supervision, punishment, and compilation of reports. The activities 
produced an increasingly dense web of texts, signs, and cues that promoted the 
intellectual as a classification of people, on top of the impact of official propa-
ganda. In other words, the discourse and practice generated meanings and bound-
aries that indicated to party cadres and ordinary people alike who the intellectuals 
were in Chinese society and their supposed beliefs, habits, and dispositions.
Like landlords and other official categories of people that appeared under 
Chinese Communism, the population of intellectuals thus formed had persistently 
fuzzy boundaries. Conceptually, the intellectual was but one of the classifications 
deployed by the CCP to pinpoint the location of the individual in a predefined 
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social order. Some of those classifiable as intellectuals were identifiable, too, as 
other types of class subject (e.g., landlords or workers). How the party defined the 
intellectual, moreover, changed over time. Politically, the classification was a tool 
of domination from the beginning. Educated party leaders and cadres exploited 
their revolutionary authority to promote and even consecrate themselves as part 
of the working class and cast less powerful persons as unreliable intellectuals. In 
this regard, CCP leaders differed from Marx, Lenin, and other leaders of commu-
nist movements who had fewer reservations in seeing themselves as revolutionar-
ies as well as intellectuals.42 Organizationally, the party’s agenda of harnessing the 
knowledge and skills of intellectuals and guarding against their negative influence 
constantly extended the classification to otherwise unaffected populations. In the 
end, every relatively educated person was classifiable as an intellectual.
A sea change of individual behavior further destabilized the boundaries of the 
population of intellectuals that emerged under Chinese Communism. For safety, 
career, or other reasons, many of those affected by the intellectual classification 
actively negotiated their social identity. They changed jobs, concocted stories, 
manipulated rules, and acted differently to cope with the positive and negative 
implications of the classification. They presented themselves as intellectuals with a 
particular political leaning or as another kind of class subject altogether, especially 
in front of the party authorities. The tactics and strategies of these persons var-
ied with their backgrounds, situations, and goals, and so did the outcomes. Some 
benefited from the positive meanings of the classification and largely escaped the 
harm of the negatives ones. Some admitted to being intellectuals but found ways 
to protect and even improve their lives and livelihoods. Some escaped the clas-
sification by playing up their other qualifications or backgrounds. Some straddled 
between classifications (e.g., “intellectual” and “worker”) and used each to their 
advantage. Some went from intellectuals to counterrevolutionaries and endured 
labor or prison sentences. Some, like Bian Zhongyun, lost their lives.
Reexamining Chinese Communism
If the first analytical movement of this book reveals the ontological transforma-
tion of the intellectual from a little-known expression adopted by the CCP to a 
primary social identity of many under the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
second movement shows how the metamorphosis affected the collective and indi-
vidual experience of Chinese Communism. To be sure, the party’s deployment 
of “capitalist,” “landlord,” and other classifications from the same Marxian analy-
sis of China led to organizational endeavors that altered life dramatically, such 
as the nationalization of industry after the 1949 revolution as well as rural land 
reform and campaigns against “counterrevolutionaries.” Yet, the deployment of 
the intellectual classification was distinct on three registers. Politically, the leader-
ship regarded intellectuals as class subjects par excellence that were both assets 
and liabilities of the revolutionary project, even though official assessment of this 
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population fluctuated periodically. Spatially, the leadership believed that intel-
lectuals existed throughout state and society and held influential positions across 
industrial production, scientific research, secondary education, popular enter-
tainment, and, more generally, the entire system of production and reproduction. 
Organizationally, the leadership was determined to develop China economically 
and therefore could not remove these persons completely from their posts regard-
less of their real or imagined threats to the project, unlike how the party dispensed 
with the “capitalists” or “landlords.” In brief, once the party defined professors, 
factory managers, journalists, and others as intellectuals, their incorporation into 
Chinese Communism became a persistent challenge.
The CCP’s efforts to harness the rational, constructive, and essential knowledge 
and expertise of “intellectuals” and to defend against their corruptive, contagious, 
and endless threats became a principal raison d’être of Chinese Communism. 
However the party leadership represented intellectuals—as utterly incorri-
gible, ideologically rectifiable, or, most of the time, somewhere in between— 
corresponding revolutionary paradigms, policies, and programs followed. Indeed, 
every major shift of the direction of the revolutionary project came after a top-
down reinterpretation of the intellectual or a revision of the meanings and sym-
bolisms that the leadership inscribed upon the classification. The turn from urban 
revolution to rural insurgency during the late 1920s captured a powerful rejec-
tion of the previous view that intellectuals were critical to the success of Chinese 
Communism. In contrast, the Yan’an phase (1937–1948) of the project epitomized 
the leadership’s determination to involve as well as reeducate such people. After 
1949, the leadership turned the Yan’an approach to intellectuals into a foundation 
for building a socialist and industrialized China. Before the Great Leap Forward of 
the late 1950s, the leadership had called into question again the value of intellectu-
als to the revolutionary project. Official denunciations of such subjects intensified 
further before the Cultural Revolution scorched the nation.
More concretely, once the intellectual emerged as a classification of people of 
the CCP, the imagined subject became a fulcrum of revolutionary practice, a basis 
on which the symbolic power and administrative capability of the party devel-
oped. On the ideological front, political rhetoric, narratives, and theories based 
on Marxist thought flourished. The party elites promoted the political and moral 
superiority of Chinese Communism and of themselves by tirelessly discrediting 
worldviews and ideas they attributed to “intellectuals” as well as the lifestyles 
and behavior of such persons. Their critiques took on traditional philosophies 
and all kinds of contemporary political thought (e.g., constitutionalism, social 
democracy, anarchism) and political and organizational practices traceable to 
these ideas. The critiques also targeted what Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci 
called “common sense,” or popular values and beliefs considered antithetical to 
the socialist revolution.43 On the organizational front, an ever-growing system 
of governing approaches and programs as well as administrative measures and 
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routines appeared, because of the constant effort of the elites to dictate the involve-
ment of “intellectuals” in the revolutionary project. A variety of tasks multiplied 
wherever such subjects were located, especially those related to classification (e.g., 
documentation, investigation, identification), mobilization (e.g., propaganda, 
meetings, networking), reeducation (e.g., study class, self-criticism, evaluation), 
and supervision (e.g., appointment, reporting, discipline).
The extent to which the CCP deployment of the intellectual classification engen-
dered intense ideological and organizational activities is revealed fully in three 
intertwined institutions that emerged before the party seized power and thrived 
afterward: workplace management by party cadres, ideological reeducation, and 
mass surveillance. To the party leadership, the knowledge and skills possessed by 
intellectuals and their enviable status and prestige enabled them to wield influence 
disproportionate to the size of their population, not to mention provide support 
to the exploiting classes and their political representatives. The advantages also 
permitted the intellectuals to move across sectors and space with relative ease, and 
to articulate defense of their beliefs and even challenge the party’s views, policies, 
and measures. Wherever intellectuals clustered under Chinese Communism (e.g., 
schools, publishing houses, research institutes), management by trained party cad-
res was considered vital to maintaining official control and tackling any sabotage 
or subversion of the project. Ideological reeducation emerged as indispensable to 
curbing the negative influence of the “petty-bourgeois” and “bourgeois” habits 
and dispositions of intellectuals. And mass surveillance was ultimately adopted, 
because meticulous investigation, observation, and documentation would reveal 
the strengths and weaknesses of these persons and thus how each one of them 
should be incorporated into the project. Each of the institutions produced pro-
cedures, processes, and posts that shaped authority structures and organizational 
behavior and therefore life under Chinese Communism. Each served to reproduce 
a ruling population of party cadres and a dominated population of intellectuals, 
notwithstanding the fuzzy boundaries between these two types of people.
The CCP deployment of the intellectual classification had another major 
impact on Chinese Communism: it supplied heretofore unavailable rationales and 
vocabulary for those who otherwise occupied different social and physical space 
(e.g., reputed professors, regional officials, company clerks, college students, local 
artists) to develop oppositional collective identities. The ideological, organiza-
tional, and interpersonal minefields that these persons were forced to navigate, or 
their shared experience of how the party defined, degraded, and dominated them, 
created “an objective potentiality of unity.”44 They interpreted their subjugation 
with various kinds of political thinking, besides the values and ideas promoted by 
the party. Some challenged the conduct of the party and its cadres and even the 
direction of the revolutionary project. However short-lived or disparate were the 
protests and however tragic the results, the complaints and grievances as well as 
the proposals and suggestions had a potential audience as broad and dispersed 
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as the extent to which the party had constructed the category of intellectuals. In 
other words, the success of Chinese Communism transformed the treacherous 
intellectuals initially prowling on paper to an ever-growing population of real 
and potential adversaries of the project. For the party elites, the project had to 
be reconstituted repeatedly to stamp out the perfidy. The upheavals of Chinese 
Communism were inseparable from its objectification of the intellectual.
OVERVIEW OF THE B O OK
This book examines the mutual constitution of the intellectual and Chinese 
Communism from the early 1920s to the end of 1964, that is, from the time right 
after the CCP’s founding when the classification was about to appear to the period 
shortly before the Cultural Revolution became the official priority of the revo-
lutionary project. Even with these boundaries, it is impossible to produce any 
exhaustive account of the dynamics, which progressively spread across virtually 
every aspect of political and social life. The following chapters feature critical 
pathways and episodes for grasping how the intellectual was objectified and the 
consequences. This alone requires a multipronged journey that inspects inter alia 
political discourses, revolutionary strategies, rural activities, work arrangements, 
state registrations, organized protests, cinematic productions, and individual con-
duct, thus an analysis that reveals the multiplicity of the elements underlying the 
objectification as well as the breadth and depth of its impact. My account is based 
on many kinds of empirical material, including official declarations of the CCP 
and speeches of its leaders; policy statements, directives, reports, and statistics 
from various offices under the party; articles from newspapers, magazines, and 
specialized journals; films and plays; personal testimonies and biographies; and 
existing scholarly analyses. If the resulting picture makes sense, it is not because 
the thousands of pieces of evidence are uniformly accurate or reliable, as they were 
originally gathered or interpreted by a variety of people under different and some-
times unknown circumstances. Rather, it is because the gestalt recovers a historic 
feature of Chinese Communism, the objectification of the intellectual, the conse-
quences of which for Chinese politics, society, and culture are still visible today, 
almost forty years after the project started to decline.
Put another way, this book illuminates the politics, policies, and practices 
that preceded the abuses during the Cultural Revolution against those who were 
decried as “bourgeois intellectuals” and against those among them who had alleg-
edly morphed into enemies of the people. How that mass movement extended the 
objectification of the intellectual, how the objectification continued to affect the 
constitution of Chinese Communism, and how the classification and the project 
evolved after the Cultural Revolution deserve a separate study.
Two additional caveats before we move on. First, when the intellectual or intel-
lectuals appear in this book, they do not denote any kind of persons that I have 
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in mind. The appearances, instead, demonstrate that the terms have been used in 
multiple ways by the CCP, party authorities, and others and that they have flex-
ible political, moral, and demographic meanings tied to the politics, interests, and 
circumstances in question. Second, my argument that the intellectual and Chinese 
Communism were mutually constitutive does not imply that their impact on each 
another was uniform across space, especially after the CCP gained sovereign con-
trol over China. Not only did the objectification of the intellectual vary spatially, 
but individuals and organizations responded to the objectification with different 
combinations of what symbolic and material resources they could muster. In other 
words, a tapestry of discourse and practice made up the relations between the clas-
sification and the project.
The next chapter describes the origins of the term zhishifenzi and its appropria-
tion by early CCP elites as a classification of people, or “a revolution in the order 
of words” that preceded “revolutions in the order of things.”45 My focus is on a 
poignant debate about “the intellectual class” (zhishi jieji) that permeated urban 
political and literary circles during the early 1920s, at the height of the iconoclasm 
of the May Fourth movement, which redefined the relations of Chinese society 
with tradition and knowledge and hence politics and revolution. The debate cen-
tered on an alleged lack of political courage and moral integrity of members of 
the intellectual class, and its need to overcome such weaknesses if China was to 
be saved from foreign occupation, economic backwardness, and other crises. The 
ontological presuppositions, ethical assessments, and political sentiments under-
lying the powerful condemnations of the intellectual class would become founda-
tions on which the CCP elites conceptualized the intellectual. I show that after 
the Communist International sponsored by the Soviet Union intervened in the 
building of the party in China, party leaders, who had participated in the debate 
and considered themselves part of the intellectual class, reinterpreted their rela-
tions to this population with a Marxian analysis. The intellectual class reappeared 
as the main ideological enemy of Chinese Communism, while the leaders began 
to depict themselves as proletarian revolutionaries. The leaders therefore cre-
ated an insurmountable division under the project, which they believed reflected 
their relations to other educated people in Chinese society. Soon to be labeled 
“intellectuals,” these people would become the Other, and thus threats to Chinese 
Communism.
Chapter 3 takes up another critical juncture in the mutual constitution of the 
intellectual and Chinese Communism, The setting is Yan’an, the rural town in 
northwestern China in which Mao and others set up the headquarters of the CCP 
during the late 1930s, and from which the party would wage its eventually success-
ful takeover of China. Armed with the modified view that intellectuals, though 
untrustworthy, were vital to the revolutionary project because of their possession 
of knowledge and skills, the leadership recruited a heterogeneous population of 
educated people to the remote town. Ensuing establishment of organizations, 
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allocation of responsibilities, and division of space produced and reproduced 
social boundaries that bolstered the official representation of the newcomers as 
a distinct population of “intellectuals.” Workplace management by party cadres, 
ideological reeducation, and mass surveillance intensified and reinforced the por-
trayal of these intellectuals as inferior class subjects. I stress that negotiations of 
the intellectual classification flourished. Educated party leaders and cadres, not to 
mention the newcomers, altered their conduct and appearance to minimize real 
or potential stigmatization. Their responses not only strengthened the leadership’s 
critical representation of intellectuals, but also muddied the boundaries of this 
objectified category of people.
In chapter 4 I illustrate the spread of the intellectual classification in post-
revolutionary Shanghai and the concurrent extension of the symbolic power 
and administrative capacity of the newly found socialist state. My focus is an 
early 1950s official drive to register “unemployed intellectuals.” The state wanted 
to reduce unemployment through harnessing unused knowledge and skills for 
national reconstruction purposes. The registration drive involved the establish-
ment of procedures and mechanisms for identifying candidates; the formation of 
local offices and training of resident teams for promotional, documentation, and 
other tasks; and the mobilization of hundreds of trade and other associations for 
certification assistance, as well as placement efforts. The event became a collective 
exercise through which the state educated officials and ordinary people alike about 
its Marxian understanding of the intellectual and how to use the classification in 
everyday life. Meanwhile, recent discriminatory recruitments and dismissals by 
the state and other job losses pushed former government officials and military 
officers, as well as others with dubious records from the official perspective, to 
sign up as unemployed intellectuals in large numbers, sometimes even through 
fraudulent means. As the drive proceeded, official surveillance intensified within 
the city and across the establishments required to offer work or training to unem-
ployed intellectuals. For the state, the registration became another instance that 
confirmed intellectuals as being unreliable subjects when it came to advancing 
Chinese Communism.
Chapter 5 focuses on the central role that the postrevolutionary workplace 
played in objectifying the intellectual and the kinds of social relations and orga-
nizational culture that arose as a result. The locus of analysis is the secondary 
education profession in Shanghai, a sector officially declared to be filled with unre-
liable intellectuals. Progressively intense domination of the sector by CCP cadres, 
through their official assignment to authoritative positions, created an abundance 
of textual, verbal, and physical cues that cast the faculty and staff precisely as 
such subjects. The domination enabled the state to collect sufficient information 
to distinguish each of the “intellectuals” as a class subject with particular habits 
and dispositions as well as separate them into different subtypes for political and 
professional purposes. I stress that the cadres, most of whom were educated and 
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thus had been treated by colleagues and superiors as intellectuals, exploited their 
authority to promote themselves as proletarian revolutionaries. They shifted the 
moral burden that they had carried under Chinese Communism to those whom 
they now ruled. Their treatment of ordinary faculty and staff members involved 
disrespect, disregard, and distancing. For the faculty and staff, learning their own 
class identity dictated by the state entailed fear and anxiety, resentment and resis-
tance, and maneuvers to cope with threats to their safety and livelihood. At the 
workplace level, I conclude, the mutual constitution of the intellectual and Chinese 
Communism led to schisms, grievances, and political disaffection.
Tensions and frictions stemming from the objectification of the intellec-
tual under Chinese Communism came to a head during the 1957 Rectification 
Campaign, when the state urged professors, scientists, and others whom it 
regarded as intellectuals to evaluate its performance. Chapter 6 discusses three 
major perspectives on the intellectual and Chinese Communism that appeared, 
each of which confirms that they had become inseparable in political thinking 
inside and outside the state. Scholars, writers, and other social notables saw a fal-
tering socialist project because of the ineptitude of party cadres. They built upon 
the Confucian literati tradition, defined themselves as intellectuals, and called for 
a broad involvement of people like themselves in decision-making. College stu-
dents used Marxist and other political ideas to launch an even more intense attack 
against Chinese Communism. They disputed the official view of class struggle and 
socialist development in China, and wanted intellectuals like themselves to lead 
the revolutionary project away from CCP domination. When the state hit back, it 
proposed to expand the pool of usable and reliable intellectuals by supporting the 
work of professional workers and the training of college students and by deepening 
their ideological reeducation. The state wanted to extend professional education 
to select factory workers and other manual laborers and turn them into engineers 
and other kinds of skilled personnel. I emphasize that none of these efforts to rede-
fine the intellectual and Chinese Communism became reality. The project, instead, 
took a dark turn when the party denigrated the intellectual further.
Chapter 7 uses theater and cinema production to illustrate the mutual constitu-
tion of the intellectual and Chinese Communism from 1958 to 1964. To legitimize 
the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), the ambitious production campaign that dis-
carded scientific reason and rational planning, the state widened its attack against 
“intellectuals” and their knowledge and skills. The making of the famous musical 
drama Third Sister Liu reveals how the state mobilized local populations to cre-
ate, circulate, and consume degrading ideas and images about intellectuals, all the 
while relying on educated party cadres, scriptwriters, and other professional work-
ers to organize and promote the anti-intellectual propaganda. Behind the musi-
cal’s success, the rift between the cadres and the professional workers deepened, as 
the former used the production to attack the latter even though both populations 
were denigrated by it. I then turn to the notable film Early Spring in February to 
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highlight the struggle to redefine the intellectual after the Leap’s failure. While 
some party leaders mobilized people, symbols, and other resources to depict edu-
cated people in a favorable light, or invested positive meanings into the intellectual 
classification, others did the opposite. The film challenged the Leap’s disparage-
ment of intellectuals, but became a target of attack nationwide. Although audience 
reactions suggest that college students and others were confused by the official 
denunciations, another layer of virulent ideas, idioms, and imageries about intel-
lectuals saturated the nation shortly before the onset of the Cultural Revolution.
The final chapter summarizes the mutual constitution of the intellectual and 
Chinese Communism from the 1920s to the early 1960s. I emphasize that my 
analytical approach can help recover critical but underexamined aspects of social 
classification, bureaucratic organization, political division, social interaction, and 
individual calculus under the CCP. Fascinating questions about the classification 
and the revolutionary project await exploration. In the second half of the chapter, 
I turn to the highly visible legacy of the objectification of the intellectual under 
Chinese Communism. Since the 1980s, the CCP has abandoned Marxism and 
Leninism, but not their functional and structural assumptions about intellectuals. 
Official propaganda and governance continue to objectify the intellectual into a 
usable subject and a political threat for China’s development as well as to revive 
the kinds of divisions among educated people that first emerged under Chinese 
Communism. Meanwhile, political relaxation and economic liberalization have 
prompted scholars and writers to reinterpret the intellectual in various ways. The 
twenty-first-century Chinese struggle to define the intellectual, unlike those in 
other countries, permeates state and society.
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The Birth of a Classification
From what I have seen, China’s intellectual class has the worst ethos for mu-
tual cooperation and solidarity. In moral terms, China’s intellectual class is 
significantly less ethical than other classes. For example, [its members are] 
maliciously competitive, brashly frivolous, and divisively opinionated; [they] 
spread rumors and falsehoods, shamelessly ingratiate themselves with the 
powerful, and so on.
—Zhang Dongsun, “Zhongguo zhishi jieji de jiefang yu gaizao,” 
1919
Since the 1989 Tiananmen protest movement, writings on intellectuals have flour-
ished in China, thanks to the relaxation of official control over media and academia 
designed to diffuse state-society tensions caused by the bloodshed, imprisonments, 
and executions that followed the mass demonstration. The interlocutors include 
well-known figures such as the late Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo (1955–
2017), the prolific intellectual historian Xu Jilin (1957–), and the exiled critics Wei 
Jingsheng (1950–) and Yu Jie (1973–).1 The diversity of viewpoints is unprecedented 
in the history of the PRC. The accounts reflect and reinforce existing analytical 
approaches and narratives in the transnational literature on China’s intellectuals. 
Some studies trace the conduct and dispositions of contemporary intellectuals and 
their pedigrees to the imperial traditions of state service and dissent of literati. 
These works show the political, ideological, and moral choices that intellectuals 
made from the late nineteenth century to the 1949 Chinese Communist takeover 
amid crises of political transition, war, and revolution. Some accounts describe the 
mistreatment of intellectuals under the PRC as well as their courage, complicity, 
and resilience. Others identify challenges that intellectuals have faced in a global-
ized China, or how markets and professions under authoritarian governance have 
influenced the outlook and behavior of such persons, especially in relation to the 
state and matters of social justice.
Any definition of a social category, Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star tell 
us, privileges one point of view while marginalizing others.2 The narrative of the 
endless struggle of China’s intellectuals, both as a population and as individuals, 
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obscures how zhishifenzi (the intellectual) became a primary classification of 
people and a central concern of rulers, organizations, and ordinary people under 
Chinese Communism. This chapter begins our pursuit of an alternative history of 
the intellectual in contemporary China. I start with the relations, processes, and 
discourses that nurtured the intellectual classification, conditions comparable to 
what happened with les intellectuels in France during the Dreyfus affair. During 
the famous May Fourth movement of the late 1910s and the early 1920s, a debate 
on zhishi jieji (the intellectual class) permeated literary and political circles, when 
zhishifenzi had yet to enter the vernacular. Participants denounced members of 
the intellectual class for failing the nation because of their lack of political cour-
age and moral integrity. The assumptions, arguments, and analyses that saturated 
the debate would influence how the CCP elites defined, denounced, and deployed 
“intellectuals.” While the debate raged on, the party was founded under the tute-
lage of the Third International (Comintern), sponsored by the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union. Early CCP leaders, many of whom had been active in the debate 
and considered themselves part of the intellectual class, condemned this popula-
tion further with a Marxist-Leninist understanding of class, party, and revolution. 
Former friends and allies reappeared with the rest of the educated population as 
ideological enemies of the incipient communist movement, while the leaders pro-
moted themselves as China’s only genuine socialist revolutionaries.
Recovering this embryonic link between the intellectual and Chinese 
Communism is critical to understanding their entwined development thereafter. 
For one thing, key conceptual boundaries that would make up the influential clas-
sification existed before its deployment by the CCP, associated with a social cate-
gory known within elite circles as the intellectual class. The latter was apprehended 
through the prism of core cultural values, beliefs, and ideals as well as the themes, 
imagery, and language of a stirring protest movement. That is, conventional and 
contemporary ethos formed the foundation of the emerging classification as much 
as the foreign ideology of class struggle to be accepted and promoted by the party. 
Equally significant is how the early party leaders shifted from identifying with to 
separating themselves from the intellectual class. Similar maneuvers by large num-
bers of educated party cadres with respect to what they saw as intellectuals would 
spread across the revolutionary project and muddle the local identification of such 
subjects. To borrow a biting remark from Foucault, this chapter helps us “catch 
a glimpse of the radiant city” of Yan’an, Beijing, and elsewhere after the CCP as 
ruling power declared what intellectuals were and what their role would be under 
Chinese Communism, hence the narratives and organizations as well as interests, 
interactions, and experiences to be found in those places.3
I begin with an etymology of zhishifenzi. Transnational research often traces 
the term to its Russian and French counterparts, or интеллигенция (intelligen-
tsia) and intellectuels.4 Such analyses are highly problematic. First, they present 
little linguistic evidence on how the Russian or the French expression morphed 
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into zhishifenzi. Second, they draw from the terms their positive connotations 
such as the public-mindedness, civic engagement, or moral integrity of the indi-
viduals, but tend to ignore the negative meanings associated with the words from 
early on, for example, political conceit, effeminacy, or intellectual deformity.5 Most 
importantly, the analyses gloss over why the May Fourth generation of scholars, 
writers, and students consistently used zhishi jieji (the intellectual class) to denote 
the educated when writing about Chinese or other societies, and why a broad 
shift to zhishifenzi (intellectuals or, literally, members of the educated popula-
tion) occurred subsequently. I indicate that during the May Fourth movement, the 
conventional ordering of the Chinese people into jieji (class) categories and the 
popularity of European socialist ideologies based on analysis of relations between 
economic classes inflected the reception of foreign concepts of intellectuals. This 
is evidenced by the Chinese rendering of интеллигенция, intellectuels, and intel-
lectuals into zhishi jieji, even by political parties. Within the CCP, improved under-
standing of the Marxist concept of class would guide the leaders to replace zhishi 
jieji with zhishifenzi. By the early 1930s, the party had largely removed implications 
that educated people constitute a class of their own from its official language.
I then describe the May Fourth understanding of the intellectual class in 
Chinese society. Research on the historic movement has long laid out its immense 
impact on science, literature, romance, political thought, and other areas of life.6 
The scholarship explains how scholars, writers, and college students responded to 
national crises of foreign encroachment, warlord rule, economic backwardness, 
and stagnant traditions. Yet, insufficient attention has been paid to how these edu-
cated people, including those who would join the CCP, portrayed themselves or 
the broader educated population. Their representations of the intellectual class 
feature three major characterizations: (1) it is a politically and morally objection-
able population; (2) its members must overcome their weaknesses and lead work-
ers, peasants, and others in the struggle to overcome grave national problems of 
culture, inequality, and governance; and (3) some, especially the younger, mem-
bers of the intellectual class are better equipped ethically and intellectually than 
other members to lead the struggle.
It is well known that under Comintern influence early CCP leaders adopted 
an unprecedented revolutionary identity built upon Marx’s and Lenin’s teachings 
on class struggle, labor movements, and the dictatorship of the proletariat.7 In the 
third section of this chapter, I show that the leaders combined those teachings 
with May Fourth ideas in novel ways and introduced a radical separation between 
themselves and the intellectual class. The leaders accepted the May Fourth vision 
that the intellectual class was a distinct population, but rejected the idea that it 
could develop into a benign and decisive transformative force. They portrayed the 
intellectual class, instead, as a tool of oppression of the ruling classes. At the same 
time, the leaders declared themselves genuine socialist revolutionaries as well as 
part of the working class, that is, proletarian leaders of the struggle to end class 
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exploitation in Chinese society. In other words, the intellectual class became the 
Other in the discourse of the budding party, an enemy of Chinese Communism.
FROM “ THE INTELLECTUAL CL ASS”  TO 
“INTELLECTUALS”
Compared to its Russian, French, and English counterparts, the term zhishifenzi 
appeared relatively late. As far as we know, it first appeared in print in November 
1920 in the inaugural issue of The Communist (Gongchandang), in an article 
titled “Commemorating the Third Anniversary of the Founding of the Russian 
Communist Government.” That periodical, the first in China devoted to promot-
ing communism, was published by a small group of communists in Shanghai 
with help from Grigori Voitinsky (1893–1953), head of the Far East Bureau of 
the Comintern. Zhishifenzi does not seem to have appeared in print again until 
January 1925, when the Chinese Communist Youth League issued its “Resolution 
on Propaganda and Agitation” during its third national congress.8 From then on, 
the expression appeared repeatedly in the resolutions, instructions, reports, and 
meeting records of the CCP and its sponsored periodicals. Existing research does 
not offer any evidence on how zhishifenzi was used outside communist circles 
after the mid-1920s. Judging from the term’s appearance in the titles of published 
essays—at least four times in four different periodicals between 1928 and 1932 and 
another eight times in seven different periodicals during 1933 and 1934—scholars, 
writers, and students apparently had started to use the term with some regularity 
by the early 1930s.9
Wang Zengjin, who has studied the etymology of zhishifenzi, shows that it is 
not a direct translation of any Russian, French, or English word. The term, instead, 
was derived from another Chinese term, zhishi jieji, which political parties, schol-
ars, and others used during the May Fourth era to denote the educated population 
in China and elsewhere.10 Zhishi jieji is what Lydia Liu calls a “return graphic loan,” 
that is, a classical Chinese character compound used by the Japanese to trans-
late a modern European word and then reintroduced into the Chinese language.11 
These linguistic loans were very common during the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries because of intellectual traffic between China and Japan, facili-
tated especially by the return of thousands of Japanese-educated college students 
to China.12 The Japanese expression in question is chishiki kaikyū (the intellectual 
class), a translation of the Russian word интеллигенция (intelligentsia). Japanese 
sociologists, socialists, and Marxists used chishiki kaikyū regularly from 1919 
onward.13 In China zhishi jieji had appeared in print before the 1919 May Fourth 
protest erupted in Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities. The flowering of literary and 
political journals that followed greatly increased the term’s circulation. Between 
1920 and 1925, more than thirty periodical and newspaper articles had “the intel-
lectual class” in China or elsewhere as the central subject of their investigation.14 
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Both the CCP and the more influential Nationalist Party of China (Zhongguo 
guomindang) depicted the intellectual class as a core section of the Chinese popu-
lation in their reports, resolutions, and instructions.15 The term’s popularity is con-
firmed by a 1929 translation of a book review from the U.S.-based Saturday Review 
of Literature by the influential magazine Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi) pub-
lished in Shanghai. The book is the English translation of Julien Benda’s notable La 
Trahison des Clercs (The Treason of the Intellectuals), in which he lamented what 
he perceived as the abandonment by philosophers, artists, and others of truth, 
reason, and universal morality in favor of political passions and gains. Eastern 
Miscellany translated “intellectuals” as zhishi jieji, even though the editors were 
probably as aware as anyone of the less-used expression, zhishifenzi.16
A combination of structural, political, and cultural reasons explains why polit-
ical parties, writers, and others used “the intellectual class” to denote educated 
populations in China and abroad during the early twentieth century. The aboli-
tion of the traditional civil service examinations and the demise of imperial rule 
shortly after the turn of the century, together with the rapid expansion of urban 
commerce and industry and the emergence of modern education as well as aca-
demic and professional disciplines, had broad linguistic impact. The changes ren-
dered usage of shi (literati), wenren (literati or scholars), dushu ren (men of letters), 
and other traditional designations for educated people problematic. These terms, 
which signal the knowledge of Confucian scriptures of the individuals and their 
common aspiration to public office, did not capture the growing diversity of train-
ing, careers, and ambitions of the educated population. Occupation-based clas-
sifications reflecting differentiation within this population were widespread by the 
late teens. The notion of “occupational circles” (jie), another return graphic loan, 
was used regularly in periodicals and newspapers to separate educated personnel 
into sections such as “academic circles” (xueshu jie), “intellectual circles” (sixiang 
jie), “journalistic circles” (xinwen jie), and “medical circles” (yixue jie). Within 
this fluid linguistic environment, “the intellectual class” became an umbrella term 
denoting the constantly evolving population of educated people. At the same time, 
the term serves to link members of this population in the cultural terms of ances-
try, status, and dispositions to previous generations of Confucian literati, as some 
of the educated continued to study the scriptures and aspire to public office.17
The use of “the intellectual class” within literary and political circles, further-
more, reflected their members’ exploration of European socialist thought and, 
especially, class analyses. Introduced into China largely via Japan since the last years 
of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), different strands of socialist thinking, including 
social anarchism, guild socialism, trade unionism, syndicalism, social democracy, 
Marxism, Bolshevism, and state socialism, received immense attention after the 
May Fourth demonstrations, so much so that a “belief in socialism of one variety 
or another was shared across the political spectrum.”18 Underlying the enthusiasm 
were momentous developments inside and outside China. For two decades before 
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the demonstrations, political groups, scholars, and students in China had been 
using their newly acquired knowledge of Western values and institutions to con-
demn traditional ethics, political thought, and institutions as sources of national 
weakness in the emerging global system of nations and political competition.19 
Urban industrialization had created new kinds of economic inequality and labor 
militancy that heightened such discontent with the status quo.20 Globally, World 
War I (1914–1918) was often seen as evidence of the bankruptcy of Western capital-
ism with its brutal pursuit of land, profit, and power. By contrast, the 1917 Russian 
Revolution, though still poorly understood within China and elsewhere, was per-
ceived positively and even as a harbinger of further revolutions.21 Within these 
contexts, participants in the May Fourth and later debates on reform and revolu-
tion adopted the language of class from European socialist thought to articulate 
their views—and argued about the role of the intellectual class in the struggle.
Most significantly, the use of “the intellectual class” by political parties, schol-
ars, and students suggests that they drew on conventional approaches to social 
classification in their attempts to understand recent changes in Chinese society. 
According to Philip Kuhn, jieji (class) had been a common term since the Han 
Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). It denotes “a system of social ranks,” “fixed degrees 
on a continuum,” a rank within “an accepted hierarchy of status distinctions,” or 
“the gradient that separated social groups,” before acquiring during the twenti-
eth century meanings related to ownership in production based on European 
socialist thought.22 China’s political and cultural elites had long combined jieji 
with other terms to order the general population into functional and hierarchical 
categories, often with ethical and political implications. A prominent example is 
the Confucian division of “commoners” into classes of scholars, peasants, arti-
sans, and merchants according to “the social usefulness of their vocations” and a 
remaining class of “mean” people that included butchers, actors, and others who 
were classified as such “by the virtue of the stigma of [their] occupational or inher-
ited status.”23 When political groups, writers, and others mentioned the intellec-
tual class or, for that matter, any other category of jieji (especially during the May 
Fourth era), conventional ideas about the social rank and status of the population 
and the vocation of its members came into play. This was probably the case, too, 
when “the intellectual class” was used in analyses of European and other societ-
ies, that is, traditional Chinese values partly informed the analysis of those other 
educated populations.
Put differently, during the May Fourth era, scholars, students, activists, and 
others considered the intellectual class a population integral to Chinese society. 
For centuries, China had reproduced a population of literati with distinct status, 
offices, and careers. After the demise of the civil service examination, modern sec-
ondary and higher education and their privileged graduates embodied this elitist 
legacy. In 1915, for example, China had over four hundred million people, but only 
90,000 secondary school students.24 Competing descriptions of the membership 
The Birth of a Classification    27
of the intellectual class existed, to be sure, even among early CCP leaders, because 
of the diverse culture of intellectual and political inquiry of the period. Zhang 
Guotao (1897–1979), one of the party’s founders, included secondary school stu-
dents in the intellectual class, but not existing officials, whom he assigned to a 
“scholar-official” (shidafu) class because he believed that their characters were as 
offensive as those of officials under imperial rule.25 Qu Qiubai (1899–1935), another 
party leader, was also critical of existing officials. However, he placed such indi-
viduals in an old intellectual class that he characterized as a legacy of ruinous 
imperial rule, and classified schoolteachers and students and others who worked 
in banks, railroad companies, and other modern establishments as part of a some-
what promising new intellectual class.26 Other definitions of the intellectual class 
persisted outside Communist circles, often with emphasis on modern education. 
The 1930 Wang Yunwu Dictionary defines the intellectual class as “ordinary indi-
viduals who have received higher education.”27 Jiang Tingfu (1895–1965), a reputed 
history professor at the famous Tsinghua University, included in the category only 
professionals and experts whose work produces or disseminates knowledge.28 In 
1940, another authoritative dictionary, Sea of Words (Cihai), provided two defini-
tions of the intellectual class: people who have received education and those who 
use such training to earn their livelihoods, such as schoolteachers and lawyers.29 
Neither of the dictionaries has an entry for zhishifenzi, even though it had already 
become a key element in the Marxian schema of social classification of the CCP 
as well as a term used regularly by some scholars and writers outside the party.30
How, then, did the obscure expression zhishifenzi (intellectuals) replace the 
term zhishi jieji (the intellectual class) so thoroughly that the latter was “hardly 
used at all” after 1949, as Wang Zengjin has correctly pointed out? Wang con-
tends that the switch was purely a linguistic matter, resolved well before the CCP 
takeover of China. Zhishifenzi, he indicates, is composed of two common terms, 
zhishi (knowledge) and fenzi (part of a population or social type). Compared to 
the collective noun zhishi jieji, zhishifenzi is a “substantially more flexible and use-
ful” term that denotes the educated both as a population and as individuals.31 But 
Wang’s argument is only partly correct. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, schol-
ars and writers used “the intellectual class” as a singular as well as a plural noun, 
referring at times to “this intellectual class” or the “middle-age intellectual classes,” 
or observing that “most of the intellectual classes want reform.”32 The context in 
which the expression was used (rather than its literal meaning) dictated whether 
the intellectual class was presented as a social type, a collection of individuals, or 
a specific person. Furthermore, zhishi jieji did not fade away after the term zhishi-
fenzi appeared, especially within literary circles. “On the Intellectual Class,” “On 
the Intellectual Class and Its Responsibilities,” and “On the Fate of the Intellectual 
Class” are titles of periodical pieces published shortly before the 1949 revolution.33 
By then, some of the authors who wrote about the intellectual class, such as the 
famous sociologist and anthropologist Fei Xiaotong (1910–2005), were certainly 
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aware of the Marxist concept of class and its emphasis on ownership in produc-
tion. Nonetheless, they continued to use “the intellectual class” in their writings 
because the term captures the traditional belief that Chinese society is composed 
of categories of people with different functions and levels of prestige. As the next 
section suggests, the term also expressed ethical expectations toward the educated 
and their involvement in public affairs based on convention.
The rise of zhishifenzi in the Chinese language must be understood together 
with the growth of Chinese Communism, or how the CCP elites increasingly 
deployed the Marxist concept of class to promote their revolutionary cause. When 
the party was founded in 1921, its leaders had been using “the intellectual class” as 
others did to refer to educated people. As Comintern influence deepened within 
the party, the leaders drew on Marxism and Leninism to discuss class struggle and 
revolution and continued to refer to “the intellectual class,” even though accord-
ing to Marxist-Leninist thinking educated people do not constitute an indepen-
dent social class comparable to the capitalists, the workers, or others. An editor 
of major CCP periodicals, Qu Qiubai was arguably most knowledgeable about 
Marxism and Leninism among the party leaders. He spent years studying Russian 
language and philosophy and had written from Moscow about Lenin, the October 
Revolution, and the Soviet Union. Yet, in a January 1923 essay, he used a mixture of 
traditional and Marxian language to refer to educated people in China as an intel-
lectual class. In the article, zhishi jieji appeared with “the peasant class,” “the labor 
class,” and “the merchant class” as a primary population that made up Chinese 
society. Also, he presented zhishi jieji as involved in the class struggle between 
capitalists and workers, but not a social class by itself. Though its members ben-
efited from “surplus labor of production and the blood and sweat of the working 
masses,” “the intellectual class,” Qu wrote, “will under no circumstances become 
the main body (zhuti) of society.” Instead, the politicians and other “high-class 
hooligans” within the social category would serve as functionaries of warlords 
and magnates, while the most progressive secondary and college students would 
become a “sharp weapon of the laboring masses.”34 For Qu, as for other party lead-
ers, the intellectual class was situated between the exploiting and the exploited 
classes, with its members adopting various political stances.
By the early 1930s, the CCP elites had mostly switched to “intellectuals” in 
their essays, announcements, instructions, and reports.35 Zhishifenzi had become 
a primary classification of people under Chinese Communism. No evidence is 
available to suggest that the elites deliberated on the terminological change. In all 
likelihood, as the revolutionary project progressed, its leaders recognized that “the 
intellectual class” was conceptually and semantically incompatible with Marxist-
Leninist teachings on class struggle. Institutional transformations within the party 
reinforced the switch to “intellectuals.” Two stages of change are noteworthy. 
Before the Nationalist Party ended its cooperation in the United Front with the 
CCP in 1927 by massacring CCP members and followers, a development that the 
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next chapter will address, the CCP elites had largely overcome the “regionalist atti-
tudes and study-society modes of operation” that had originally given shape to the 
Chinese Communist movement.36 Leninist emphasis on central institutions and 
formal procedures as well as internal discipline, supervision, and political educa-
tion had become part of the CCP’s operational norms, even as the party elites 
continued to deploy traditional values, mores, and practices to approach and orga-
nize workers, peasants, and others. After the massacre, some leaders blamed the 
bloodshed on what they saw as the leadership’s lack of understanding of Marxist-
Leninist teachings on class, party, and revolution. The organization of the CCP 
shifted further toward a centralized leadership, an official party line, and use of 
Marxism and Leninism as a legitimation and communication device.37 “The intel-
lectual class” did not surface again as a significant term in the party’s lexicon there-
after. When the CCP seized power in 1949, “the intellectual class” was cast into the 
dustbin of history practically by fiat.38
THE INTELLECTUAL CL ASS IN MAY FOURTH 
IMAGINATIONS
For May Fourth activists, the intellectual class not only objectively existed—it was 
an objectionable population. The activists extended a trope from the late Qing, 
when China had begun to experiment with new modes of governance to cope 
with defeats in the global system of nations and competition. Notable scholars 
such as Yan Fu (1854–1921) and Zhang Taiyan (1869–1936) had protested that 
literati in general and scholar-officials in particular lacked functional knowledge 
and moral fortitude for nation-building purposes, going so far as to label these 
people as greedy, useless, and dim-witted.39 Attacks against the civil service exam-
ination and the literati legacy had been commonplace during the New Culture 
Movement (1915–1919), as scholars and students took aim at the Confucian tradi-
tion. Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), who would become the first general secretary of 
the CCP, founded the influential Youth Magazine (Qingnian zazhi) in 1915, which 
was renamed later as New Youth (Xin qingnian). He derided the traditional literati 
as “thugs in the middle level of society” who had kept China economically and 
politically weak as well as morally and legally underdeveloped, damaging China 
as much as the politicians at the top and the ruffians at the bottom.40 Writing for 
the magazine, Fu Sinian (1896–1950), a student at the elite Peking University who 
would head the campus briefly almost three decades later, criticized China’s schol-
ars and scholarship ruthlessly. He ridiculed the scholars as superficial, stubborn, 
conceited, and narrow-minded, and the scholarship as unsystematic, lifeless, and 
backward-looking as well as useless compared with Western learning.41
As May Fourth activists established new periodicals to promote their political 
and other beliefs and interests, denunciations of the intellectual class multiplied. 
As before, the reproaches drew on assumptions about power and authority as well 
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as relations of the individual to society in the Confucian tradition, even as that 
tradition was vehemently attacked. Many of the complaints, in effect, charged that 
educated people had abandoned the “perennial ideal of ‘public-mindedness,’ ”42 
or the moral sensibilities and duties of the individual that were conventionally 
understood to furnish society with its coherence and harmony. Educated people 
had entered officialdom in large numbers to seek fame, wealth, and power. Their 
hypocrisy, lack of political courage, and apathy toward other sectors of the general 
population were the major reasons behind centuries of illiberal autocratic rule, or 
the reproduction of a political system that had condemned China to economic 
weakness and cultural backwardness compared with Japan and Western societies. 
After tracing the “sins” of “the intellectual class” since the Warring States Period 
(475–221 BCE), or how literati from his view had gained and exercised political 
authority at the expense of ordinary people as well as the structural and moral 
integrity of Chinese society, one writer observed that the existing intellectual 
class resembled its predecessors in the self-serving involvement of its members in 
national politics.
To satisfy their lust for political power, members of the modern intellectual class 
 create parties and associations and recruit lackeys and underlings. To allay their 
 anger at political defeat, they make use of warlords and instigate wars. To attract 
 lapdogs, they talk loudly about political thought and study theories and doctrines. 
To maintain their own dignity, they fabricate mass opinions and use higher instruc-
tions as excuses. The truth is that they engage in such conduct because they long to 
have a spacious Western-style house, a fast and roomy car, and a beautiful and tender 
concubine.  . . . Whatever others regard as poisoning the thinking of the Chinese 
people or tearing families apart, they consider necessary means for the pursuit of 
their own joy, pleasure, lust, and indulgence.43
Outside officialdom too, the activists declared, members of the intellectual class 
used their training and knowledge for personal gain. Beneath this complaint lies 
the moral ideal of education in the Confucian tradition, or the belief that the pur-
pose of education is to foster self-discipline and self-realization as well as moral 
responsibility and humane government.44 For one critic, few now pursued higher 
education for moral enlightenment or even intellectual purposes, still less the edifi-
cation of the nation. Those who studied abroad went there to “have fun” for two or 
three years, purchased a sham doctorate or other degree, and flaunted themselves 
as scholars after returning home. Some stitched various foreign ideas and passages 
together into “absolutely nonsensical” books and proclaimed themselves leaders of 
particular schools of thought. Some rushed out pitifully incompetent translations 
of emerging theories and academic thought and haughtily presented themselves 
as experts.45 Modern education at other levels, another critic concluded, failed to 
have ennobling impact on the intellectual class. Although secondary and college 
students endlessly professed devotion to honorable causes, after graduation they 
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turned their attention immediately to landing a well-paying job, so much so that 
they resorted to flattery, factionalism, and other dubious and even offensive tactics 
to achieve their goal.46 The dramatic plea of another critic encapsulates the harsh-
ness of the complaints: “Oh, the intellectual class of China, there is no hiding the 
fact that your character is bankrupt. Your scandalous decline in society is almost 
beyond redemption. Please start afresh now in earnest if you want to rescue your-
selves from perpetual infamy.”47
Despite their denunciations of the intellectual class, May Fourth activists 
insisted that its members be on the frontline of national improvement, through 
promoting science and democracy, spearheading social movements, and pursuing 
other changes. This paradoxical confidence in the moral, intellectual, and organi-
zational leadership of the intellectual class also embodied major elements of con-
ventional and contemporary thinking, three of which are noteworthy. First, the 
confidence reflected an enduring moral-cum-analytical assumption in Chinese 
society. The Confucian tradition stresses the role of the educated in governance, 
their moral capacity and responsibility for criticizing mistaken policies and priori-
ties as well as inappropriate attitudes and conduct, but dismisses similar potentials 
in other populations. As Jerome Grieder observes, in the vast Confucian literature 
“the peasant never spoke—save in the inchoate cries of rebellion.”48 Second, the 
recent New Culture Movement was built upon the same assumption about the 
transformative potential of educated people. Scholar and student activists sought 
reform of the Chinese language and culture, of scholarship and education, and of 
other matters by rallying support from the broader educated population. Third, 
even though the activists increasingly used socialist thought to promote aware-
ness of the importance of labor and sought to learn from labor movements, they 
never imagined relinquishing social or political authority to industrial workers or 
other laborers. Even those who were drawn to social anarchism, the socialist phi-
losophy most opposed to social hierarchy, did not share the anti-intellectualism 
of European or Russian anarchism.49 May Fourth activists believed in their own 
civilizing missions, that is, they considered themselves responsible for assisting 
peasants, workers, and others and ultimately helping China to escape from feudal 
traditions, backward beliefs, warlord rule, and therefore foreign domination.
The following examples reveal the extent of agreement about leadership among 
May Fourth activists. Zheng Zhenduo (1898–1958), a college student who would 
become a famous writer, championed a transition to socialism through social 
movements. But he was skeptical that Chinese workers and laborers would initiate, 
or make sacrifices for, any kinds of movement, let alone provide leadership com-
parable to what their counterparts had done in Russia or Europe: “When we trav-
eled ten li [about 3 miles] outside the city of Beijing to see the original inhabitants 
there, we found them virtually living in ancient times! Their extent of stubborn-
ness and foolishness reaches the highest level. They do not have any basic knowl-
edge of science, not to mention the new tides of intellectual thought!”50 He ended 
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another essay with this English remark, an obvious plea to the intellectual class: 
“Go, seek the [people], live among them, educate them, and with their confidence, 
if you want to get rid of the yoke of autocracy.”51 Qu Qiubai had written about 
social movements, too. While he was optimistic about popular participation, his 
understanding of leadership qualities, which apparently included academic train-
ing, limited the leaders to those who were members of the intellectual class. The 
leader, he stated, must have “a positive sense of skepticism, unflappable dedication 
to research, and unwavering perseverance. He doubts, and therefore he is awak-
ened [to the crises of Chinese society]. The outcome of his research can engender 
new beliefs and worldviews; his determination can smash old habits and institu-
tions.”52 Philosopher Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973), shortly before switching from 
supporting socialism in China to favoring capitalist development, insisted that 
positive change must start with the intellectual class. Its members must undergo 
“character reform” to replace selfishness and other flaws with moral standards that 
nurture sacrifices to nation-building. They must organize social movements and 
teach, support, and join forces with ordinary people, to such an extent that the 
intellectual class and the laboring class would become indistinguishable.53
A central question for May Fourth activists was, therefore, who among the 
objectionable intellectual class were reliable allies? Or, who within officialdom, 
academia, or other occupational circles could help build broad-based movements 
to improve Chinese society? Given their ideological differences and oscillations, 
the activists disagreed on the transformation the country needed. Whatever soli-
darity they had exhibited during the 1919 demonstrations dissipated as political 
rivalry and animosity emerged. Yet, the activists shared an ethical-cum-intellectual 
criterion, at least on paper, for separating friends from foes or potential allies from 
potential enemies—that is, whether the person had achieved juewu (awakening). 
Juewu is an age-old concept with Buddhist roots. It means a realization of truth 
which leads one to act properly henceforth, giving up unseemly thinking, habits, 
and ways of life. Chen Duxiu and other proponents of the New Culture Movement 
had invoked juewu as well as zijue (self-awakening) widely to muster support for 
their proposed literary and other reforms.54 Across May Fourth writings, juewu 
carried multiple layers of meanings of what educated people should do. First and 
foremost, they must recognize the moral failings plaguing the intellectual class 
and overcome those marring their own outlook and behavior. On this foundation, 
they must awaken others, including workers and peasants, to the sorry state of 
knowledge, ethics, and governance in China. Equally important, they must study 
the history, structure, and dynamics of Chinese society as means to identify the 
proper tactics and procedures to improve its conditions. Wang Guangqi (1892–
1936), who was influenced by anarchist and socialist ideologies, believed that the 
awakened within the intellectual class and other classes should join forces to pro-
duce a classless society.55 Yun Daiying (1895–1931), who would join the CCP soon 
after its establishment, suggested that the awakened must cooperate with their 
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foreign counterparts to combat imperialism, a problem that May Fourth activists 
regarded as foundational to China’s political and economic difficulties.56
Chen Chengze (1885–1922), an editor of newspapers and periodicals who had 
studied in Japan, disagreed with Chen Duxiu and others who wanted to reorganize 
China on the basis of anarchism, communism, or other radical political thought. 
Nonetheless, he shared the juewu approach to societal change, or the need for a 
mass awakening led by educated people who would critically interrogate their own 
thinking and conduct so as to articulate proper courses for national transforma-
tion. The problems of China, he asserted, did not stem from hostilities involving 
social classes or ethnic groups, as they did in Western societies. Instead, the endur-
ing lack of such conflicts in China had fostered “a focus on the self.” This ethic had 
stunted the development of community, civic, and other forms of associational 
life, as well as of a national consciousness, and therefore had served to perpetuate 
imperial rule. Meanwhile, members of the intellectual class had exploited lofty 
rhetoric and other tactics to empower and enrich themselves. For Chen, any radi-
cal political ventures such as social revolution, universal suffrage, or decentraliza-
tion of authority to provinces would merely redistribute power among those who 
already held it. The “truly awakened” would not promote grandiose solutions, reck-
less boycotts, or other forms of rebellion based on manipulation of the passions 
and naïveté of the populace. Instead, they would patiently develop self-governance 
and basic literacy across towns and villages as well as nurture labor cooperatives 
and other grassroots organizations as means to foster a popular agreement on the 
national developmental path.57
It is a well-known fact that May Fourth activists carried forward the New 
Culture Movement’s adulation of young people as political subjects.58 For our pur-
poses, this adulation represents another feature in May Fourth interpretations of 
the intellectual class: that educated young people were imagined as sharing an 
unparalleled potential to achieve self-awakening and thus deserving a leading role 
in reform or revolution. While this belief challenged the understanding of moral 
and intellectual authority in the Confucian tradition, it reproduced the traditional 
vision of government as an elite-led, moral enterprise built upon an authorita-
tive set of knowledge. The activists replaced Confucian scholarship with Western 
political and intellectual approaches, and scholar-officials with young people 
who could adopt such approaches to reorganize Chinese society. To be sure, edu-
cated young people were accorded such a privileged position within May Fourth 
thinking, not simply because modern education was believed to have potential to 
empower them to challenge conventions or even because some had already led 
attacks on such conventions. A persistent fear existed among May Fourth activ-
ists, as among New Culture advocates, that educated young people would slide 
into self-interested pursuits of power, wealth, and fame, replicating the behavior 
of older members of the intellectual class and previous generations of scholar-
officials. Faith was therefore necessary to sustain the view that educated young 
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people would somehow play a leading moral, intellectual, and organizational role 
in the transformation of Chinese society.
Early CCP leaders were among the May Fourth activists who assumed that edu-
cated young people represented the hope of Chinese society. As late as December 
1922, or eighteen months after the CCP was founded, for example, Zhang Guotao, 
used the recent political and labor protests in urban areas to argue that “an 
extremely small number of members of the intellectual class” had proven to have 
“the strongest revolutionary spirit.” He proceeded to describe what he considered 
another disappointing trend unfolding among secondary and college students, or 
their self-absorption.
As of now, their revolutionary ardor is dimming day by day. Although they have 
made many tactical mistakes, the biggest reason is that they have been taken in by 
the hubbub of the movement in the cultural sector. What are the outcomes there? 
Students who have announced that they would fight for national salvation are pushed 
back into the classroom. Leaders of the May Fourth movement are learning to pub-
lish poetry and essays in the vernacular, going abroad to study, researching literature, 
philosophy, and science in the university, and applying themselves to reorganization 
of national cultural heritage.59
Rather than giving up on such young people, Zhang reaffirmed their place in revo-
lutionary change. Peasants everywhere were waiting to be led out of the “fiery 
pit” of bandit and warlord oppression, and workers in foreign-owned plants were 
“ceaselessly calling for help.” The role of educated young people, he stated, was to 
go to “every village, every factory, every shop, every school, and every site” to pro-
mote and organize the occupants for revolutionary struggle.
THE INTELLECTUAL CL ASS AS THE OTHER
In July 1921, slightly two years after the May Fourth demonstrations, the CCP 
was formally established in Shanghai. As Arif Dirlik observed, Grigori Voitinsky 
of the Comintern, who had arrived in China in March 1920, was crucial to the 
party’s founding. He met with Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao (1888–1927), and others 
who would become the party’s initial leaders. He discussed with them Marxism 
and class struggle, the October Revolution and the Soviet Union, and the Russian 
Communist Party and the Comintern. His visit stimulated the formation of 
Marxist study societies in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other places. Until 
then, Chinese reception of Marxism, mainly via translations of Japanese works, 
had been lukewarm. Writings on Marxism formed but a small part of the rapidly 
growing modern political literature. They emphasized Marx’s economic interpre-
tation of history and society, focusing on such concepts as wage labor, surplus 
value, and capital accumulation, but not his theory that class struggle drives his-
tory forward. The theory, which conjures up sectional interests and rivalries as 
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well as violent revolution followed by the imposition of new forms of state con-
trol, squared poorly with influential proposals to improve China through reforms 
of education, politics, and cultural tradition, not to mention the deep-rooted 
Confucian emphasis on social harmony. Furthermore, class struggle as a prin-
ciple contradicted the ideal of mutual aid and social unity underlying the anarchist 
vision of revolution, a main medium through which Chen, Li, and others had 
encountered Marxism.60
Under the Comintern’s ideological, organizational, and sometimes economic 
support, the Marxist study societies promoted communism by translating and 
publishing Marxist works, launching periodicals, and growing their own mem-
bership. Chen Duxiu and others used their improved knowledge of Marxism and 
Leninism to engage fellow May Fourth activists in debate on issues of reform and 
revolution. Their goal was to elevate Marxism-Leninism above competing political 
thoughts, establish it as the theoretical orthodoxy among the increasing number 
of CCP members, and convert other socialists to their cause. The tone of their 
engagement with other socialists ranged from courteous to acrimonious, depend-
ing on the ideas and proposals under interrogation.61 All the while, Chen and other 
party leaders could not but confront the question of the intellectual class within a 
new theoretical context—one dominated by Marxism and Leninism and markedly 
different from the Confucian and other intellectual traditions that had previously 
informed understandings of the social category. How did the intellectual class fit 
into the Marxist schema of classes? What were the relations of the intellectual class 
to class struggle and revolution? What roles would members of the class play after 
the revolution? And what were their own relations to the intellectual class as lead-
ers of the CCP?
It is necessary to outline Marx’s and Lenin’s understandings of the relations of 
intellectuals to class, party, and revolution before explaining how the early CCP 
leaders combined these foreign views with May Fourth thinking to redefine the 
intellectual class as a social type. For Marx, classes are based on relations to the 
ownership of land, raw material, machines, and other resources shared by individ-
uals in the realm of production.62 Class struggle, which determines the acceptable 
form of ownership in a society, and classes are, respectively, the driving force and 
agents of social change. Marx provided no more than “brief and fugitive glosses” 
about the educated as a people in his class analysis.63 Yet, what he said, did, and 
signaled had major influence on the organization of communist movements. His 
early work and political activities suggest that the transition of a workers’ move-
ment to a socialist revolution must be guided by the right kind of learned people, 
or those who understand the dynamics of class struggle in the society in question. 
These communists, as he and Friedrich Engels pronounced in the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, “have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletar-
iat as a whole”—but they do “have over the great mass of the proletariat the advan-
tage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate 
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general results of the proletarian movement.”64 In addition, Marx stressed labor 
vigilance against other kinds of leaders involved in labor movements, “regard-
ing his [ideological] adversary either as misguided by erroneous principles or as 
unscrupulously using principles as a disguise for selfish interests.”65 In particular, 
Marx believed, anarchists and other socialists “often wrought considerable havoc” 
on such movements, and writers, schoolteachers, and students usually lacked “rev-
olutionary steadfastness.” Even with proper intellectual guidance, socialist revolu-
tions would occur only when workers have “gradually and painfully attained the 
level of class consciousness and political organization necessary for the overthrow 
of capitalism.”66
In his reformulation of the relations of intellectuals to class, party, and rev-
olution, Lenin resolved some of the gaps, tensions, and ambiguities in Marx’s 
vision, but only to enunciate “a remarkable heresy.”67 Building on Marx’s class 
analysis, Lenin indicated that professors, clerical staff, civil servants, technicians, 
and other white-collar workers form an intelligentsia between the exploiting 
and the exploited classes in capitalist societies. This heterogeneous population 
of educated people generally do not own any means of production or engage in 
direct production like workers or peasants. Instead, they obtain their livelihoods 
through services to the major classes and occupy the interstices of the class struc-
ture. Like Marx, Lenin believed that the working class is the agent of the socialist 
revolution. Unlike Marx, however, he insisted that workers on their own would 
develop at best “trade-union consciousness,” or a bargaining and compromis-
ing mentality that impedes insurgent movements, not to mention the socialist 
revolution. Revolutionary thinking must be brought to labor by a revolutionary 
socialist intelligentsia, or communists who are trained in theory and organiza-
tion and who serve as “the ultimate guardian” of the revolution. The commu-
nist party is the tool for uniting “revolutionaries from the intelligentsia” with 
“worker-revolutionaries.”68
Furthermore, Lenin extended Marx’s attack against the politics and dispo-
sitions of other educated people. Not only did Lenin disparage the kinds of 
reform or revolution proposed by ideological competitors; he persistently criti-
cized ordinary educated people.69 His famous work One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back was written in 1904, amid his struggle with fellow Russian revolutionar-
ies to define the organization of the communist party. The following passage 
captures the crux of his attack. His view anticipated the extensive role that the 
party assumed in controlling and reforming educated people after the October 
Revolution of 1917.
No one will venture to deny that the intelligentsia, as a special stratum of modern cap-
italist society, is characterized, by and large, precisely by individualism and incapacity 
for discipline and organization. . . . This, incidentally, is a feature which unfavorably 
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distinguishes this social stratum from the proletariat; it is one of the reasons for the 
flabbiness and instability of the intellectual, which the proletariat so often feels; and 
this trait of the intelligentsia is intimately bound up with its customary mode of life, 
its mode of earning a livelihood, which in a great many respects approximates to the 
petty-bourgeois mode of existence (working in isolation or in very small groups, etc.). 
(Italics in the original)70
For all intents and purposes, Chen Duxiu and other early CCP leaders had 
switched from a May Fourth to a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the intellec-
tual class by mid-1923, as the party began to develop into a unified revolutionary 
organization guided by Marxist-Leninist teachings and a strong central leader-
ship.71 New Youth, which had become the party’s flagship organ, did not publish 
any debate, if it occurred, on the change in perspective, nor did other forums 
used by the leaders to explain class struggle, worker revolutions, and the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat. In a December 1923 article in which Chen analyzed 
China’s class structure, he repeated much of Lenin’s perspective on the intelli-
gentsia. The article offered support to the Comintern policy that the CCP should 
form a united front with veteran revolutionary Sun Yatsen (1866–1925) and his 
Nationalist Party (Guomindang). The Comintern wanted the CCP to work with 
the Guomindang to wage a “democratic revolution” to remove foreign powers 
and warlords from China before mobilizing the working class in a socialist revo-
lution. “The intellectual class,” Chen wrote, was not “an independent class” with 
any “firm and unshakable” political character. It was part of the petty bourgeoisie 
with members furnishing ideological and other forms of support to landlords, 
capitalists, and warlords. Because the intellectual class lacked “any specific eco-
nomic foundation” of its own, or the material basis for a shared class conscious-
ness, some of the members supported reform and even revolution, but only with 
transient “romantic” sentiments and “fantasies of [themselves] transcending class 
interests.” Nonetheless, Chen stated, members of the intellectual class would be 
critical for bringing together different sections of Chinese society in the dem-
ocratic revolution.72 A year later, Peng Shuzhi (1895–1983), who had worked at 
the Moscow branch of the CCP, pulled no punches on attacking “the intellectual 
class,” stating that 80 to 90 percent of its members in capitalist societies were 
“lapdogs” of the bourgeoisie. Some of the members of China’s intellectual class 
had “passionately” supported revolutionary efforts and even joined revolutionary 
organizations, only because these people shared “the psychology of the bourgeoi-
sie” but had seen their financial and professional goals harmed by warlord rule 
and foreign occupation and themselves snubbed, insulted, and abused by these 
powers.73
In other words, CCP leaders extended the May Fourth attack on the intel-
lectual class with a Marxist-Leninist logic. Their reinterpretation challenged the 
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May Fourth assumption that the intellectual class constituted a relatively autono-
mous political force and that some of its members, especially secondary and col-
lege students, could turn over a new leaf and lead the effort to transform Chinese 
society. The intellectual class, the leaders concluded, had never been and would 
not be a decisive transformative force. Under this interpretation, former friends 
and allies who had been promoting anarchism and other forms of socialism reap-
peared alongside ordinary educated people as part of a global “intellectual class” 
serving class exploitation and capitalist political rule in one way or another. For 
example, the June 1923 special “Comintern” issue of New Youth carried lengthy 
articles about capital-labor relations and the international communist move-
ment as well as the October Revolution and the Soviet Union. In two successive 
pieces, Qu Qiubai restated Lenin’s and the Comintern’s attacks on the “opportun-
ism,” “economism,” and “revisionism” of various socialist ideas and programs to 
discredit their Chinese advocates. The ideas of Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein, 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Henri de Saint-Simon, and other famous European and 
Russian socialists and anarchists, and the activities of various European socialist 
parties, were criticized for paying little attention to the history of class struggle, the 
nature of capitalist development, and the revolutionary role of the working class. 
Qu observed that members of “the intellectual class” who were active in politics 
dreamed up “an ideal society” and sought to “implement the details” of organi-
zation that they had supplied. Anarchism was idealistic and utopian because its 
“petty-bourgeois” proponents failed to understand the workings of politics. Social 
democrats who pursued “class cooperation” were part of the “bourgeois” enemy.74 
Labor unions, another article suggests, had become “the last refuge of the inter-
national bourgeoisie” and the tools of so-called reformers “to divide the working 
class” and disrupt communist movements.75 Vanished from these writings was the 
courteousness that the CCP leaders had recently extended to some of their ideo-
logical rivals.
For CCP leaders, their reinterpretation of the intellectual class as a harmful 
force for the socialist revolution could not but raise questions about their own 
identities. Were they still part of the intellectual class, as they had previously sug-
gested? Were they the revolutionary intellectuals who Lenin had stated must lead 
communist movements? What were their relations to Chinese labor? The leaders 
did not offer any definitive answers in the contemporary reports, analyses, and 
declarations published by the party. Enough evidence, however, suggests that they 
were assembling for themselves a novel revolutionary identity while attacking the 
intellectual class with a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Their vehement attacks on 
the politics and behavior of the intellectual class imply that they no longer iden-
tified themselves as part of that population. By their own definition, the intel-
lectual class was at best an unreliable ally of the working class and an enemy at 
worst. But the CCP leaders, unlike Lenin, did not claim with any consistency that 
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the educated persons leading communist movements constituted the genuinely 
revolutionary section of the intelligentsia. The leaders reserved the phrase “revolu-
tionary members of the intellectual class” (geming de zhishi jieji) and “revolution-
ary intellectuals” (geming de zhishifenzi) mainly for other educated people within 
the party or working with it, while implying that these persons, though useful to 
Chinese Communism, harbored petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois values and 
habits that were obstacles to its success.76
The CCP leaders also did not seem to share Lenin’s pessimism or even their 
own previous doubts about the revolutionary potential of labor. Their writings, 
instead, echoed Marx’s view on how the socialist revolution would be won. Qu 
Qiubai proclaimed that the proletarians worldwide would combine their “basic 
inclination toward collectivism and organization with ability to use social science” 
(that is, Marxism) to arrive at “general and practical principles” to be deployed 
against capitalist rule.77 Peng Shuzhi contended that Chinese workers could pro-
vide leadership to the democratic revolution that the CCP would sponsor together 
with the Guomindang before launching their own socialist revolution.78 We argu-
ably see a glimpse of how the leaders wanted to define their relations to the intel-
lectual class, the working class, and the socialist revolution as early as July 1922. 
“We the proletariat have our own class interests,” the Declaration of the Second 
Congress of the CCP announced, and the purpose of the CCP “is to organize the 
proletariat.”79 Although the party leaders had relatively privileged backgrounds 
and educations, they wanted to be recognized first and foremost as part of the 
proletariat and organizers of its revolution.
Put differently, early CCP leaders creatively combined Marxism, Leninism, 
and the May Fourth discourse in an effort to turn themselves into members-cum-
leaders of the proletariat. From Marxism, the leaders accepted the idea of the 
revolutionary proletariat, that is, that the working class would ultimately acquire 
the class consciousness and organizational skills needed for the socialist revolu-
tion. From Leninism, they borrowed the notion of the revolutionary vanguard, 
which expects the communist party and its leadership to guide, nurture, and orga-
nize the proletariat. From May Fourth discourse, they adopted self-awakening as 
a prerequisite for leadership in social change. They asserted that through their 
studies of politics and society they alone recognized the revolutionary path that 
China must follow to save itself from foreign encroachment, economic backward-
ness, political tyranny, and other crises, all considered to be consequences of class 
exploitation and its recent intensification under capitalist development in Chinese 
society. The leaders suggested that they constituted an entirely different category 
of educated people compared with scholars, officials, college students, and other 
educated people. They were the proletarians and communists at the forefront of 
the Chinese socialist revolution; the others were members of the intellectual class, 
working against it in one way or another. The political ideas and ideologies of the 
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intellectual class, however sensible they might seem, had to be defeated along with 
its members. For the CCP leadership, the intellectual class became the Other, an 
enemy of Chinese Communism.
The fact that millions of Chinese categorized themselves and were classified by the 
state as intellectuals during the Mao era has nothing to do with the changes that 
occurred in China’s division of labor after the 1949 revolution. Like other indus-
trializing countries, China saw a diversification of work, skills, and careers, which 
should have impeded the assignment of this heterogeneous population to the 
same social category. Nor would the wide range of political or other conducts of 
these persons justify giving them a common classification. The transformation of 
these people into “intellectuals,” instead, reflected an interplay of discourse, rela-
tions, and processes across Chinese society, in which the CCP played the domi-
nant role. So objectified was the intellectual that many would deprecate themselves 
as embodiments of the inferior, greedy, and conceited subject as alleged by the 
state; so objectified that others protested as, with, and for intellectuals when there 
were opportunities to speak out; so objectified that otherwise perfectly ordinary 
people were hounded to death and even murdered publicly during the Cultural 
Revolution, because of an imagined fear that the scourge of intellectuals would 
incurably infect Chinese Communism.
A quarter of a century before the CCP takeover of China, key conceptual 
boundaries of the intellectual as an official classification of people had already 
emerged, associated with a social category known as the intellectual class. For the 
party leadership, the intellectual class was a diverse yet distinct population consist-
ing of professors, writers, lawyers, schoolteachers, college students, and other edu-
cated personnel. Members of this population shared an intermediate position in 
the class structure, or one that fostered outlooks, ideas, and habits at odds with the 
objectives of Chinese Communism. Still, recent secondary school graduates and 
other young people in the population had potential for political and moral self-
improvement. These boundaries that defined the intellectual class did not come 
only from Marxism and Leninism, the internationally influential revolutionary 
thought borrowed by the leadership to interpret and publicize the plight of a belea-
guered nation; more importantly, the boundaries reflected deep-rooted cultural 
assumptions as well as powerful contemporary thinking about Chinese society, 
or ideas restated in innumerable accounts and analyses during the May Fourth 
movement. The Marxian synthesis of various political thoughts by the party lead-
ers led them to assert a distinction between themselves and the intellectual class, 
even though the leaders were as educated and privileged as those whom they criti-
cized. These conceptual boundaries would become foundations of revolutionary 
policy and later sovereign classification.
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Formed at the cusp of the May Fourth movement, the Comintern’s interven-
tion in Chinese politics, and the CCP reception of Marxist-Leninist ideology, zhi-
shifenzi as a social classification had an inauspicious beginning compared to the 
Russian интеллигенция or the French intellectuel. The Russian radicals, liberals, 
and conservatives who popularized the term интеллигенция during the late nine-
teenth century were undoubtedly divided about its meanings. The word neverthe-
less had multiple positive connotations: intellectual enlightenment, service to the 
people, superior moral qualities, and intelligence.80 Likewise, the much-debated 
French term featured honor, civic engagement, incorruptibility, and moral author-
ity in its original meanings. In comparison, “the intellectual class,” the predeces-
sor of zhishifenzi, was rife with negative imports such as selfishness, greed, vanity, 
timidity, and lack of discipline, reproaches against educated people popularized 
by the May Fourth movement. When the CCP leadership reinterpreted and fur-
ther denigrated the intellectual class within a Marxist-Leninist framework of class, 
party, and revolution, the discourse conjured up the perception of a tenacious 
enemy of Chinese Communism—the intellectuals.
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Visible Subjects in the Countryside
But after I became a revolutionary and lived with workers and peasants and 
with soldiers of the revolutionary army . . . I came to feel that compared with 
the workers and peasants the unremoulded intellectuals were not clean and 
that, in the last analysis, the workers and peasants were the cleanest people 
and, even though their hands were soiled and their feet smeared with cow-
dung, they were really cleaner than the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intel-
lectuals. That is what is meant by a change in feelings, a change from one 
class to another. If our writers and artists who came from the intelligentsia 
want their works to be well received by the masses, they must change and 
remould their thinking and their feelings. Without such a change, without 
such remoulding, they can do nothing well and will be misfits.
—Mao Zedong, Speech at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and 
Art, 1942
In the spring of 1939 Ma Hong (1920–2007), a 19-year-old, had an unforgettable 
encounter with Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Ma had recently joined the CCP and was 
studying at the Academy of Marxist-Leninist Studies (Malie xueyuan) in Yan’an, an 
impoverished town in northwestern China that housed the party’s headquarters. 
The academy was set up across a row of loess caves traditionally used as residential 
spaces. It offered what the party leadership regarded as advanced theoretical and 
political training to select party members, some of whom had studied in college 
and even overseas. The training was designed to prepare these individuals for posi-
tions of authority in the ongoing project of Chinese Communism. On the day of 
the encounter, Mao arrived at the academy and paid a surprise visit to an office 
shared by students, before giving a prescheduled speech. As the party secretary of 
his class, Ma answered the Chairman’s questions about life on campus on behalf 
of delighted classmates. Mao then inquired about the teenager’s own background. 
Ma replied humbly that he had little formal education and therefore his “level of 
knowledge and learning” was not high, but he also stressed that he relished every 
opportunity to read books and newspapers. Before leaving the office, Mao excited 
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the students further with three pieces of impromptu calligraphy that validated 
their sacrifices and hard work. One of these said “Reading books is good.”1
Based on his daughter’s recollection, Ma came from a poor rural family but 
was not as undereducated as he indicated to the Chairman. Although his parents 
did not send him to school, Ma learned to read and write so painlessly as a child 
that a village elder paid him to compile the local lineage genealogy and the county 
gazetteer. Ma used the earnings to attend primary school and completed it in fewer 
than four years. The school principal promptly hired this outstanding graduate 
to teach senior primary classes. Fellow villagers also considered Ma exception-
ally talented, and helped him land a desk job in a railway management bureau 
when he was only 16.2 His precociousness would be recognized at the academy. 
Within two years of meeting Mao, Ma penned two important essays that laid out 
the rationale, approach, and procedure for investigating and evaluating the class 
backgrounds and characters of party cadres, a political as well as literary achieve-
ment, and all the more so for a young adult.3 In front of Mao, however, Ma did not 
disclose that he was a superior writer or former schoolteacher, or other parts of his 
life that would have led the Chairman to see him as an “intellectual.” Ma’s reaction 
suggests that he understood something unconventional, and even paradoxical, 
about the self-presentation of educated people under Chinese Communism. He 
recognized this, moreover, before others did during the famous 1942 Yan’an Forum 
on Literature and Art, when Mao put down “bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intel-
lectuals,” all the while flaunting his own literary achievement, aesthetic sensitivity, 
and cultural refinement within the rural town.
This chapter describes the rise of a visible, sizable, and stigmatized population 
of “intellectuals” and the spread of the institutions of workplace management by 
party cadres, ideological reeducation, and mass surveillance in Yan’an. Within the 
town, Chinese Communism enjoyed much-needed stability and security after a 
tumultuous decade marked by growth, fragmentation, and carnage. The party 
elites accepted Mao’s leadership, however grudgingly, and his view that the revo-
lutionary project badly needed the knowledge and skills obtainable from intel-
lectuals even though they were untrustworthy. Exploiting the symbolic power 
and mobilization skills it had acquired since the early 1920s, the party recruited 
large numbers of relatively educated people to Yan’an. Ensuing partition of space, 
division of work, establishment of organizations, and other social and physical 
rearrangements engendered an abundance of signs and cues that reinforced the 
top-down representation of the newcomers as intellectuals. The virtually coercive 
Rectification Campaign (Zhengfeng yundong) (1942–1944) initiated by Mao nor-
malized not only his view of the intellectual but also the triple institutions men-
tioned above. Instruction, confession, supervision, and other measures turned the 
newcomers and others into usable but unreliable “intellectuals” as well as subjects 
of education and objects of knowledge. Like the emergence of the intellectual clas-
sification shortly after the CCP’s founding and the subsequent normalization of 
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the classification under the PRC, the pursuit of revolutionary authority by edu-
cated party members over others who were also educated was a central dynamic 
in the spread of the marker.
Although the above objectification of the intellectual occurred in a relatively 
enclosed environment organized by the CCP, it was not a uniform, clear-cut, 
or one-sided process. Conceptually, the party’s definition of intellectuals—as a 
population of educated people situated between the exploiting and the exploited 
classes—did not capture the complexity of the backgrounds of the educated per-
sons involved, some of whom could be counted as “workers,” “poor peasants,” or 
other kinds of subject under the official schema of classes. Organizationally, the 
hierarchical structure underlying workplace management by party cadres, ideo-
logical reeducation, mass surveillance, and other political control mechanisms 
had uneven impact on social identity, as they tended to spotlight some as “intel-
lectuals” more than others who were equally, if not more, educated. Furthermore, 
because the intellectual classification was laden with both positive and negative 
meanings, individual negotiations aimed at gaining authority and opportunity 
within the revolutionary town and minimizing stigmatization, like the conduct of 
Mao and Ma noted above, created ambiguity and difficulty in everyday identifica-
tion. In fact, as Chinese Communism expanded, it furnished pathways for upper 
mobility, job change, and training that enabled many educated persons to improve 
their revolutionary images as well as to benefit from their academic or professional 
training. The revolutionary project created a myriad of social and ideological posi-
tions and stimulated multiple strategies of “position-taking”4 that muddied the 
boundaries of the population of intellectuals that emerged.
This chapter therefore gives an account of the evolution of the intellectual from 
a classification of people in early CCP ideology to the social identity of tens of 
thousands of revolutionaries in a rural society. It illustrates the corresponding 
transformation of institutions, organizations, and relations as well as personal val-
ues, interests, and habits. Research on Yan’an has studied how the party leadership 
set up the town and the implications for Chinese Communism after 1949.5 It has 
explored how writers, artists, and others as intellectuals supported or challenged 
the project.6 Only limited attention has been given to arguably the most important 
achievement of Chinese Communism up till then, that is, what Pierre Bourdieu 
and Loic Wacquant would call the “collective work of construction of social real-
ity” led by the party.7 Yan’an revolutionaries came to apprehend, characterize, and 
distinguish themselves and others as class subjects based on a Marxian view.8 At 
the heart of this success, this chapter reveals, was the top-down deployment of 
the “intellectual” marker. The deployment engendered discourses, processes, and 
relations that profoundly affected the revolutionary project in terms of structure 
and culture.
Before revisiting life in revolutionary Yan’an, it is necessary to summarize the 
relations between the intellectual and Chinese Communism from the early 1920s 
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to mid-1930s. I draw attention to four interrelated trends, each of which would 
intensify within the headquarters town. First, the intellectual became a major clas-
sification used by the CCP to categorize and differentiate its members and sup-
porters. Second, party leaders and cadres applied the classification to individuals 
from a variety of backgrounds, but represented themselves differently even if they 
were well educated. Third, the classification served as a powerful weapon in power 
struggles within the party leadership and at lower levels of the party. Fourth, pro-
vision of education and employment by the party and its mechanisms of control 
turned otherwise perfectly ordinary people into politically unreliable “intellectu-
als.” The classification was therefore a foundation of organization, identity, and 
schism under Chinese Communism before it entered the Yan’an phase.
PRELUDE TO YAN’AN
Despite their denunciations of the character and politics of the educated, Chen 
Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, and other early CCP leaders believed that these persons were 
critical to the development of Chinese Communism. The belief reflected the 
background of the leaders as May Fourth activists seeking to modernize China 
as well as their subsequent embrace of the Bolshevik model of socialist develop-
ment, which stressed use of professional knowledge and skills, especially after the 
socialist revolution. The Comintern-brokered United Front (1923–1927) between 
the Guomindang and the CCP provided the leaders with otherwise unavailable 
opportunities to advance Chinese Communism, with results that further rein-
forced that belief. Thanks to the work of educated men and sometimes women, 
CCP influence expanded quickly nationwide, albeit under a dominant partner 
with no interest in a proletarian revolution. CCP leaders and cadres developed and 
maintained labor unions and other supportive associations as well as orchestrated 
and assisted in labor strikes and other protests in Shanghai, Wuhan, Guangzhou, 
and elsewhere. In rural areas, efforts of propaganda and mobilization led to the 
formation of peasant associations and to social service reforms, rent and interest 
reductions, and the execution of landlords. Some leaders and cadres became sol-
diers and political commissars in the Guomindang military and helped to recruit 
factory workers and peasants into the forces. During the mid-1920s, CCP mem-
bership jumped from under 1,000 in January 1925 to almost 58,000 by April 1927.9
With their increasing exposure to Marxist-Leninist thought, early CCP leaders 
formally categorized some of the people working for Chinese Communism as intel-
lectuals. In December 1926, the party stated that 60, 12, and 27 percent of its mem-
bers in four regions (Hunan, Guangdong, Shanghai, and northern China) were 
respectively “workers, peasants, and intellectuals and others.”10 Four months later, 
the total number of CCP members who were intellectuals reportedly rose above 
11,000.11 The figures on intellectuals or other categories of class subjects reported 
by the party then or later (and many such numbers that appear in this book and 
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elsewhere) do not point to any demographic subgroups that existed objectively 
because of their own characteristics. The figures, instead, were part of the objec-
tifying practice of the CCP and the effort of its elites to remake China according 
to their image. We do not know the people, criteria, or methods involved in the 
compilation of those numbers mentioned above. In fact, the party leadership at 
that same time reported its inability to monitor this nationwide process of clas-
sification.12 From what we have seen in the last chapter, the local party authorities 
probably categorized a wide range of personnel as intellectuals, for example, from 
professors and writers to college students and office clerks. Underlying the num-
bers was an emerging approach to revolutionary organization based on counting 
and identifying class subjects in general and intellectuals in particular.
When the Guomindang ended the United Front in 1927 by slaughtering 
nearly 30,000 CCP members and supporters, the intellectual acquired what 
would become another enduring feature under Chinese Communism: the clas-
sification became a weapon in intraparty struggles. Despite early CCP leaders’ 
anti- intellectual rhetoric, educated people had gained prestige, authority, and 
opportunities within the revolutionary project. What happened at the Peasant 
Movement Institute in Guangzhou is an excellent example. Thanks to the United 
Front, the institute was established in 1924. The CCP elites tightly controlled 
the institute and used it to produce cadres to support the expansion of Chinese 
Communism into rural areas. During the institute’s three years of operation, its 
instructors, successful graduates, and students were mostly educated men.13 After 
the United Front debacle, however, political vitriol against “intellectuals” saturated 
the party, leading to its reorganization as well as an extension of its schema of 
classes across the teetering project. The new leadership, headed by Qu Qiubai at 
first and supported by the Comintern, attacked deposed leader Chen Duxiu and 
other cadres. The leadership alleged that these “petty-bourgeois intellectuals” had 
dominated “virtually every guiding body” of the party.14 “They had not received 
training in Marxism-Leninism, were ignorant of the experiences of the interna-
tional proletarian movements, and stood outside the class struggle of the workers 
and poor peasants. They had not reformed themselves into thorough proletarian 
revolutionaries. On the contrary, they have brought into the party such qualities 
as being politically infirm, incomplete, and irresolute in behavior, unorganized in 
style, together with other habits, temperaments, prejudices and fancies that are 
typical of petty bourgeois revolutionaries” (emphasis added).15 Even before the 
United Front’s collapse, ideological competitions among CCP leaders had been 
common and sometimes intense.16 The denunciations afterward crossed another 
threshold. Defeated colleagues and former allies were cast as political obstacles, 
liabilities, and even enemies of Chinese Communism, or no better and sometimes 
even worse than “intellectuals” outside the party.
When Chinese Communism splintered into rural rebellions shortly thereafter, 
some CCP leaders and cadres acquired opportunities to solidify their claim of 
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transformation to proletarian revolutionaries, the political identity they adopted 
when attacking other educated people inside or outside the party. During the 
United Front, hundreds of cadres had gained experience in rural organization 
and mobilization through the Peasant Movement Institute. They had molded and 
guided peasant interests, established schools and militias, and built layers of peas-
ant associations across different provinces.17 Some of these persons, including Mao 
Zedong, returned to the countryside in Jiangxi Province and elsewhere afterward 
and joined forces with local party cadres, many of whom were former students and 
schoolteachers. Together, they adopted local values, mores, and practices as well 
as peasant dialects, appearance, and habits, and worked with local strongmen and 
militia, bandit gangs, sworn brotherhoods, and ordinary villagers. Their newly 
formed guerilla units defended captured territories, raided landlords’ properties, 
promoted mass uprisings, conducted land reform, and fought against incursions 
from the Guomindang military.18 These party leaders and cadres thus assumed 
roles, personae, and ways of life dramatically different from those of the leaders 
or cadres who stayed in urban areas, not to mention the office workers or the col-
lege and secondary school students that the party disparaged as petty-bourgeois 
intellectuals.
Hung-yok Ip’s study of Peng Pai (1896–1929) and Mao, both of whom were 
from well-to-do families and well educated, reveals further how some CCP leaders 
maneuvered to achieve a proletarian revolutionary identity. Peng and Mao were 
instrumental in developing the rural strategy of Chinese Communism. Although 
they touted the revolutionary capacity of poor peasants and farm hands to be even 
more advanced than that of industrial workers (and thus departed from Marx’s 
and Lenin’s teachings), they did not entrust their insurgencies to the peasantry 
any more than other party leaders handed over the organization of urban struggles 
to workers. Instead, Peng and Mao portrayed the peasantry as “deficient histori-
cal subjects,”19 through exploiting their own symbolic power acquired from revo-
lutionary leadership, urban experience, and privileged education, as well as the 
elitism of the Confucian tradition and the urban biases of May Fourth activism 
and Marxist-Leninist thought. Between Peng and Mao, a litany of problems of the 
peasantry purportedly reflecting values, habits, and ways of life in the countryside 
was identified as obstacles of the revolutionary project, or timidity, superstition, 
passivity, pessimism, ignorance, familism, localism, stubbornness, hedonism, 
incompetence, individualism, and lack of spirit, discipline, and organization.20 
Like the intellectual, the peasant became another figure that party leaders adapted 
from conventional and contemporary discourses and reintroduced into Chinese 
Communism to elevate their own status and authority, or consecrate themselves 
as proletarian revolutionaries.
As the CCP’s rural strategy grew by leaps and bounds during the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, the use of the intellectual classification as a weapon in intraparty 
struggles intensified due to policy change and local conflict. After the United Front 
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debacle, the CCP leadership, as noted earlier, demanded removals of “petty-bour-
geois intellectuals” from positions of authority within the party. The leadership 
wanted “extensive appointment of workers to cadre positions” (ganbu gongren-
hua) and recruitment of workers, poor peasants, and rural laborers into the party.21 
Much research is needed to clarify how local party organizations and members 
deployed the intellectual marker during this period of Chinese Communism. Still, 
trends are observable. Within the leadership, educated men continued to domi-
nate policymaking despite elections of former workers to top positions.22 At lower 
levels, attacks against cadres identified as intellectuals assumed unprecedented 
proportions even as the leadership warned against excessive actions. Educated 
men exploited the ideological shift to drive out political competitors and chal-
lengers, thereby announcing themselves essentially as proletarian revolutionaries. 
Some cadres relied on their touted worker backgrounds to attack colleagues whom 
they accused of being untrustworthy intellectuals. A 1933 CCP report indicates 
that leaders of the rural bases severely restricted the recruitment of “intellectuals” 
into the party.23 Some local recruits who took up teaching responsibilities quickly 
became petty-bourgeois intellectuals in the authorities’ eyes.24 Even former work-
ers and poor peasants who had received schooling organized by the party were 
sometimes put “on the enemy side of the ledger” by the local authorities.25
Across the rural bases, the objectification of the intellectual into embodied 
class subjects ultimately led to life-and-death consequences. During the early 
1930s, fear and paranoia among the leaders about infiltration by Guomindang 
agents and hence decimation by Guomindang forces intermingled with power 
struggles and triggered a wave of brutal campaigns against “counterrevolution-
aries.” Imprisonment, torture, and executions of CCP leaders, cadres, and soldiers 
became commonplace. According to one estimate, the campaigns caused the 
deaths of tens of thousands of people.26 For example, within the Red Army base 
that straddled Hubei, Henan, and Anhui Provinces (the E-Yu-Wan base area) 
and the western Fujian (Minxi) base area, “intellectuals” were designated as tar-
gets of investigation, along with former Guomindang personnel and others who 
had joined the insurgencies. Across the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi (Xiang-E-Gan) 
base area, over 5,000 people, most of them “rich peasants” and “intellectuals,” 
were executed.27 A former revolutionary remembered that in her Fujian loca-
tion, “most of those who were intellectuals in their background were reportedly 
arrested.”28 How the detained, tortured, or executed intellectuals had been identi-
fied in any of the bases remains unclear. Another former revolutionary recalled 
that “anyone with a pen clipped on the shirt would be considered an intellectual 
and could face persecution; it was worse for those who wore glasses.”29 She prob-
ably described not so much the fate of the educated party leaders on the site, 
but what occurred at the rank-and-file level, in which former schoolteachers and 
secondary school students and even some with a few years of formal education 
became targets of abuse.
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As fatal and other assaults raged across the rural rebel movements, their growth 
drew often unsuspecting people into the CCP category of intellectuals. Besides 
expanding the local Red Army forces and training their members, party leaders 
sought to develop industry, commerce, and education as well as art, finance, and 
medicine in the base areas as means to increase the legitimacy and influence of 
their insurgency. However fragile were the successes of these efforts, they turned 
many into technicians, artists, journalists, schoolteachers, and so on—or person-
nel describable as intellectuals from the party’s perspective. What happened within 
the Jiangxi base led by Mao at one point is instructive. A multilevel system of 
classes, schools, and institutes emerged. Establishments designated as universities 
(e.g., the Red Army University and the Soviet University) enrolled military and 
administrative cadres for political and theoretical training. Thousands attended 
teacher-training classes and courses in finance, nursing, commerce, and drama 
and then served in those areas. Primary schools, evening schools, and newspaper 
reading classes offered basic education to children and adults. One estimate put 
the number of primary school teachers across fourteen counties at 2,535. As well, 
some rebels took over factories and maintained transportation and communica-
tion systems, printing presses, roads, and bridges. Others wrote for newspapers 
and journals; produced dramas, music, and folksongs; and published books on 
medicine, law, politics, and other topics.30 These and other similar efforts at orga-
nization created a pool of revolutionaries who were classifiable by superiors and 
colleagues and even by themselves as intellectuals.
In sum, although the intellectual had become a major classification of people 
under Chinese Communism by the mid-1930s, who was recognized locally as 
an intellectual was not always obvious. Occupation and education, the principal 
criteria for distinguishing intellectuals expressed in CCP ideology, were impor-
tant but not decisive factors. Having been a peasant or worker, or having author-
ity within the party, did not always exempt one from the dubious marker. The 
identification was contextual rather than rule-based, shifting with relations of 
domination, organizational development, and changes in personal circumstances. 
Equally important, top-down deployment of the classification led to specific pat-
terns of revolutionary authority, organization, and violence, most prominent of 
which were the self-consecration of some of the educated rebels as proletarian 
revolutionaries and their denunciation, exclusion, and even persecution of other 
educated people as treacherous intellectuals. These ideological and organizational 
trends would converge in Yan’an—and propel Chinese Communism and its objec-
tification of the intellectual to new heights.
OBJECTIFYING ORGANIZ ATION OF A TOWN
Located in Shaanxi Province, Yan’an was a poor and remote town with roughly 
3,000 people before CCP leaders established their headquarters there.31 When the 
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leaders arrived in Yan’an in early 1937, Chinese Communism had already under-
gone important changes in response to a decade of internal turmoil and external 
aggression. First, the deadly purges that threatened leader safety and damaged 
revolutionary morale had been successfully halted; persuasion with moderate 
coercion, instead, had emerged as the primary means to handle intraparty con-
flict.32 Second, the Red Army forces had been rebuilt with nearby peasant support 
after their devastating Long March (1934–1935) from central to northwest China 
to escape annihilation by the Guomindang military. Third, thanks to his military 
prowess and political skills, Mao had risen to the top of the CCP with a precari-
ous hold on the position. Most important for our purposes, the leadership had 
adjusted its stance on intellectuals, even though they were still considered flawed 
in political and moral terms. Mao subsequently articulated the position with the 
utmost clarity in a 1939 conference of senior party cadres in Yan’an. “The [Chinese 
Communist] revolution will not triumph without revolutionary intellectuals . . . 
Our army must take in large numbers of such intellectuals. We must convince 
worker-peasant cadres to accept and not be intimidated by them. Without the help 
of revolutionary intellectuals, peasants and workers will not improve their skills or 
knowledge. And we will not be able to rule the nation, the party, or the military. 
Our government and party offices as well as mass movements must also be set up 
to attract revolutionary intellectuals.”33
The CCP’s revised approach to intellectuals was consistent with what Lenin 
promoted before as well as after the October Revolution in Russia, that is, that the 
socialist revolution and, even more so, the building of a modern socialist soci-
ety required the active participation of intellectuals.34 The party’s entrance into 
the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), or resistance against the Japanese invasion of 
China, reinforced the policy change, as the war would become the primary chan-
nel through which the leadership promoted Chinese Communism to a national 
audience and, in particular, the educated. The new united front that the CCP 
established with the Guomindang because of the war also facilitated the execution 
of the revised approach. The political cooperation enabled the CCP to maintain 
control over Yan’an and the broader Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia (Shaan-Gan-Ning) 
base area as well as to conduct limited but meaningful political activities in 
Guomindang areas.
The CCP used its networks of members and supporters, military offices in vari-
ous provinces, and newspaper advertisements to recruit “intellectuals” to come to 
Yan’an, especially young men and women, whom the Mao regime, like previous 
leaderships, considered less corrupted by Chinese tradition and capitalist ideol-
ogy. The party promised the recruits, some of whom were from overseas, accom-
modation, education, and an active role in war and revolution.35 A December 
1943 party report notes that roughly 40,000 intellectuals had entered Yan’an since 
the late 1930s. Given the party’s broad definition of intellectuals, these newcom-
ers unsurprisingly had a variety of backgrounds. Academically, 30 percent of the 
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population had started but not finished junior high school; 21 and 31 percent had 
completed senior and junior high school, respectively; and 19 percent had post-
secondary education.36 Most of these recruits were men. A large number were 
recently secondary school students, to whom the leaders also referred as intellec-
tual youths (zhishi qingnian). There were professional experts such as professors 
and engineers, literary and art personnel such as playwrights and painters, and 
technical-support and white-collar workers such as automobile technicians and 
government clerks. A small number were former soldiers. Some had poor parents, 
some had had enviable upbringings, and many came from what the party called 
the petty-bourgeois households of small business owners, schoolteachers, or office 
workers.
Top-down labeling did not transform these recruits into widely recognized 
“intellectuals” any more than self-proclamation turned Mao and other CCP lead-
ers into admired proletarian revolutionaries. How the leadership reorganized 
Yan’an and therefore Chinese Communism to receive the newcomers was crucial. 
Building on their revolutionary experience and authority, the leaders established 
an array of institutes bearing names that denoted professional or higher educa-
tion to absorb the recruits, for example, Women’s University of China, Northern 
Shaanxi Public Academy, Natural Science Research Institute, and Yan’an Ethnology 
Institute.37 Though physically crude and poorly equipped, these institutes usually 
had their own grounds with residential space allocated nearby. The newcomers 
were therefore clustered in various parts of the town, separated from the leaders, 
who lived in relatively spacious compounds that they shared with one another, 
and from the stationed Red Army troops, who protected Yan’an on its perimeters. 
Surrounded by poverty and warfare, the faculty and students took classes, read 
books, and conducted discussions. They attended opening and graduation cer-
emonies and other activities related to teaching and learning. The education usu-
ally lasted from three months to two years and involved various combinations of 
professional, political, and military training.38 Put differently, as the leaders jubi-
lantly proclaimed the arrival of intellectuals, an asset that would strengthen the 
war effort of the party and its revolutionary capabilities, unprecedented changes 
overtook work, space, and life in the previously unremarkable town.
How the CCP operated the Lu Xun Academy of Arts (Lu Xun yishu xueyuan) 
exemplifies the changes in topography and work that spotlighted the newcom-
ers as “intellectuals” as officially claimed. Named after the famous and recently 
deceased leftist writer, the academy opened its doors in April 1938 inside another 
newly established institute, the Lu Xun Normal School. Most of the Academy’s 
instructors were writers and artists from Shanghai with no experience in rural 
insurgency. The students, whose levels of education ranged from primary school 
to college, were selected because of their interest in the fine arts or performing arts. 
Climbing enrollment led the authorities to relocate the campus quickly to one of 
the hills that made up the town. The faculty and students occupied almost twenty 
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existing loess caves. They dug two more rows of caves, erected a single-story build-
ing, and cleared a desolate area for residential, performance, and other purposes. 
In August 1939 the authorities moved the growing institute farther away from the 
town center, into an imposing Catholic church with two steeples (see figure 1). 
Many nearby loess caves were converted for residential use, as were some newly 
excavated ones.39 Work within the academy reflected the leadership’s emphasis on 
both education and revolution. The faculty and students concentrated on teaching 
and learning art, music, literature, and theater. They distinguished themselves fur-
ther with use of Western sources, forms, and techniques foreign to the region and 
unfamiliar to ordinary party cadres and soldiers. They held exhibitions of their 
work and rehearsals for their productions and performed in front of cadres, sol-
diers, and students throughout Yan’an.40
These organizational measures allowed for preservation of the values and hab-
its of the faculty and students acquired outside the rural milieu, the display of 
which distinguished them further from other Yan’an residents. The notable writer 
Mao Dun (1896–1981), who taught briefly in the academy during the early 1940s, 
described faculty residences with admiration: “Because writers and artists live here, 
each cave is decorated differently and expresses its occupant’s unique character. 
Figure 1. Contemporary view of the church that once housed the Lu Xun Academy of Arts. 
(Photo by author)
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Every artist has used his clever inventiveness, his own hands, and extremely crude 
materials and turned the abode [cave] into an elegantly refined, brightly beautiful, 
or majestically special place.”41 In equally visible fashion, some faculty did not wear 
the military outfit provided to everyone who worked or studied in one or another 
of the institutes. They donned, instead, fedoras, woolen coats, and other urban-
style or self-made clothing. Students wore the military outfit, but often with “per-
sonal flair.” Young women often added a dickey underneath the shirt and pinned 
colorful swatches on their sleeves and shoes. Some students wore their caps styl-
ishly like berets. Every evening, students and instructors strolled along a nearby 
riverbank, chatting, making friends, and even falling in love. The popularity of 
ballroom dancing in revolutionary Yan’an is well documented. Many recruits and 
even Mao and other party leaders enjoyed this activity. The Lu Xun Academy was 
an especially popular venue in this regard, hosting at one point dancing parties 
every Saturday evening. These involved live music by students and decorations by 
resident artists.42
Within the academy and other institutes, relations of domination established 
by the CCP leadership signaled further that the “intellectuals” who had traveled to 
Yan’an were different from the revolutionaries who had arrived there earlier. Mao 
and other party leaders periodically visited the institutes, lectured to the students, 
and sometimes instructed them on how to overcome their “petty-bourgeois” 
foibles qua intellectuals.43 Party leaders served as heads of the institutes, while 
veteran cadres filled key administrative positions. These leaders and cadres were 
mostly well-educated men. In other words, the pattern of authority reflected and 
reinforced a social division that CCP leaders had been stressing shortly after the 
party’s founding. Or, there were two kinds of educated people in Chinese society—
those who had transformed themselves into proletarian revolutionaries and those 
who had not. For example, the head of the Academy of Marxist-Leninist Studies, 
Zhang Wentian (1900–1976), had a university-level education and had received 
theoretical training in Marxism in the Soviet Union. He briefly headed the CCP 
before Chinese Communism entered its Yan’an phase.44 Thanks to his revolution-
ary experience, authority, and knowledge, this man could confidently claim to be 
a proletarian revolutionary in front of the faculty and students whom he oversaw. 
This was probably true, too, of the chief of instruction at the Lu Xun Academy, Xu 
Yixin (1911–1994), a revolutionary of ten years’ standing who had received higher 
education in the Soviet Union.45
For practical and ideological reasons, the Mao leadership used the resources of 
some of the institutes to train separately newly arrived factory workers and other 
laborers as well as party cadres from nearby areas and other rural bases. Such vis-
ible arrangements further reinforced the official view that the recruits who were 
former writers or schoolteachers or other kinds of educated persons were “intellec-
tuals.” What happened at the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Resistance University 
of Military and Politics Affairs (Zhongguo renmin kangri junshi zhengzhi daxue) is 
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revealing. This institute, which produced tens of thousands of political, military, 
and other personnel, divided the constantly changing mix of trainees into brigades 
(dui). For example, the class that moved into Yan’an with the institute in early 
1937 had fourteen brigades totaling almost 1,400 people. Senior and ordinary Red 
Army personnel filled eight of the brigades. The remaining six brigades, including 
one composed entirely of women, contained mostly recently arrived and relatively 
educated young people.46 Across the institutes, even when the classes involved a 
mixture of trainees, the heads apparently wanted those who were party cadres or 
former workers to monitor the behavior of former office workers, college students, 
and others, and to remain on guard against their supposedly inevitable display of 
petty-bourgeois or other undesirable ideas and behavior.47
Job assignment within Yan’an also had classification impact. To strengthen 
the Shaan-Gan-Ning base for war and revolution, the CCP leadership used many 
recruits immediately after their arrival or upon their completion of training to 
expand education, art, industry, and other sectors. For example, the industrial 
workforce jumped from under 200 people before 1937 to over 12,000 by 1944.48 
The assignments not only turned many into engineers, schoolteachers, journalists, 
and other kinds of personnel that fit into the party’s definition of intellectuals; the 
development of some of the sectors led to the further clustering of the recruits 
across the town. A place called Cultural Valley (Wenhua gou) quickly emerged as 
home to various writers’ groups, literary associations, art troupes, a library, and 
other cultural and educational organizations. On Refreshing Mountain (Qingliang 
shan), which is a short distance away across the Yan River that runs through the 
town, the leadership created a media hub that included a news agency, a newspa-
per, a printing press, a radio station, and a bookstore, among other facilities. The 
establishment of Yan’an Central Hospital (Yan’an zhongyang yiyuan) during the 
late 1930s illustrates how this approach to job assignment brought those whom the 
leadership regarded as intellectuals together. The leadership approved the project, 
chose a site, and appointed as head a bespectacled man who had a doctorate of 
medicine from the University of Toulouse in France. Others with experience in 
medicine, nursing, and pharmacology were reassigned to work in the hospital. 
Physicians and other medical personnel were sent from elsewhere to the estab-
lishment, which also recruited and trained newly arrived women with secondary 
education to become nurses.49
NORMALIZ ATION OF A MAR XIAN CL ASSIFICATION
The Rectification Campaign sponsored by Mao was a watershed in the history of 
Chinese Communism. The campaign began in Yan’an, spread to other CCP bases, 
and served to consolidate Mao’s leadership and strengthen ideological discipline. 
In their account of the campaign, David Apter and Tony Saich indicate that “a 
symbolically orchestrated tutelary regime”50 built upon textual learning and other 
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instructional techniques and backed by coercive power enveloped Yan’an. This 
regime served to propagate Mao’s understanding of revolutionary ethics, Chinese 
society, and global history and at the same time to delegitimize other political 
narratives, visions, and strategies. For our purposes, at the center of this achieve-
ment was the Mao leadership’s deployment of the intellectual classification. In fact, 
we cannot understand the campaign and its organization any more than we can 
fathom the topographical and institutional changes mentioned above without tak-
ing into account how the classification was used. Mao’s view of the intellectual as a 
usable but unreliable subject defined the character of the campaign, while its suc-
cess deepened the objectification of the intellectual and left behind an influential 
organizational legacy.
During Rectification, Mao and his deputies used the intellectual classification 
as a weapon to attack competitors and potential challengers, just as previous CCP 
leaders had done when embroiled in intraparty struggles. At the elite level, Mao’s 
targets were the so-called Russian Returned Students led by Wang Ming (1904–
1974), Bo Gu (1907–1946), and Zhang Wentian. These members of the party lead-
ership had studied at the Soviet-sponsored Sun Yat-Sen University of the Toilers 
of China in Moscow during the 1920s. Through their work in the Comintern, they 
had developed close relations with the Soviet regime, which continued to exert 
influence over Chinese Communism, albeit with diminishing impact after rural 
insurgency became a main component of the project. Wang, Bo, and Zhang had 
each held the top post in the party before Mao’s ascent. Each of them had lost a key 
ideological battle to Mao not long before he initiated the campaign. Known to be 
a Marxist theoretician and an essayist, Wang had promoted a Soviet-sanctioned 
model of a united front between the Guomindang and the CCP for the Anti-
Japanese War in lieu of the one proposed by Mao.51 Zhang and Bo had headed the 
critical work of revolutionary propaganda and cadre training as well as the party 
organ Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao), but encountered Mao’s rebuke for failing 
to highlight the uniqueness of Chinese society and of the Chinese revolutionary 
experience.52
Written by Mao shortly before Rectification spread across Yan’an, “Reform 
Our Study,” “Rectify the Party’s Style of Work,” and “Oppose Stereotyped Party 
Writing” were important essays where he laid out the campaign’s rationales and 
his dissatisfactions with particular types of conduct and thinking found under 
Chinese Communism.53 Although the works unmistakably attacked revolutionar-
ies who were well educated, none labeled Wang, Bo, Zhang, or any of the Russian 
Returned Students as petty-bourgeois or unreliable intellectuals. However, Mao’s 
teeming complaints against party leaders and cadres who had researched, lectured, 
or written about Marxist theory and practice leave little doubt that he regarded the 
Returned Students as such subjects (rather than as proletarian revolutionaries like 
himself). In “Reform Our Study,” Mao launched a thinly veiled attack against such 
individuals. He placed them together with other educated people within the party 
56    chapter 3
based on what he observed as their “subjectivist attitude” (zhuguan zhuyi) toward 
the socialist revolution and indicated why they all needed ideological reeducation.
With this attitude, a person does not make a systematic and thorough study of the 
environment, but works by sheer subjective enthusiasm and has a blurred picture of 
the face of China today. With this attitude, he chops up history, knows only ancient 
Greece but not China and is in a fog about the China of yesterday and the day before 
yesterday. With this attitude, a person studies Marxist-Leninist theory in the abstract 
and without any aim . . . When making speeches, they [senior party cadres and even 
leaders] indulge in a long string of headings, A, B, C, D, 1, 2, 3, 4, and when writing 
articles, they turn out a lot of verbiage. They have no intention of seeking truth from 
facts, but only a desire to curry favour by claptrap. They are flashy without substance, 
brittle without solidity. They are always right; they are the Number One authority 
under Heaven, ‘imperial envoys’ [dispatched from Soviet Russia by the Comintern] 
who rush everywhere. Such is the style of work of some comrades in our ranks.54
Mao’s attack against the Returned Students reminds us of Qu Qiubai’s condem-
nation of Chen Duxiu and other CCP leaders during the late 1920s. That is, the 
victor of an intraparty struggle denounced the defeated as treacherous intellectu-
als. A critical difference, however, separates the attacks. Like Qu, the Returned 
Students had Comintern support and political training in Moscow. The fact that 
they became Mao’s targets reveals that Soviet influence over Chinese Communism 
had declined significantly.
What happened to Zhang Wentian reveals how some defeated CCP leaders 
became self-denigrating “intellectuals” for others to see. A polyglot and a success-
ful writer and translator, Zhang was one of the four Returned Students who had 
received advanced training in Marxist-Leninist thought from the Soviet regime. 
During the 1930s, he had used his training and leadership position to advocate 
passionately for the inclusion of “petty-bourgeois” writers and “intellectuals of 
petty-bourgeois background” in Chinese Communism.55 His appointment as 
head of the Academy of Marxist-Leninist Studies in Yan’an reinforced his superior 
status as a Marxist theoretician and revolutionary. As Mao’s attack against fellow 
leaders intensified, Zhang conceded that the Returned Students were ideologically 
unprepared to be proletarian revolutionaries. In September 1941, he indicated 
at a high-level CCP meeting that the Comintern had made a grave mistake by 
placing “cadres without actual experience in revolutionary work” in the party’s 
upper echelons. He confessed that “subjectivism” and “dogmatism” had severely 
colored his understanding of Marxist thought, leading to among other things 
his “crude and cartoonish” interpretations of issues and problems facing Chinese 
Communism.56 Responding to Mao’s criticism and instruction, Zhang and other 
leaders embarked on a rural investigation trip in January 1942 to acquire what 
passed for genuine knowledge and experience about class and revolution in China. 
He and his team spent more than a year in northern Shaanxi studying and writing 
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reports on economic and other village issues. His return to Yan’an brought forth 
further self-reproaches. In a March 1943 report to the CCP Central Committee, 
he implicated others, too, as usable but unreliable intellectuals who lacked basic 
knowledge of Chinese society. “In particular,” he wrote, “the kind of intellectuals 
like ourselves [who wanted a socialist revolution] always love to ‘hold our heads 
high and gaze at the sky’ and find among the stars other-worldly, bizarre ‘ide-
als’ . . . We do not understand the most mundane, most common, and yet most 
essential issue facing the masses,” or their pains and traumas stemming from ram-
pant class exploitation.57
Outside the CCP leadership, the Rectification Campaign in Yan’an targeted the 
large numbers of recently arrived “intellectuals” and led to conspicuous growth of 
ideological reeducation, mass surveillance, and management by party cadres. To 
be sure, the campaign also attacked those regarded as former peasants (nongmin) 
and workers (gongren) among the revolutionary personnel, or the purportedly 
deleterious impact of class exploitation on these persons’ thinking and behavior. 
The assault on the intellectuals, however, occurred on an entirely different scale. 
First, the Mao regime had inherited from previous leaderships a deep distrust of 
such subjects. Second, recently arrived writers, artists, and students had incurred 
the ire of Mao and other leaders by airing or supporting complaints about inequal-
ity and other problems of organization in the town.58 The leadership combined 
Marxist-Leninist and May Fourth language with Maoist reproaches and declared 
intellectuals an obstacle to revolution if they should remain ideologically unre-
formed. The attacks appeared widely in speeches, directives, and reports as well 
as in Liberation Daily, which also reproduced the required readings of the cam-
paign.59 Many of the condemnations were drawn from Mao’s writings, especially 
the above-mentioned essays; some were gleaned from other leaders’ works, such 
as the notable piece written by Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969) in 1939, “How to Be a Good 
Communist.”60 Mao’s scornful remarks on intellectuals quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter constitute but one example of the torrential attacks.
The Mao regime claimed to have unmasked intellectuals’ dubious participation 
in Chinese Communism on three levels: how they understood the project, what 
they wanted from it, and how they behaved in it. On the first level, the leadership 
charged that intellectuals glossed over the importance of Marxism and Leninism. 
Their political thinking reflected, instead, valorization of personal experience, fix-
ation on abstruse philosophies, and dogmatic use of Marxist-Leninist teachings. 
That is, they failed to understand what Chinese Communism stood for. On the 
second level, the leadership noted that self-centeredness was a central trait of intel-
lectuals. Although they were involved in a socialist revolution, they pursued their 
own goals, sang their own praises, and aspired to become famous surgeons, educa-
tors, writers, and so on, exhibiting en masse “the syndrome of a self-styled hero” 
(geren yingxiong zhuyi). This conduct of theirs harmed the project’s progress. On 
the third level, intellectuals therefore tended to dislike assignments incompatible 
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with their own ambitions or interests. They lacked discipline, flouted orders, 
and sought to come and go as they pleased. At heart, the leadership proclaimed, 
this focus on personal interests, accomplishments, and liberties reflected the 
“petty-bourgeois” or “bourgeois” backgrounds of intellectuals, or ways of think-
ing antithetical to sacrifice, order, and collectivism, the very things that Chinese 
Communism allegedly needed if it was to succeed.61
Within Yan’an, a multilayered instructional apparatus emerged, turning revo-
lutionaries at virtually all levels into subjects of education as well as objects of 
knowledge. Headed by Mao, the ad hoc General Study Commission of the CCP 
Central Committee (Zhonggong zhongyang zhong xuexi weiyuanhui) handled 
policymaking. Subarea study commissions controlled by party leaders and senior 
party cadres appeared in the Red Army, the Central Party School (Zhongyang dan-
gxiao), the Shaan-Gan-Ning government, and the cultural, educational, and other 
sectors. The commissions drew up study plans based on the leadership’s instruc-
tions and on considerations relevant to the sector in question. Writers, teachers, 
military officers, government officials, and others underwent three to five months 
of training, using part of the workday to study and discuss material preselected by 
the General Study Commission. Mao and his deputies visited various establish-
ments and gave lectures, advice, and encouragement. The trainees were required 
to “interrogate deeply,” “discuss fervently,” and “understand and connect with the 
spirit and substance” of the material. They had to use the material to examine the 
establishment where they worked and to “reform thoroughly” its operation and 
their colleagues’ workstyles and political thinking. They were instructed to reflect 
“comprehensively” on their own conduct, ideas, and experience and to identify, 
examine, and overcome their political and ideological mistakes. Everyone, includ-
ing senior party leaders, was required to keep “study and discussion notes” (biji), 
and to write and rewrite “a political history of the self ” (zizhuan) to demonstrate 
efforts and progress.62
Besides serving to amplify the Mao leadership’s attack on “intellectuals,” top-
down deployment of “criticism and self-criticism” across the many institutes 
engendered a multitude of supposedly firsthand confirmations of the official view. 
Under the supervision of senior or other party cadres, students and instructors 
divulged, discussed, and denounced their own mistakes and those of others. They 
condemned themselves and one another for selfishness, lack of discipline, arro-
gance, and other shortcomings that the leadership stated were common among 
intellectuals. They reported that they had been seduced by incorrect or impractical 
political views, including “dogmatic” interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. They 
traced the shortcomings to their own “petty-bourgeois” or other backgrounds and 
the allegedly corresponding lifestyles and social ties. Some pored through their 
own writings, drawings, or other works as well as those of one another, and dis-
covered and decried objectionable political views and expressions. The authorities 
within the institutes organized the publication of some of the mistakes on wall 
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posters, bulletin boards, and newsletters to encourage further collective learning 
and individual disclosure. Liberation Daily published select self-criticisms by writ-
ers, artists, and students for the same purposes.63
Additional mechanisms of official surveillance were set up to ensure the suc-
cess of ideological reeducation. Before Rectification spread across the institutes 
and sectors, the General Study Commission had provided administrative and 
ideological training to senior party cadres to prepare them to become supervisors. 
During the campaign, the cadres attended study and discussion sessions at lower 
levels and offered instructions and guidance. The commission established a trav-
eling inspection team (xunshi tuan) with responsibility of reporting once a week 
on general issues and concerns. Members of the team visited discussion sessions 
and gave recommendations. They had the authority to examine study and discus-
sion notes and mete out tests to gauge the participants’ efforts and progress. At 
lower levels, inspection commissions were formed, too, to monitor participation 
in learning activities. Members of these commissions assumed various tasks, such 
as attending discussions, administering exams, checking study notes, and giving 
advice. Some establishments (e.g., the Central Military Commission, the Central 
Party School, the Shaan-Gan-Ning Government) created visiting teams (canguan 
tuan) that traveled to other sites to exchange learning experiences. The team mem-
bers would meet with senior cadres on the site, read study notes, and talk to indi-
vidual participants. Some establishments (such as Shaan-Gan-Ning Government) 
even arranged joint conferences (lianxi huiyi) between various agencies to address 
campaign issues and assess progress.64
Within Yan’an, Rectification thus led to a “total reeducation of the [revolution-
ary] community.”65 The intellectual as a classification of people doubled as a linch-
pin of the campaign and a substrate acted upon by it. Ideological reeducation, 
mass surveillance, and management by party cadres became the tripods and con-
duits through which the leadership normalized the meanings it inscribed on the 
marker and defined the authority structure of Chinese Communism. Henceforth, 
tens of thousands of revolutionaries recognized themselves or identified others as 
intellectuals based on the CCP discourse of class struggle. The objectification of 
the intellectual under Chinese Communism entered a new phase.
MANIPUL ATIONS OF SO CIAL IDENTIT Y
Although CCP domination produced in Yan’an a highly visible population of 
“intellectuals,” its boundaries remained indeterminable in practice. The ambi-
guities embedded in the party’s concept of intellectuals, the heterogeneous back-
grounds of the revolutionaries, and the diverse training and opportunities they 
received ceaselessly affected how they regarded themselves and one another. Self-
refashioning, which intensified after Rectification, further blurred the boundar-
ies of the objectified population. While relatively educated persons had to deal 
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with actual or potential stigmatization, they also had opportunities to acquire 
positions and authority as government, industry, and other sectors expanded in 
nearby areas controlled by the party. This tension between class identity and revo-
lutionary career, or the moral and the functional view of the intellectual of the 
Mao regime, drove many to monitor and even modify their own image. The fact 
that every indicator used by the party to define or describe the intellectual as a 
class subject (i.e., education, occupation, political thinking, moral dispositions, 
and habits and lifestyle) was changeable or concealable on an individual basis only 
reinforced self-refashioning.
Overall, four sets of hierarchical divisions that reflected the ideology and orga-
nization of Chinese Communism formed the basis on which Yan’an revolutionar-
ies sought to minimize stigmatization and benefit from their knowledge or skills. 
The divisions were those between the party elites and the rest of the revolutionary 
personnel, the military and the nonmilitary sector, “poor peasants” and “workers” 
and other Marxian categories of people, and party members and nonmembers. 
Since the 1920s, the CCP leadership had been investing the upper sections of these 
divisions with positive meanings, symbolisms, and imageries of class and revo-
lution through speeches and statements, theater and literature, and other chan-
nels. An ascent to any of the upper sections would provide the revolutionary with 
symbolic resources for self-presentation, be they pertaining to his or her belief, 
behavior, or background. Upward mobility would not make one immune to being 
labeled an unreliable intellectual, as Mao’s attack against Zhang Wentian and other 
Russian Returned Students evidenced. Nonetheless, the ascent would help the 
revolutionary separate herself symbolically, if not also physically, from the school-
teachers, journalists, and others working under Chinese Communism, for whom 
the leadership regarded ideological reeducation and discipline as most necessary, 
not to mention from the “petty-bourgeois” and “bourgeois” intellectuals outside 
the revolutionary project.
Based on memoirs and other material, we can divide Yan’an revolutionaries’ 
strategies of self-refashioning broadly into three (non–mutually exclusive) types: 
self-consecration as proletarian revolutionary, deflection of the intellectual marker, 
and self-image makeover. As we have seen, self-consecration as proletarian revo-
lutionary had been a strategy available to CCP leaders since the 1920s. The leaders 
exploited their revolutionary authority, organizational experience, and even liter-
ary skills to elevate themselves above the rest of the revolutionaries. The triumph 
of Mao during Rectification, and especially his attack against senior colleagues, 
greatly reduced the number of party leaders who could use the strategy. Timothy 
Cheek’s study of the campaign offers clues to the kind of leaders who might still 
be able to present themselves as proletarian revolutionaries in words and deeds. 
Zhang Ruxin (1908–1976), Yang Shangkun (1907–1988), and Kang Sheng (1898–
1975) had all studied in Moscow but had been supporting Mao before he initiated 
Rectification. During the campaign, Zhang, Yang, and Kang assumed leadership 
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roles in the areas of propaganda, organization, and security respectively. Zhang 
and Yang reprimanded senior party cadres openly and instructed them on how to 
reform themselves ideologically; Kang was in charge of exposing and punishing 
“irredeemable enemies,” including those among “intellectuals,” and of delivering 
lectures to the cadres about such enemies.66 Rectification thus elevated the three 
men above the cadres and even some party leaders. Equally telling is the case of 
the Red Army’s commander in chief, Zhu De (1886–1976). Zhu came from a well-
to-do family and had once enrolled in the University of Göttingen in Germany. By 
the late 1930s, a foreign correspondent observed, “Had it not been for his uniform, 
he could have passed for almost any peasant in any village in China.”67 During 
Rectification, Zhu exploited his revolutionary authority, military leadership, and 
physical transformation to attack writers and others, including those within the 
army, for lacking proletarian consciousness. He indicated that he “did not belong 
to the proletariat originally” but “had handed himself over to” (toujiang) and 
was willing to die for that class. In effect, he announced that he was a proletarian 
revolutionary.68
For other CCP leaders chastised by Mao or subjected to ideological reeduca-
tion, Rectification did not necessarily lead to their permanent stigmatization as 
unreliable intellectuals. Quite the contrary, their superior status within the party 
provided them with otherwise unavailable opportunities to reclaim their proletar-
ian revolutionary identity—so long as they submitted to Mao’s leadership. Let us 
revisit Zhang Wentian’s return to Yan’an from rural investigation. In the reports 
to the CCP Central Committee, he recounted repeatedly how he had studied 
work and life using Mao’s ideological approach (which included “seeking truth 
from facts,” “going to the masses,” “emphasizing typical examples,” and focusing 
on production), and how he strove to purge himself of the subjective, dogmatic, 
and bureaucratic attitudes that the Chairman had condemned. In December 1943 
he produced for Mao’s perusal a lengthy volume, Notes from Self-Examination 
(Fanxing biji), in which, to the Chairman’s delight, he again “conducted a system-
atic and profoundly revealing criticism” of his intellectual habits and political mis-
takes. From then on, Zhang returned to the center of the party’s activities, while 
continuing to criticize himself in public forums, including the Seventh National 
Congress of the CCP held in Yan’an in 1945. His self-abnegation paid off. During 
the Congress, he was reelected to the Political Bureau, the party’s highest body, 
which had only thirteen members.69 Zhang did not regain the political capital 
that he had once had as head of the party; nonetheless, he had enough compared 
with most others under Chinese Communism to present himself as a proletarian 
revolutionary.
At lower levels, Rectification amplified existing efforts by revolutionaries to 
deflect the intellectual marker. Some of the revolutionaries were from poor fami-
lies and did not want their academic training or professional experience to impede 
their advancement. Ma Hong, with whom I began this chapter, was an example. 
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For this precocious young man, the main challenge of self-presentation was how 
to draw attention to his disadvantaged background while benefiting from his 
excellent writing skills and education in a research institute run by the party. Ma 
emphasized his humble background and lack of schooling, and hence signaled 
that he was not another petty-bourgeois intellectual who had come to Yan’an to 
join the revolution. For revolutionaries like Ma, repeatedly referring to stints of 
manual labor that they had endured might help as well. What happened at the 
Anti-Japanese Resistance University during the late 1930s suggests that finger-
pointing probably remained within the arsenal of self-representations of formerly 
underprivileged revolutionaries. When asked by superiors to screen and recruit 
recently arrived personnel into the party, some of the cadres staffing the campus 
balked. One of them remembers, “We were somewhat worried about absorbing 
into the party college students who used to wear long gowns and leather shoes. 
Almost all of those whom we had recruited until that point were young peasants 
or handicraft workers. I felt that those students did not behave as they should have 
in a revolution. Most of them had very complicated social ties and rather bad class 
backgrounds.”70 The cadres exploited their familiarity with the CCP rhetoric of 
class and played up the social distance between themselves and the students, even 
as this gap was closing because of their own improving access to education and 
job opportunities, and because the austere lifestyle in Yan’an was continuing to 
transform the appearance, habits, and routines of the students. In effect, the cadres 
indicated to themselves and their superiors that they were genuine revolutionaries 
and the others were unreliable intellectuals.
Likewise, the CCP cadres who had survived the bloody purges of “intellectu-
als” in rural revolutionary bases during the 1930s had little reason to want to be 
marked as such subjects. By Rectification, some of these cadres had been in the 
countryside for more than a decade. The discipline, labor, and valor needed to 
survive armed invasions, severe climates, and demanding terrains had left physi-
cal signs, or (to borrow from Foucault) “a bodily rhetoric of honor”71 useful for 
self-presentation. For example, Long March veteran Cheng Fangwu (1897–1984), 
who headed the Northern Shaanxi Public Academy (Shaanbei gongxue) in Yan’an, 
was a May Fourth activist who had studied in Japan, taught in a university, and 
edited several journals, among other literary and intellectual activities. There was 
seemingly little in his everyday appearance that betrayed his superior education 
or previous privileges. As a former revolutionary recalls, Cheng was “of medium 
size, having a few whiskers and an always greasy face that he apparently seldom 
washed. He wore a cotton-padded jacket that looked filthy and glossy [from 
overuse]. Nowhere was Cheng close to resembling a cultured man [wenhua ren]; 
instead, he looked like a veteran cook.”72 Yang Guangchi (1905–1987), a former col-
lege student, had been a political officer in Red Army forces since the early 1930s. 
In Yan’an, he trained large numbers of secondary school and college recruits at 
the Anti-Japanese Resistance University. A former student recalls that Yang was a 
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“completely experienced soldier” who wore “shining five-star medals” on his uni-
form and hardships on his face and had “the appearance of an ordinary worker.”73 
Both Cheng and Yang adopted bodily strategies for self-presentation.
Self-image makeover was the most common strategy of refashioning employed 
by Yan’an revolutionaries after Rectification. Here stigmatized writers, students, 
and others performed commitment to the ideal version of a revolutionary as pro-
moted by the Mao regime. Their goal was to gain symbolic and other resources that 
would help to alter their now-recognized identifications as petty-bourgeois intel-
lectuals. Joining the Red Army was an approach for some, although a physically 
risky one. The CCP elites had built around the forces an aura of courage, loyalty, 
and discipline compared with the selfishness, impracticality, and other shortcom-
ings ascribed to “intellectuals.” Enlistment could bring one a military rank (such 
as platoon leader), a classification as military personnel (junren), and the acco-
lade of “Red Army warrior” (hongjun zhanshi), all of which were symbolic assets.74 
Serving in an impoverished village inside or outside the region as deputy village 
chief (fu xiangzhang) or village clerk (xiang wenshu) helped other revolutionar-
ies to improve their images. The party needed staff to expand propaganda and 
organizational work in the countryside. Austere as life was in Yan’an, conditions 
in such villages were worse, filled with risks to health and life itself.75 By accepting 
a rural assignment, one practically announced willingness to rise above one’s own 
“petty-bourgeois” desire for comfort and professional success. After Mao chastised 
writers and artists during the Yan’an Forum, many of them reportedly wanted to 
be sent to the countryside, or follow what the Chairman had asked them to do.76 
The notable poet Ai Qing (1910–1996) and other artists as well as some former 
schoolteachers and students even volunteered to join the Red Army.77
The CCP authorities did not support every enlistment or transfer request from 
writers, artists, or students, and thus decided in practice which “intellectuals” 
would receive such opportunities for self-refashioning. Chen Xuezhao (1906–
1991), an accomplished writer with a PhD from the University of Paris, had come 
to Yan’an in 1938. After Rectification, the authorities assigned her as an editor at 
Liberation Daily. Chen expressed her desire to live and work among poor villag-
ers “to reform [her] thinking and worldview and to produce literary works that 
would serve peasants, workers, and soldiers.” Her repeated requests for transfer 
to the countryside were denied. Two years later and not yet a party member, she 
was reassigned to the Central Party School as a literacy teacher. Headed by party 
leaders, this institute specialized in providing select cadres with advanced political 
training.78 Chen taught in the Fourth Division (Sibu). The enrollees were veteran 
cadres, military officers, and other cadres of “peasant” or “worker” origins who 
were chosen for their laudable service to Chinese Communism and their need 
for basic education for report-writing and other tasks.79 Within this environment, 
Chen could not but be typecast as an intellectual because of her background and 
responsibilities (see Figure 2).
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Even writers, artists, and others who stayed in professional or literary posts after 
Rectification found ways to alleviate their stigma. The Mao leadership demanded 
that such revolutionaries improve their political consciousness and performance. 
Someone who received positive assessments in this respect from superiors stood 
a good chance of gaining a reassignment, an invitation to join the party, or a pro-
motion in party rank—or symbolic resources for self-presentation. Displaying 
commitment to official ideology, watching one’s words and deeds, and following 
orders were appropriate tactics. He Qifang (1912–1977) graduated from Peking 
University in 1935, and worked as a schoolteacher while publishing poetry and 
essays in newspapers before departing for Yan’an and joining the CCP during the 
late 1930s. When Rectification ended, the party decided to send him to Chongqing 
to liaise with novelists, essayists, playwrights, and others supportive of the revo-
lutionary project. The city, which was in southwest China, had been designated 
by the Guomindang as the national capital. Hu Feng (1902–1985), a prominent 
writer among those who received He Qifang, remembered that the revolutionary 
used himself to illustrate the success of thought reform. He spoke with “a tone that 
Figure 2. Commemorative inscription of Mao Zedong’s message to college instructors 
counseling them to serve the revolution by fulfilling teaching responsibilities rather than by 
requesting to be sent to the frontline. (Photo by author)
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made others feel he was proving he had already reformed himself into a genuine 
member of the proletariat,” while indicating to his audience that they should mend 
their “petty-bourgeois” thinking and habits.80
Around the same time, Zhao Chaogou (1910–1992), a famous journalist who 
visited Yan’an with some others, noticed the following on his day of arrival: 
“Here the tinges of femininity are unusually light. Not even one woman wears 
a qipao [a close-fitting dress] or a perm, and no lovers strut around holding 
hands. Most female cadres put up little feminine affect and behavior (jiaorou de 
zuozuo). What they wear differs little from what male cadres wear. To exaggerate 
somewhat, Yan’an is probably the least sexy (xinggan) place [in China].”81 Such 
departures from the multifaceted display of urban styles and habits in the town 
before Rectification occurred in other areas of life, too. Zhao spoke to notable 
writers but found that they did not mention any foreign literary theory during 
conversations on art and literature, quoting, instead, Mao’s famous lectures on 
the topics. Most of the students he interviewed had studied in urban schools 
and even colleges but showed no obvious sign of having received a Western-
style education. The students gave “standardized” replies not only to queries 
about politics and revolution, but also to those related to romance and personal 
life.82 Their reactions undoubtedly reflected top-down pressure and tutelage and 
even fear. When considered with other flourishing tactics of self-refashioning, 
such conduct can be said also to reflect a desire to be seen as a committed 
revolutionary.
Participation in agricultural work, voluntary or not, was another channel for 
writers, artists, and other “petty-bourgeois intellectuals” to improve their own 
images. This form of adaptation had strong ideological, practical, and institu-
tional support within Yan’an. The CCP leadership had praised the class charac-
ter of poor peasants and farm laborers, such as their perseverance, humility, and 
righteousness, even as their habits and dispositions were criticized as tainted by 
exploitative traditions. Driven by necessity, large numbers of revolutionaries had 
participated in agricultural production before Rectification. After the campaign, 
the Mao regime deepened what it called the “to the village” (xiaxiang) movement, 
requiring “intellectuals” to raise their revolutionary consciousness through work-
ing and living with peasants. The leadership expanded farming in the Shaan-Gan-
Ning base area to cope with Guomindang embargoes. Teachers, students, and 
others learned to sow grains, grow vegetables, raise livestock, chop wood, spin 
yarn, make tools, and so on.83 Shen Xia (1921–1945) was Mao Dun’s daughter. She 
was attending Yan’an University, another institute started by the party, when she 
heard that the campus would participate in the drive to produce farm and other 
goods. What she entered in her diary suggests that production activities were per-
ceived by those stigmatized as intellectuals as opportunities to alter their class 
identity: “Now it is time to experience reality and temper myself through labor. 
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For someone who wants to train herself into a complete proletarian, genuinely 
taking part in labor has great import.”84
In sum, Yan’an revolutionaries used occupational, physical, and linguistic strat-
egies as well as institutional channels under Chinese Communism (e.g., official 
assignment, rank promotion, productive labor) to deflect the menace of the “intel-
lectual” marker or mitigate its stigma. For these individuals, building a revolu-
tionary career would entail managing their own biography, physical appearance, 
public conduct, social relations, and so on. The goal was to obviate or temper 
attacks against their political and moral character and garner approval from col-
leagues and superiors. As such, the maneuvers did not call into question the lead-
ership’s view of the intellectual as a usable yet unreliable subject. To the contrary, 
they further legitimized the view and objectified the intellectual.
In a 1990 lecture at the Collège de France, Bourdieu stated that if it seems easy 
to talk about a subject, it is because “we are in a certain sense penetrated by 
the very thing we have to study.”85 The conviction toward what the subject is 
becomes an obstacle to understanding its genuine nature. The intellectual under 
Chinese Communism is a case in point. Research relies on readily available 
concepts of intellectuals that emphasize the social function, cultural capital, or 
moral conduct of the educated, however they are defined. The studies mask the 
metamorphosis of the intellectual from an obscure classification adopted by the 
CCP to concrete political, ethical, and physical forms, or embodied subjects 
locatable eventually throughout state and society. Within Yan’an, the emergence 
of a population of “intellectuals” reflected as well as affected the organization of 
Chinese Communism. The CCP discourse of class and revolution and reorgani-
zation of political relations, division of labor, and space constituted the ontolog-
ical foundation of the subjects. As revolutionaries were turned into usable but 
unreliable intellectuals, ideological reeducation, mass surveillance, and work-
place management by party cadres intensified. The incorporation of the intel-
lectuals into the revolutionary project enabled the party to pursue otherwise 
unachievable goals, such as expanding industrial production, deepening rural 
mobilization, developing multifaceted propaganda, and increasing literacy in 
the Red Army.
What happened in Yan’an was but a harbinger of the mutual constitution of the 
intellectual and Chinese Communism that would occur nationwide. After 1949, 
class subjects recognized as intellectuals appeared in every sector penetrated by 
the state. The multiplications, elaborations, and intensifications of the ruling tac-
tics and strategies that had originally converged in the town altered local organiza-
tion and thus subjectivities and social identities. Government offices, newspapers, 
villages, and many other sites each had intellectuals who were used and abused 
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in particular ways. Yan’an was the fountainhead of such development in another 
respect. The Mao regime assigned many revolutionaries who were trained there 
to positions of authority. Whether these cadres had been denounced as intellec-
tuals by the regime or not, they were familiar with its ideology and practice of 
class struggle. They spread the official view of the intellectual through meetings, 
reports, newspapers, and other channels. They helped to reorganize local author-
ity structures and install political control mechanisms. Some even headed scien-
tific, educational, industrial, and cultural establishments. In short, they became 
frontline agents in the objectification of the intellectual under the PRC.
68
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The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of a 
Registration Drive
Question: Can dance hostesses [wunü] who have graduated from junior high 
school or above register as unemployed intellectuals?
Answer: Dance hostesses and others who meet the official criteria can 
 register as unemployed intellectuals.
—Staff Manual of the Shanghai Municipal Commission for 
Handling Unemployed Intellectuals, 1951
[She] became a Guomindang member during the Anti-Japanese War;  husband 
teaches in a factory-run school. Not that sophisticated; saw great progress 
 during training. Poor awareness in the past; now can criticize [political and 
ideological offenses and injustices]. Likes to help others and to laugh; not 
serious enough; has the gift of gab; straightforward.
—An official entry on Chen Taozhen, 32, a state-labeled 
unemployed intellectual looking for work, 1952
On December 1, 1951, slightly over two years after the PRC’s founding, the 
Shanghai government began a registration process for persons officially referred to 
as “unemployed intellectuals” (shiye zhishifenzi). Similar registrations occurred in 
Beijing and other major urban areas. The main purpose of the registrations was to 
locate educated but jobless people, ascertain their background and experience, and 
return as many of them as possible to work, especially in sectors and regions where 
replenishment or expansion of the labor force was needed. Because of two decades 
of war and revolution, unemployment had become a national problem. From the 
perspective of the new political leadership, the harnessing of otherwise unused 
knowledge and skills was not only vital to socialist development but also neces-
sary for tackling joblessness. The registration drive in Shanghai lasted for fourteen 
months and overlapped with various highly charged national campaigns, including 
the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the Resist-America-Aid-Korea 
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Campaign, the Three Anti and the Five Anti Campaign, and Thought Reform of 
Intellectuals. These other campaigns involved mass parades, public denunciations, 
incarcerations, executions, and other poignant dramas.1 With the registration 
drive, there is apparently little to attract those scholarly lenses that routinely focus 
on the excesses of coercion or politicization of ordinary life by the Mao regime. 
In those rare instances when it is spotlighted, the registration is depicted as little 
more than a public welfare event, or else the official interpretation is presented.2
With this chapter, we begin our investigation of the mutual constitution of the 
intellectual and Chinese Communism in postrevolutionary China. In Shanghai, 
the registration of unemployed intellectuals turned out to be a key exercise 
across state and society that served to objectify the intellectual. To conduct the 
registration, the municipal government set up commissions and offices; printed 
instructions, regulations, and manuals; and devised application forms, assessment 
protocols, and identification cards. The government posted announcements in 
newspapers and other places and involved professional, trade, and other organiza-
tions. It arranged meetings, training sessions, and visits to local neighborhoods 
to educate CCP cadres and residents about unemployed intellectuals and official 
efforts to locate and assist these individuals. Eager to find paid work or help fam-
ily members to do so, neighborhood residents sought information and studied 
eligibility criteria. Many gathered documents, filled out application forms, and 
prepared themselves for interviews. Cadres and residents thus learned how the 
state defined intellectuals in professional and academic terms, amid its complaints 
about the class character of these people and calls for them to learn from workers 
and peasants. Like the overlapping campaigns which advanced CCP control of 
government, industry, and other sectors, the registration drive helped the party 
extend its symbolic power and administrative capability into local neighborhoods. 
The drive furthered goals of the campaigns such as spreading the Marxian vision 
of Chinese society and the party’s principles of social classification, recording and 
ascertaining the backgrounds of individuals, and mobilizing their participation in 
officially sponsored activities. Furthermore, the drive enabled the authorities to 
reach the unemployed, who otherwise had little incentive to observe state-man-
dated routines or procedures.
The boundaries of the category of intellectuals that emerged during the reg-
istration drive were no more clear or stable than those found in Yan’an a decade 
before, even though the CCP was much richer in resources for enforcing its system 
of social classification. Shanghai saw a proliferation and repeated replacement of 
rules and regulations governing registration eligibility, with contents that reflected 
varying official approaches to revolutionary justice, the allocation of opportunities, 
and the reduction of unemployment as much as changing official efforts to clar-
ify the kinds of people to be considered unemployed intellectuals. Although the 
registration drive turned many unemployed people directly (as well as employed 
people indirectly) into locally recognizable “intellectuals,” ambiguities regarding 
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who the intellectuals were persisted. Meanwhile, some individuals used the drive 
for self-interested purposes, registering themselves or others who did not meet the 
criteria for recognition as unemployed intellectuals. In other words, in the lower 
reaches of the population of intellectuals formed under Chinese Communism, as 
in the upper echelons described in the last chapter, we encounter in sharp relief the 
political and social forces as well as individualized and institutionalized conduct 
that objectified some as intellectuals but not others who had similar backgrounds 
or even superior education. The category of intellectuals everywhere assumed a 
historical form that reflected the dynamics of Chinese Communism.
As unemployed intellectuals appeared en masse across Shanghai, official sur-
veillance intensified in the local neighborhoods and the growing state sector. The 
city had been the major financial, industrial, and commercial center in China and 
home to political and official bodies sponsored by British, Japanese, and other for-
eign authorities and, not least, the Guomindang. Even without the citywide purges 
launched by the victorious CCP to rid government offices, colleges, and other sites 
of people confirmed or presumed to be staunch political enemies, many of the 
unemployed still had worked for other political regimes, foreign or domestic capi-
tal, or “vice” businesses eventually closed by the state such as nightclubs and caba-
rets. For the Shanghai authorities, among the unemployed intellectuals were many 
who had been involved in the political repression, economic exploitation, or moral 
corruption of the Chinese people. Clarifying the backgrounds of the intellectuals 
was necessary to forestall future problems of governance. Within the state-run 
establishments instructed to train or hire the intellectuals, the authorities used 
political and moral standards gleaned from official discourse to screen and select 
candidates. They investigated the chosen and monitored, documented, and cate-
gorized their behavior. The “petty-bourgeois” and “bourgeois” politics, habits, and 
dispositions of intellectuals described in official discourse were converted into vis-
ible realities and written records. The usable yet unreliable intellectual who had 
emerged in Yan’an not only migrated into the postrevolutionary workplace, but in 
many cases did so in the form of a figure detested by the local authorities.
To use Pierre Bourdieu’s terminology, the intellectual appeared twice in homol-
ogous forms during the Shanghai registration of unemployed intellectuals, that 
is, both in the objective structures of the state and in the mental structures of ordi-
nary people. The classification saturated various forms of official announcements, 
informed registration rules and activities, and led to specific mechanisms of domi-
nation within local neighborhoods and workplaces. Under these circumstances, 
government officials, registration staff, enterprise administrators, and neighbor-
hood residents began to consider themselves and/or others as intellectuals, or a 
specific type of political subjects based on the Marxian understanding promoted 
by the state. What bridged the classification across two kinds of structure was the 
symbolic power and administrative capability of the Mao regime, both of which 
the registration drive helped to strengthen, notwithstanding that the concept of 
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intellectuals remained unstable because of central adjustments of registration cri-
teria and variations of local understanding. Before moving on, it is vital to high-
light the dynamics of displacement and employment in Shanghai and nearby 
areas from the late 1940s to the early 1950s, which critically influenced the kinds 
of people who would claim to be unemployed intellectuals and therefore how the 
authorities reacted.
DYNAMICS OF PRESELECTION
Like other Chinese cities, Shanghai, with a population of approximately 5 million 
people, saw high unemployment while the civil war (1946–1950) raged between 
the CCP and the Guomindang.3 The CCP takeover of the city, which began in late 
May 1949, was followed by capital flight, foreign economic sanctions, Guomindang 
air raids, a Guomindang naval blockade, and other challenges that intensified the 
problem of joblessness.4 From March to May 1950, an additional 150,000 workers 
were laid off.5 The municipal government followed central instructions and regis-
tered and organized assistance for the unemployed.6 The recovering city was hit 
with economic decline again in the spring of 1952 because of the state-sponsored 
Five Anti Campaign, which attacked tax evasion, bribery, cheating on govern-
ment contracts, and other economic wrongdoing in the commercial and indus-
trial sectors. Many firms responded to the campaign by terminating, suspending, 
or cutting back operations, which led to a “wave of sackings” of white-collar and 
blue-collar workers and manual laborers.7 Over 414,000 people reportedly signed 
up for unemployment assistance during 1952, and more than 300,000 remained on 
the registry two years later.8 These figures do not include people who had some but 
inadequate work, homemakers and sojourners looking for work, and others who 
stayed away from all forms of official registration for one reason or another. In 
short, Shanghai’s unemployment rate hovered above 10 and sometimes 20 percent 
during the early 1950s.9
Critical to our analysis are the forms of displacement that preselected those 
who would come forward during Shanghai’s registration of unemployed intel-
lectuals. In August 1948, the CCP implemented its personnel policy in northeast 
China when state agencies (including government departments, the military, the 
police, and the judiciary) and state-run establishments (such as schools, news-
papers, and radio stations) were seized from the Guomindang. When the Red 
Army entered Beijing and Tianjin in January 1949, CCP cadres were directed to 
“shake up” existing state agencies, except those overseeing public utilities and 
public health. The cadres were asked to dismiss “reactionary elements, notori-
ously objectionable people, and unusable incompetents,” assess the background 
and performance of the rest of the staff, and retain only the minority who were 
vital to everyday operation. Anyone who was rendered redundant but did not fall 
into any of those rebuked categories of people would be reassigned to another 
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post or sent home with an allowance and an order to wait for official assignment. 
Across state-run establishments, the cadres were instructed to keep the workforce 
intact and dismiss only the most notorious, the steadfastly reactionary, and the 
incompetent employees. During the spring and summer of 1949, however, mas-
sive layoffs unanticipated by the Mao leadership occurred during the takeovers 
of Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou. Almost 27,000 people were cut from state 
agencies and state-run establishments.10 In Shanghai, more than 6,000 people 
were laid off; another 800 were dismissed; a few thousand more were instructed 
to wait for assignment or to return to their native places, or simply resigned.11 For 
example, almost 280 people, or 20 percent of the workforce, were removed from 
the public secondary school system.12 The layoffs triggered “mass social unrest” 
and compelled a tactical retreat from the leadership. In September 1949, takeover 
cadres were directed to remove from office only “the minority of war criminals 
and special agents [of enemy regimes] and notoriously objectionable elements,” 
and to even rehire some of the people who had been laid off.13
In practice, former officials and administrators and others who were most 
offensive to the CCP authorities were ousted from state agencies and state-run 
establishments during the Shanghai takeover. Among those removed were lead-
ers of Guomindang organizations and staunch supporters of the fleeing regime; 
former political, military, and intelligence officers; and people who had reportedly 
committed serious acts of wrongdoing such as graft or embezzlement or violent 
crimes against CCP members or supporters. The removal of Wang Guocai, the 
head of discipline and instruction at Yangshupu Secondary School in the sum-
mer of 1949, is illustrative. Undercover CCP agents had studied this Guomindang 
member and discovered that he had been a political instructor at the Luoyang 
campus of the Central Army Officer Academy (Zhongyang lujun junguan xuex-
iao). They determined that he was “obviously reactionary” in his political think-
ing and behavior. Wang reportedly had gotten his post at the secondary school, 
not because of his educational credentials or pedagogical skills, but through 
his connection with and willingness to serve the school principal, an alleged 
Guomindang special agent who had already left for Taiwan. Wang was said to have 
been a Guomindang mouthpiece throughout the civil war and, especially, in front 
of his students.14 Some of those removed from state agencies or state-run estab-
lishments would be arrested and even executed during the Campaign to Suppress 
Counterrevolutionaries (1950–1952); others would find work on their own or leave 
the city. The bulk would see the official registration of unemployed intellectuals as 
an opportunity to return to full-time employment.
In Shanghai, business closures pushed large numbers of office workers with 
different levels of knowledge and skills into the ranks of the unemployed. Between 
January and May 1950, 1,400, or more than 10 percent, of factories and 6,000, or 6 
percent, of shops (shangdian) were closed. Although many of these establishments 
reopened in response to the surging demand created by China’s involvement in the 
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Korean War (1950–1953), bumper crops nearby, and state economic intervention, a 
total of 1,800 factories and 7,800 shops applied for closure in 1950.15 During the same 
period, more than 90 private banks and money houses (qianzhuang) were closed, 
or almost 60 percent of such establishments, because of the severe restrictions 
that the municipal government placed on financial exchange.16 Likewise, between 
August 1949 and December 1950, almost 600 of 1,600 import-export companies 
went out of business because of state regulation or other reasons.17 Private news-
papers, news agencies, radio stations, publishing houses, and schools were forced 
to shut down or reorganize their operation to comply with new regulations.18 For 
example, almost 40 private schools ceased operation during the first year of CCP 
rule.19 Hotels, jewelry stores, dance halls, gambling venues, and other places that 
catered to a business clientele or encouraged consumerism also saw rapid declines 
due to official regulation. The Five Anti Campaign furthered closures of small and 
medium-sized enterprises.20 By May 1952, “urban unemployment was again high 
and confidence in the prospects for urban employment growth again shattered,”21 
prompting the municipal government, already a main consumer of industrial 
products, to increase loans and orders to local factories and organize mergers and 
other economic activities to arrest job losses.22
Two other forms of displacement increased the number of educated people 
among the unemployed in Shanghai. First, land reform began in the suburbs in July 
1950 and was relatively peaceful until the Korean War intensified within months. 
Besides public denunciations and confiscation of land, animals, crops, and other 
forms of property, landlords faced investigation, arrest, and summary execution. 
Meanwhile, the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, which led to false 
accusations and reckless executions, spread across rural areas.23 Fengxian County, 
for example, located to the south of the city, saw 30 landlords sentenced to death 
and 129 given jail sentences.24 We do not know how many landlords or their fam-
ily members fled to Shanghai. But the threat of punishment likely pushed some of 
these people to seek refuge there, where anonymity and therefore personal safety 
was still possible. Some of these newcomers had attended traditional tutor schools 
(sishu), modern-style schools, and even colleges.25 Second, closures and reduc-
tions of operation of various kinds of establishments within the city from the late 
1940s to the early 1950s created tremendous pressure on household incomes, and 
drove homemakers who had received formal education to enter or return to the 
job market.
The way in which the CCP offered jobs and opportunities after seizing 
Shanghai depressed the average educational level of those who would register as 
unemployed intellectuals, especially among young men and women. To support 
its takeover of China, the party was determined to tap the “source of energy and 
enthusiasm” among secondary school and college students and recent graduates. 
This undertaking reflected the party’s now-entrenched cult of youth. In practice, 
the Mao regime established many courses and centers to train young people for 
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official service.26 Soon after the takeover of Shanghai had started, the East China 
Military and Political University (Huadong junzheng daxue) run by the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) (previously the Red Army) sought to enroll at its Suzhou 
and Nanjing campuses 30,000 people aged between 18 and 28 with at least a junior 
high education.27 The PLA also wanted 3,000 “intellectual youths” from Shanghai, 
individuals between 18 and 30 years of age with that same education, to join the 
Southward-bound Service Corps and assist in propaganda, mobilization, and 
other tasks vital to the takeover of other cities or regions.28 Many other opportuni-
ties for intellectual youths to join the PLA followed, with age restrictions varying 
across recruiting organizations. For example, the garrison near Shanghai planned 
to train 950 men and 50 women who had graduated from high school to become 
“cultural cadres.”29 Another unit needed 300 people to serve as “cultural and art 
workers.”30 The Ninth Regiment had 1,200 openings in communication, art, and 
other capacities.31
Other careers in government were available to educated young people. For 
example, the East China People’s Revolutionary University (Huadong renmin 
geming daxue) enrolled thousands with the aim of training them to assist the 
CCP takeovers occurring elsewhere.32 The East China branch of the Central Tax 
Administration Institute (Zhongyang shuiwu xuexiao) needed 500 people to learn 
to become “finance and tax cadres.”33 And the Shanghai Cadre Institute (Shanghai 
ganbu xuexiao) wanted to train 1,000 people for various positions in the central 
government.34 There were opportunities for older educated adults. The posi-
tions, however, were often limited to those who had college education and pro-
fessional experience and were willing to relocate. For example, representatives of 
the People’s Government of Northeast China (Dongbei renmin zhengfu) were in 
Shanghai as early as September 1949 to recruit professors in various fields of sci-
ence and technology as well as experts (zhuanjia) in similar areas and in law, poli-
tics, medicine, accounting, and so on.35 The Central Ministry of Heavy Industry 
announced a few months later a plan to hire factory management and technical 
personnel with university or technical college educations.36 The Dongbei govern-
ment had almost 5,000 additional openings for various kinds of faculty, experts, 
and technical personnel.37
In sum, even though war and revolution had forced students in Shanghai to 
enter the labor market prematurely and increased the unemployment of recent 
graduates, many of these people did not need to use the subsequent official regis-
tration of unemployed intellectuals to return to work. Likewise, the knowledgeable 
but jobless had other channels to find work. The registration drive was destined to 
encounter large numbers of ordinary office workers, former Guomindang mem-
bers and government officials, especially those whom the CCP had dismissed 
on political, moral, or even criminal grounds, and others who, for one reason or 
another, had not been able to take advantage of state-sponsored training or other 
opportunities.
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STATE AND SO CIET Y SEARCH FOR INTELLECTUALS
In January 1951, the State Council of the PRC issued a “Supplementary Instruction 
on the Handling of Unemployed Intellectuals” that directed regional governments 
to return such people to work “to the fullest extent possible.”38 The “instruction” 
followed months of assistance provided by the state to displaced office workers and 
technical personnel, unemployed graduates, and other educated people in the form 
of job placement or living subsidies, sometimes together with mandatory political 
reeducation. Reflecting its Marxian view of China’s class structure, the state had 
been referring to these persons as unemployed intellectuals to distinguish them 
from unemployed workers (shiye gongren), whom it classified as part of the pro-
letariat. Large numbers of such workers existed, and large shares of resources had 
been allocated to tackle their joblessness.39 With that instruction noted above, the 
state adopted the goal of registering unemployed intellectuals systematically, edu-
cating them at people’s revolutionary universities and other venues, and placing 
them in the educational, industrial, and other sectors. The instruction included 
a statement of individual eligibility designed to help the local authorities to iden-
tify unemployed intellectuals. Heretofore a principal classification of people under 
Chinese Communism, the intellectual acquired a concrete administrative defini-
tion. “The range of people to be handled as unemployed intellectuals is as follows: 
(1) those who have at least graduated from senior high school or have an equivalent 
education, but have lost their jobs or have been unable to find work since leaving 
school; and (2) those who have considerable academic knowledge and prestige in the 
local area and are willing to serve the people, but cannot take up hard work or sup-
port themselves due to old age or poor health” (emphasis added). To undermine 
political enemies and lawbreakers, the State Council declared that “the minority of 
intellectuals” who had “degenerated into special agents [of other political regimes] 
or vicious thugs (eba)” or had committed serious criminal acts were not eligible 
for assistance.40 From the state’s perspective, these intellectuals had apparently 
morphed into counterrevolutionaries or class enemies, or were no longer usable.
In Shanghai, the Shanghai Municipal Commission for Handling Unemployed 
Intellectuals (Shanghaishi chuli shiye zhishifenzi weiyuanhui) (SCHUI) was formed 
in October 1951. The commission was composed of officials from six municipal 
bureaus (education, personnel, civil affairs, labor, culture, and news and publica-
tions) and representatives from the General Office of the municipal government 
and the Shanghai branches of the Women’s Federation, the Education Union, 
and the Communist Youth League. District (qu) branches of the commission 
were established to involve officials from corresponding district bureaus and 
representatives from an even broader array of organizations sponsored or sanc-
tioned by the state, including political associations such as the China Democratic 
League (Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng) and the China Association for Promoting 
Democracy (Zhongguo minzhu cujinhui). The SCHUI formulated policies, 
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procedures, and regulations for registering unemployed intellectuals, prepared 
applications forms and identification cards, and wrote press releases for news-
papers. It organized classes to teach the district staff how to run the registration 
office, use bulletin boards, public assemblies, and other channels to publicize the 
registration drive, and handle applications. Manuals explaining official terminol-
ogy, individual eligibility, standards of documentation, and other registration mat-
ters were printed and distributed.41 A total of ten registration offices were set up 
across urban and suburban Shanghai.42
The Shanghai authorities used junior (instead of senior) high school gradua-
tion or its equivalent level of education as the minimum academic qualification for 
registering as unemployed intellectuals.43 The change had apparently come from 
the State Council, as its subsequent instructions and decisions consistently defined 
unemployed intellectuals according to the relaxed criteria, which in effect increased 
manifold the number of people classifiable as intellectuals across China.44 There 
were probably three reasons behind the change. First, jobless people with high 
school diplomas were too few to justify an official registration campaign. Second, 
the Mao regime had deemed less educated persons to be intellectuals during its 
Yan’an years. Third, many schoolteachers, accountants, and others who fit into 
the Marxian concept of intellectuals of the state were not high school graduates. 
Included in the SCHUI staff manual were additional regulations and statements 
about eligibility, which show that the state continued to grapple with how to use 
the intellectual as a classification in administrative matters. For example, peddlers, 
pedicab drivers, and dance hostesses who had the required education could regis-
ter as unemployed intellectuals, but not instructors from traditional tutor schools, 
because these individuals “lacked knowledge of modern culture and science.”45 
Others were disqualified on political grounds, for example, denounced landlords 
hiding in Shanghai, expellees of state-owned enterprises, and college students who 
had refused official assignments. The SCHUI also wanted those discovered to be 
counterrevolutionaries or criminals during the registration drive to be handed 
over to the Public Security Bureau for further investigation and punishment.46
Research has stressed the CCP’s imposition of a Marxian system of social clas-
sification on state and society during the early 1950s. The Shanghai registration 
of unemployed intellectuals enabled the party to extend this system into urban 
neighborhoods. Applicants had to put down, many for the first time, their class 
background according to the official double markers of “family status” (jiating 
chengfen) (e.g., poor peasant, petty bourgeoisie, capitalist) and “individual origin” 
(benren chushen) (e.g., student, office worker, industrial worker). Other require-
ments captured growing state surveillance that seized upon particular aspects 
of social life as objects of analysis. Applicants were instructed to describe their 
involvement in political organizations (zhengzhi qingkuang) and the backgrounds 
of close friends and relatives (shehui guanxi). Everyone had to submit an auto-
biographical narrative (zizhuan) of his or her “individual experience, changes in 
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political thinking, understanding of the PRC government, and personal strengths 
and weaknesses.”47 As we shall see, the collection of these materials helped the 
local authorities not only to pin down each applicant’s own particularity as a class 
subject, as Foucault might have said, but also to describe the general traits of the 
applicants as well as compare between any two of them based on the official ana-
lytical framework.48
The SCHUI drew into the search for unemployed intellectuals many of the 
city’s political, professional, trade, and other associations. The commission was 
expecting that some applicants had lost their academic diplomas, professional 
certificates, or letters of appointment because of war and displacement. It had 
thus asked prominent associations for assistance and trained their representa-
tives in assessing and certifying educational achievements and employment 
histories.49 Numerous cases of missing documents were reported shortly after 
the registration drive had started, so much so that the commission augmented 
the list of certifying associations to roughly 300. These associations included, 
for example, the Shanghai branches of the China Art Workers Association, the 
China Pharmacology Association, and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; 
the Shanghai Peasants Association and the Shanghai Homemakers Federation; 
and the district branches of various labor unions. Applicants without valid papers 
were instructed to approach an association related to their own occupation. The 
association was required to assign to each case two of its members, who would 
use their knowledge and familiarity with the applicant to evaluate that applicant’s 
asserted qualifications, experience, and, if appropriate, class background, political 
involvement, and other matters that deserved attention. The association would 
then furnish a written report to SCHUI as to whether the applicant was an unem-
ployed intellectual (see figure 3).50
In Shanghai, the search for unemployed intellectuals intensified further after 
their registration was integrated into the Unified Unemployment Registration 
(shiye renyuan tongyi dengji) in October 1952. A national event, the unified regis-
tration sought to address the rising urban unemployment that resulted from the 
Five Anti Campaign. The registration was also designed to enable local govern-
ments to ascertain, among other things, the backgrounds of the unemployed, a 
population quite challenging for the state to reach, let alone control. The Shanghai 
authorities had noted that some who could sign up as unemployed intellectuals 
had not done so for reasons such as fear of relocation or arrest.51 Within every 
district, neighborhood unemployment registration committees (lilong shiye 
renyuan dengji weiyuanhui) were formed to publicize the registration drive and 
to document former officials and police officers as well as workers, homemakers, 
youths, and others who were jobless. Each committee normally contained seven 
to thirteen members who were residents of the neighborhood. The committees 
were supervised by the district’s labor and employment commission, the mem-
bers of which were drawn from various government offices.52 For example, in the 
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industrial district of Yulin, the population of which exceeded 230,000, the com-
mission trained more than 1,800 unemployed workers, homemakers, and others 
to staff the neighborhood committees. These persons took classes on registration 
procedures and requirements. They learned criteria for categorizing people as 
unemployed intellectuals. They practiced alongside the authorities and performed 
tasks such as promoting the registration through bulletin-board messages, visiting 
families to explain policies and eligibility, and verifying documents and checking 
submitted applications.53
The unified registration in Shanghai, which lasted until January 1953, involved 
rule and regulation changes that affected, once again, how state and society under-
stood the category of intellectuals. Politically based barriers to registration were 
lifted for members of the following disfavored groups: former Guomindang mili-
tary officers and state officials; expellees from the military, government offices, 
and state-owned establishments; former Christian clergymen, Buddhist monks, 
Figure 3. An announcement of the certifying 
role of associations in Wenhui Daily, January 8, 
1952.
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fortune-tellers, and “religious and superstitious practitioners” of other kinds. So 
long as they satisfied the educational and unemployment requirements, such peo-
ple could register as unemployed intellectuals. If the changes helped the state locate 
such personnel, place them where they could be monitored, and alleviate unem-
ployment, it also served to absorb these people squarely into the population of 
intellectuals. Rule changes adopted for other reasons had classification and career 
impact, too. In a reversal, the authorities stipulated that those who had completed 
junior high school but had been making ends meet in a blue-collar or unskilled 
position for an extended period were ineligible to register as unemployed intellec-
tuals. A homemaker with such education was no longer automatically considered 
an unemployed intellectual; unless her family was in dire poverty, her application 
for assistance would be “put on record,” or handled after unemployed men with 
comparable qualifications had been helped. By contrast, displaced workers who 
had sought education in part-time schools and achieved the equivalent of junior 
high school graduation could choose to register as unemployed workers or unem-
ployed intellectuals.54
A procedure of collective appraisal (pingyi) of unemployment status was 
adopted by the Shanghai authorities. As the next section will show, during the 
registration drive organized by the SCHUI, the authorities had good reasons to 
doubt the truthfulness of the applicants and the propriety of the registration staff. 
Collective appraisal was inserted to assist local governments with obtaining accu-
rate information about the unemployed and in deciding case by case whether to 
list applicants on the placement registry, recommend them for state relief, act on 
their job request at a later time, or even deliver them for prosecution for discov-
ered wrongdoing. Each neighborhood registration committee was required to 
form an appraisal team of about twelve people including district officials, registra-
tion staff, and some of the unemployed, and to invite local residents to appraisal 
sessions. The procedure thus fostered further public learning of the official schema 
of classes, including use of the intellectual classification.
What happened in Baxian Lane in Songshan district, which the Shanghai 
Municipal Commission of Labor and Employment cited as exemplary in conduct-
ing the registration drive, is illuminating. Officials from the commission orga-
nized multiple meetings to encourage members of the local residents’ committee, 
women’s representatives in the neighborhood, homemakers, the unemployed, and 
others to attend the appraisals. The local registration committee had already con-
ducted pilot research and established appraisal procedures. The latter included dis-
cussion by the committee members of information provided by the unemployed; 
appearance of the unemployed before the committee to explain their background 
and experience; and feedback and questions from attending residents. The com-
mittee even asked the unemployed to evaluate one another’s statuses.55 In short, the 
appraisals served as neighborhood forums in which officials and residents alike 
grappled with the class identity of each unemployed person with guidance from 
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Source: Electronic database of Wenhui Daily at Shanghai Municipal Library.
*The figures include both zhi1shifenzi and zhi4shifenzi. The second one was dropped by the newspaper after the 1949 
takeover.
1938 1946 1952 1957
Zhishifenzi (intellectuals)*  27  53 798 1,511
Xuezhe (scholars) 210 285 141  317
Wenren (literati)  93 113  26   80
Wenhua ren (cultural personnel)  25 113  12    9
Dushu ren (men of letters)   9  25   9   19
Table 1 Number of Wenhui Daily Articles with Specific Terms for Educated Persons, 1938–1957 
the state. The exercise led all of the participants to consider their own class identi-
ties and those of their friends and relatives, if they had not already done so.
In Shanghai, these registrations played a unique role in turning the intellectual 
into a primary classification of people. For more than a year, every district was 
involved in studying the concept and locating unemployed intellectuals. Table 1 
illustrates this development from a linguistic perspective. Wenhui Daily (Wenhui 
bao) was founded in Shanghai in 1938 and quickly became a major newspaper and 
channel for political and intellectual debate. Before 1949, the term zhishifenzi was 
used significantly less than other terms denoting educated people (which, unlike 
zhishifenzi, often signaled the basis of their knowledge). After 1949, CCP control 
of the media produced a surge in the use of zhishifenzi, as the party considered the 
other categories of people as subsets of intellectuals. The registrations and Thought 
Reform of Intellectuals overlapped in 1952 and pushed the use of the term to new 
heights, while it also circulated in abundance in radio, cinema, magazines, and 
public meetings—right when “intellectuals” were locatable in every neighborhood.
A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY
Between the two registration drives, the Shanghai authorities signed up 40,000 
unemployed intellectuals.56 Table 2 indicates the self-reported ages and educa-
tional attainments of 34,100 people who registered during the first eleven months 
of the events. Half of the registrants merely satisfied the official minimum edu-
cational requirements. The two youngest cohorts contained the smallest propor-
tion of college-educated members for reasons discussed above. Overall, only 12 
percent had college education. Because educated homemakers could register as 
unemployed intellectuals during the SCHUI registration, women constituted a 
moderate majority (57 percent). In terms of professional knowledge, the largest 
proportion (35 percent) did not report any specific skills; 23 percent mentioned 
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Source: SMA B1–1–1121, 206.
Notes: “College” refers to at least two years of postsecondary vocational training. “Other” refers to the possession of 
professional expertise or recognized knowledge and local reputation but not formal academic credentials.
18–25 26–35 36–45 46–60 Above 60 Total
Junior high  8,008
(62.5)
 6,398
(45.3)
 2,129
(41.0)
  637
(35.2)
   32
(18.2)
17,204
(50.4)
Senior high   4,235
(33.1)
 5,823
(41.2)
 2,096
(40.3)
  588
(32.5)
   51
(29.0)
12,793
(37.5)
College   568
(4.4)
 1,898
(13.4)
  953
(18.3)
  536
(29.6)
   65
(36.9)
 4,020
(11.8)
Other    3
(0.0)
   16
(0.1)
   20
(0.4)
   50
(2.7)
   28
(15.9)
  117
(0.3)
Total 12,814
(100.0)
14,135
(100.0)
 5,198
(100.0)
 1,811
(100.0)
  176
(100.0)
34,134
(100.0)
Table 2 Educational Attainments of “Unemployed Intellectuals” by Age (with Percentage), 1952
experience in finance or economics, but mainly as bookkeepers or elementary 
learners of accounting; 19 percent were former schoolteachers or had worked in 
education, arts, literature, or the news media; another 7 percent were former cleri-
cal workers.57
Having expected to find a substantial number of knowledgeable and skillful 
people—for example, physicians, surveyors, factory supervisors, and mechanical 
engineers—the registration authorities were disappointed. “Many of the registrants 
are of low cultural level; only a small number have high academic or professional 
achievements . . . Although our methods of classification and figures suggest that 
we have a number of technical personnel, rarely do these people have genuine 
expertise or robust learning. The majority have acquired their skills and knowl-
edge from part-time school, have been jobless because of chronic illness, or have 
not worked before.”58 In hindsight, this outcome was inevitable. The state had set 
junior high school graduation or its equivalent educations as the minimum edu-
cational requirement for anyone to register as an unemployed intellectual. Official 
programs of training and recruitment had absorbed many with knowledge and 
skills or college educations into various occupations. Seeing many relatively young 
people among the registrants, the authorities nonetheless toed the line of the offi-
cially promoted cult of youth and indicated that most of the registrants would 
contribute to China’s socialist development after receiving training from the state.
More disturbing to the registration authorities was their no-less-inescapable 
discovery of the disagreeable political backgrounds and orientations of the reg-
istrants. Six months into its registration drive, the SCHUI issued an installment 
82    chapter 4
of what would become a consistently scathing official assessment of unemployed 
intellectuals during the 1950s. There were, the report stated, “many sons and 
younger brothers of landlords and rich peasants, members of reactionary parties 
and youth corps, former judicial personnel, bureaucrats, public school teachers, 
and former military officers and so on, and the family members of these people.” 
These kinds of registrants generally had “very poor understanding [of the revolu-
tion led by the CCP], very backward thinking [about class exploitation inside or 
outside China], and very insufficient appreciation of the serve-the-people view-
point [of Chairman Mao].” The commission practically restated the outcomes of 
the recent purges conducted by the party in government offices, the judiciaries, 
and other sites in or near Shanghai. But the SCHUI downplayed the institutional 
sources of the unemployment by highlighting the joblessness as a symptom of 
the inferior class-based character of the registrants. The latter allegedly exhibited 
a “strong desire to lead a life of pleasure and enjoyment and hence an aversion 
to taking jobs outside Shanghai.”59 As we shall see, although jobs were available 
elsewhere, it was not easy for registrants to obtain any of these positions, even 
if they were ready to leave their families behind or move with them to the new 
locations of employment. To the authorities, however, the inability of unemployed 
intellectuals to get work outside the city was yet another indication that they were 
refusing to confront their “petty-bourgeois” or “bourgeois” habits and dispositions 
acquired from families, schools, and workplaces in a city known for its commer-
cialism and consumerism.
The SCHUI’s unease about the registrants also reflected disruptions of the reg-
istration drive during early 1952, when the Three Anti Campaign, which attacked 
malfeasance in government, and the Five Anti Campaign were in their early 
phases. District cadres who worked in the registration offices were reassigned to 
assist in the investigative and punitive campaigns for roughly two months, when 
thousands of people signed up as unemployed intellectuals. The SCHUI discov-
ered afterward that “the mental condition of the office staff had slipped into a state 
of extreme disorder.” Worrying about their own prospects and the well-being of 
friends and relatives, staff members became listless and confused as well as divided 
and disgruntled. Consequently, the registration drive was tainted by irresponsible 
and illicit behavior. Zhabei district was an undistinguished working-class area. 
The registration office there was cited by the commission as an egregious exam-
ple. Someone who knew little about the registration drive had assumed leader-
ship. The staff “did whatever they felt like doing.” They came to work late and left 
early together, played chess in the office, and used field trips and investigations as 
excuses to go home or to cinemas or billiard halls. Conventional and emerging 
social divisions surfaced and produced a fractured workplace at other sites. Staff 
members from government offices and from state-sponsored associations quar-
reled with one another, and so did male and female cadres, young and old person-
nel, and Communist Youth Leaguers and the rest of the staff. In Fenglai district, 
The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy    83
office staff reportedly dreaded coming to work and hoped the registration would 
end immediately. Elsewhere, some of the operating funds were stolen, staff mem-
bers suddenly quit, and even the office sign was not hung properly.60
Registration work was predictably compromised. The SCHUI had expected 
registration office staff to assist in verifying information provided by appli-
cants. Ideally, staff members would visit the establishments (e.g., colleges and 
companies) and locations (such as previous home addresses) mentioned by the 
applicants to gather evidence and determine in an “objective” and “systematic” 
manner whether they had been truthful. Lacking training and supervision, the 
commission noted, even those who had conducted such investigations performed 
poorly. Some had asked questions of little value and submitted “crude and care-
less” reports. In Yimiao district, for example, the registration office failed to catch 
someone who had lied about a friendship with a CCP member to increase his 
own chances of placement, and another person who had covered up involvement 
in the intelligence service of another political regime. In some cases, female rela-
tives of “counterrevolutionaries” had passed as “general representatives of women” 
of the neighborhood and were recommended for job assignment. In other cases, 
individuals known locally as fraudsters or bullies were logged as activists who 
supported CCP policies and personnel. Some staff members, moreover, followed 
their own belief in “benevolence and gentleness” and compiled grossly simplistic 
reports about applicants.61
The SCHUI uncovered that registration staff had exploited the management 
vacuum created by the Three Anti and Five Anti Campaigns to help friends, rela-
tives, and others. Some staff members used the official seal fraudulently to approve 
otherwise unqualified applications and even recommended ineligible candidates to 
recruiting establishments. For example, a cadre in Laozha district had taken money 
from applicants. He was prepared to sign up ineligible people as unemployed intel-
lectuals and process their placements. In Xincheng district, a staff member insisted 
on sending a colleague’s sister-in-law to a teacher-training program organized by 
Shanghai Normal College, even though she did not meet the publicized politi-
cal requirements. Another staff member had fallen in love with an applicant and 
sought to use his position to find her a position.62 The illicit behavior reflected, 
to a good extent, the challenges that some unemployed persons confronted in 
acquiring a livelihood, as the state increasingly controlled the labor market and 
administered opportunities based on principles of class struggle. Other kinds of 
improper behavior noted by the commission—for example, the registration offices 
repeatedly sanctioned counterfeit diplomas and letters of  employment—were 
mainly an outcome of the large volume of applications processed by the staff and 
the lack of training and supervision provided by the SCHUI authorities.63 From 
the latter’s perspective, however, the registration of unemployed intellectuals was 
tainted twice: by the selfish, class-based conduct of the applicants and by that of 
the  registration staff.
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By May 1953, only 31 percent, or 10,500, of the 34,100 unemployed intellec-
tuals represented in Table 2 had found jobs through state assistance. Another 
2,300 found work themselves, and 253 saw their registration disqualified after 
official investigation. A higher proportion of male registrants (34 percent) than 
of female registrants (29 percent) were assisted in paid positions or traineeships. 
Educational achievement mattered. Among those who had attended college, 39 
percent acquired a position, compared with 36 and 25 percent of the senior high 
and junior high school graduates. Almost 30 percent of the placements were 
outside Shanghai. Most of those who received appointment (39 percent) were 
hired for general office work or as some kind of trainee, 24 percent for finance or 
accounting work, and another 22 percent as cultural workers or schoolteachers. 
Only a small number were placed in highly technical fields such as engineering, 
medicine, or factory management.64 The relatively low percentage of registrants 
who received an official assignment did not indicate a lack of interest from recruit-
ing establishments, which were mainly government departments and state-owned 
enterprises expanding rapidly under CCP rule. Within the first twelve months of 
the registration of unemployed intellectuals, almost 140 establishments contacted 
the SCHUI.65 Some submitted plans to hire hundreds or more of these people. For 
example, the East China Department of Education had 3,000 vacancies.66 The low 
rates of success reflected a mismatch between what many of these establishments 
wanted—technicians and technical personnel (jishu renyuan)—and the regis-
trants’ knowledge and skills.67
Equally important, the poor placement rates were results of political vigilance 
on the part of the recruiting establishments, or their efforts to avoid acquiring 
individuals portrayed or implicated as political undesirables by the state, such as 
former Guomindang personnel, former landlords, and people who had received 
official punishment. The general approach of the establishments, the SCHUI 
observed, was “rather be understaffed than indiscriminately taking on new 
employees” (ningque wulan) and preferential treatment of “the youngest possible 
candidates.”68 The collective outcome was reflected in the rates of placement of 
the cohorts represented in Table 2. Thirty-five percent of the youngest cohort of 
registrants, or those with the least work experience, received assignments, com-
pared to 31, 26, 13, and 1 percent of registrants in the successive cohorts. It is true 
that young people tended to be single or childless and hence open to relocation. 
Positions outside Shanghai, while plentiful, usually paid less (because the state cal-
culated salaries on the basis of regional living standards), and therefore were not 
attractive to many who had a family to support in the city. However, the rates of 
placement suggest that discrimination against older registrants was in play. For the 
recruiting establishments, the backgrounds reported by young registrants in their 
applications and autobiographical narratives, however misleading, were easily ver-
ifiable compared with the long lists of appointments, connections, and activities 
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or, worse, the lack of such information furnished by older candidates. The political 
vigilance of the establishments reflected and reinforced the cult of youth spreading 
within the state sector.
What happened to Yu Jielin’s job search, which the SCHUI cited as not uncom-
mon, is instructive. Yu was a struggling 36-year-old with two years of senior high 
education and a family of three to feed. Before the registration of unemployed 
intellectuals began, he had received two months of training from the Shanghai 
branch of the People’s Insurance Company of China but was not given a posi-
tion there. To make ends meet, he performed various kinds of lowly physical 
work. After successfully registering as an unemployed intellectual, Yu was rec-
ommended to the Shanghai Medical Equipment Manufacturing Company and 
passed its written and physical exams. Still, the company did not offer him any-
thing. Quite puzzled, SCHUI officials contacted the company and learned that he 
was rejected because of his “complicated political background.” According to the 
registration information provided by Yu, he was no more than a former low-level 
supporter of Guomindang rule who had served as a village chief and attended an 
officially sponsored political training course.69 Other establishments, the commis-
sion noted, took caution to a similar extreme when considering unemployed intel-
lectuals for positions. The East China Bureau of Mining Management declined 
to accept any candidates unless the Shanghai Public Security Bureau investigated 
their backgrounds and guaranteed that the candidates had not been members of 
Guomindang organizations. Some establishments wanted to know that the can-
didates were “politically reliable” or had a “clean history,” and refused to accept 
qualified police statements such as “up to now no political problem has been 
found with this candidate.” According to SCHUI, the Provincial Government of 
Rehe evaluated 134 candidates for 100 positions in finance and economics and 
hired only 12 (a 9 percent rate of acceptance). The East China Bureau of Geology 
was apparently more risk-tolerant. Management looked at 611 candidates for 500 
trainee vacancies and took 167 (a 27 percent rate of acceptance).70
Once detected by those seeking to register as unemployed intellectuals, the 
recruiting establishments’ vigilance compounded these persons’ tendency to 
withhold information from the authorities. Some of them inverted a well-known 
official slogan to express what they believed would give them the best chance of 
rejoining the workforce. They stated that the state practiced “ruthlessness for those 
who confess [their wrongful pasts], and leniency for those who cover up [such 
background]” (tanbai congyan yinman congkuan), instead of the other way around 
as promised. The SCHUI indicated that there were registrants who had chosen not 
to reveal some of their connections, activities, or appointments until after starting 
the new position.71 To be sure, recruiting governments and enterprises understood 
that among unemployed factory and other manual workers were people who had 
been dishonest about their backgrounds and activities. However, since the state 
86    chapter 4
had no plan to place such workers in professional or administrative positions in 
large numbers, such establishments did not have to worry about their impact on 
everyday operation.
In brief, a self-fulfilling prophecy emerged. The Mao regime wanted to exploit 
the knowledge and skills of “unemployed intellectuals” for purposes of socialist 
development, even though it considered these persons politically unreliable. The 
way in which the emerging state conducted appointments and dismissals as well 
as the registration drives predetermined the kinds of people who came forward as 
unemployed intellectuals and asked for assistance. Few of them possessed profes-
sional training or experience. Many had worked for Guomindang or had other 
background disapproved by the state. Furthermore, neither the state nor recruit-
ing establishments could quickly verify personal information provided by those 
who claimed to be unemployed intellectuals. In the end, the Mao regime obtained 
what it had anticipated—a pool of intellectuals who could fill various kinds of 
position but who it feared would wreak havoc on socialist development.
THE DEEPENING OF THE SURVEILL ANCE STATE
In April 1952, after five months of registering unemployed intellectuals, the SCHUI 
responded to lingering questions from higher authorities and recruiting establish-
ments about the registrants’ backgrounds. The commission’s leaders gathered staff 
members from every district and explained to them a “mass-line” (qunzhong lux-
ian) approach to investigation, borrowing the term from the famous method of 
revolution articulated by Mao during the Yan’an phase of Chinese Communism. 
The investigations would henceforth involve local branches of state-sponsored 
associations and local residents’ committees; local officials, CCP activists, and 
homemakers; and the relatives, friends, neighbors, and former colleagues of the 
applicants. With each application, registration staff would approach the local 
associations and the local residents’ committee to confirm claims about educa-
tional attainment, work experience, family background, and so on. Additional 
care would be needed for applicants whose “situations are relatively complicated,” 
or with whom hints existed that they had worked for the Guomindang or other 
political regimes, served the exploiting classes beyond the role of an ordinary 
white-collar worker, or lied in their applications. Staff members were instructed 
to interview as many people as necessary in the local neighborhood, contact the 
applicant for further information, and visit or write to the mentioned workplaces 
to clarify what positions the applicant had held, the quality of performance, and 
the reasons for termination. Staff members were asked to hold “investigative group 
meetings” with people who knew the applicant well to obtain further informa-
tion. If doubts persisted as to whether the person had committed serious crimes, 
assistance from the Public Security Bureau or the local police station would be 
warranted. The goal was to have everyone contacted “candidly disclose every piece 
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of information” they had on the applicant. The staff could then assess the cred-
ibility of the informants and the evidence and therefore the true identity of the 
applicant.72
This mass-line approach of the SCHUI to investigating unemployed intel-
lectuals was fanciful thinking. The commission and its staff constituted but an 
extremely thin layer of the municipal bureaucracy, which was simultaneously 
managing other official campaigns across the city. The frontline registration per-
sonnel lacked opportunities to execute the ambitious investigation, not to mention 
appropriate training or support to accomplish the task. Nonetheless, the approach 
revealed that the official view of the intellectual as a usable but unreliable subject 
informed surveillance practice in urban society. The registration authorities feared 
that some unemployed intellectuals might be resentful of CCP rule or even plot-
ting against it. At the very least, these intellectuals shared habits and dispositions 
harmful to socialist development. In the authorities’ minds, who these persons 
were, what they believed, and what they had done thus had to be clarified. As we 
have seen, two of the investigative procedures mentioned by the commission were 
actually deployed during the subsequent Unified Unemployment Registration: 
extensive neighborhood participation and public discussion.
As official surveillance on the unemployed intensified across Shanghai, recruit-
ing establishments that could neither wait for the SCHUI to complete its inves-
tigation nor exclude unemployed intellectuals from hiring plans took matters 
into their own hands. What happened at the New Education College of Shanghai 
(Shanghai xinjiaoyu xueyuan) offers a window on the tactics and strategies of 
such establishments, few of which had resources to pursue comprehensive per-
sonnel investigation during the early 1950s. The college was originally set up to 
train instructors in primary, secondary, vocational, and factory-run schools to 
become CCP activists. Due to the rapid expansion of the Shanghai school system, 
the college quickly switched to preparing displaced schoolteachers to return to 
work. A few months into the registration of unemployed intellectuals, the col-
lege’s mission was extended to the training of such persons for school positions. 
During the summer of 1952, the college enrolled almost 3,000 unemployed intel-
lectuals, of whom over two-thirds were women, in a six-week residential course. 
The training involved little instruction in pedagogical skills or academic subjects. 
The course was modeled after the ideological reeducation program that the CCP 
had developed in Yan’an, which was then deployed widely across Shanghai as part 
of Thought Reform of Intellectuals. The trainees were required to learn about the 
policies of the Mao regime, its interpretation of politics, society, and history, and 
what it regarded as the correct approach to work. Most important for our pur-
poses, mandatory “confessions” (tanbai) were an integral part of the training.73
The college authorities were most interested in learning the political back-
grounds and activities of the unemployed intellectuals. The details obtained 
through confessions would not only reveal how each of these persons had 
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approached the 1949 revolution, but also serve as the bases for determining job 
assignment and other kinds of action. The authorities apparently guided the train-
ees in a particular manner to elicit their cooperation.
Depending on the ideological state of the trainees, we repeatedly explained the of-
ficial policy [of educating, reforming, winning over, and uniting with intellectuals] 
to dispel misgivings, and we patiently and sincerely taught and helped the trainees to 
attain self-awareness. We did not push or force them. We let them move from ordi-
nary issues in their political life to past involvement in significant political activities, 
from their thinking to their participation in organizations and activities, from help-
ing them to identify friends [of the revolution among people whom they know] to 
recognizing its enemies, from fragmented self-examinations [of ideological missteps 
and mistakes] to holistic confessions [of background and activities] as their aware-
ness improved . . . At every stage, we selected successful examples as guides, played 
instructional films, and showed what the trainees had accomplished with the confes-
sions to educate the trainees themselves. Finally, we helped the trainees further to 
reveal their backgrounds in a lucid and concrete manner through their writing of 
autobiographical narratives and open discussions of the content of the narratives.74
From the confessions, the authorities identified 952 of the trainees (33 percent) as 
having “problems” in their backgrounds. Among the serious cases, which num-
bered above 200, 49 people had reportedly held leadership positions at the district 
or higher level of the Guomindang or other “reactionary” political organizations. 
Forty-eight were former special agents of Guomindang intelligence or para-intel-
ligence agencies or had served the collaborationist regime in similar capacities 
during the Anti-Japanese War. Thirty-eight had occupied the post of section chief 
or higher offices in the Guomindang government. Seven had attained the rank of 
brigade commander or above in the Guomindang military. Ten were former land-
lords; 51 were “CCP renegades.” A few were former drug traffickers and convicted 
criminals.75 It is unclear how these results compared with what the trainees had 
stated when they registered as unemployed intellectuals. The state recognized that, 
in general, some thought reform participants exaggerated their past activities and 
wrongdoings because of pressures to conform to official expectations as well as to 
show cooperation and remorse in front of peers and superiors.76 One thing, how-
ever, is incontrovertible. The college expended material, symbolic, and intellectual 
resources to investigate every trainee in response to direct instructions, with the 
underlying belief that unemployed intellectuals were usable but unreliable.
Official surveillance at the college did not stop with the backgrounds, beliefs, 
and behavior of the trainees. The authorities monitored, evaluated, and docu-
mented the “ideological state” (sixiang qingkuang) of everyone and any changes 
therein, or what these men and women were prone to feel, think, and do as class 
subjects.77 The official discourse on intellectuals became the analytical foundation 
on which the trainees were apprehended. Instruction, conversations, symposiums, 
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and other campus activities became occasions for observation, examination, and 
documentation; the speeches and comportments of the trainees and their inter-
action with the authorities and one another were sources of information. The 
authorities were especially interested in two things: first, the extent to which the 
trainees supported the socialist project, the official policy on intellectuals, and the 
state’s plan to reeducate these people; and second, the trainees’ effort to overcome 
their own self-centeredness, indiscipline, and other undesirable traits that they 
had allegedly acquired since childhood and in roles such as official, firm manager, 
and schoolteacher. Like the confessions, the assessments were used to determine 
appointments, or punishment if necessary.
When the training began, the college authorities reported that self-interest was 
a major reason behind the enrollments. Some trainees had no desire to work in a 
school, but needed a job. Some joined the class so they could show their families 
that they were making efforts at finding employment. Some women stated that 
having a regular income would free them from the bullying of in-laws. Diagnosed, 
too, was a lack of understanding of the training and its intentions, as manifested 
in allegations such as “training classes organized by the CCP are identical to con-
centration camps [jizhong ying]; labor reform is inevitable,” and in rumors that 
“those who performed poorly will be sent to Subei [the northern part of Jiangsu 
Province] or northeast China to help open up remote areas and perform farm 
labor.” The authorities documented cynicism toward ideological reeducation from 
expressions such as “individualism is part of human nature and can’t be altered” 
and “bring on thought reform if that’s what I need to get a job.”78 As comments and 
conduct were entered into official records, every trainee became “a describable, 
analyzable object”79 or, in the authorities’ eyes, a class subject with specific ideo-
logical, moral, and behavioral inclinations.
The next chapter explores, among other things, how postrevolutionary surveil-
lance inside the workplace intensified the objectification of the intellectual with 
an “ever more subtle partitioning of individual behavior.”80 Suffice it to mention 
here that the college authorities adopted a quasi-official system of notation, a set 
of recurring vocabulary based on the official discourse on intellectuals, to sum up 
their observations. The vocabulary facilitated not only concise communication of 
the trainees’ attributes as class subjects and comparison between trainees, but also 
their evaluation in relation to the ideological, moral, and behavioral expectations 
of the state. Desirable attributes identified by the authorities included, among oth-
ers, “sincere about learning” (xuexi renzhen) the material furnished by the state, 
“aspiring to make progress” (yaoqiu jinbu) to meet official standards, “upright 
in their ways” (zuofeng zhengpai), and “relatively honest” (jiao laoshi) given the 
corruptive commercial and moneymaking culture of Shanghai. Examples of 
negative attributes were “backward thinking” (sixiang luohou) on political, eco-
nomic, and social issues; fear of hardship, challenges, and extra work (pa chiku); 
tendency toward being “rash and irritable” (xingqing jizao); and “rather strong 
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petty-bourgeois proclivities” (xiao zichan jieji qingtiao jiaonong) in terms of 
speech, attire, and lifestyle.81
In the end, almost all of the 3,000 trainees were assigned to a position in a school. 
This does not mean that the college authorities were confident about their knowl-
edge of these people or pleased with the latter’s performance during the six weeks 
of ideological reeducation. The high placement rate reflected, instead, increasing 
demand for schoolteachers and other school personnel across Shanghai.82 In fact, 
the appointments were only for six months initially. The receiving campuses were 
expected to examine and further reeducate the appointees to determine whether 
they deserved permanent employment. In other words, state surveillance of the 
trainees migrated into their newfound workplaces. Roughly 60 trainees (2 per-
cent) did not receive any assignment. One category of rejects included former 
Guomindang personnel who were uncooperative and others who had reportedly 
committed violent crimes or were suspected of having been sabotaging CCP rule. 
The Public Security Bureau was notified about these people; with its consent, how-
ever, they still could be considered for positions at schools. Members of a second 
category were not considered for any school position. These were mainly men and 
women who had signed up as unemployed intellectuals fraudulently or fugitives 
or criminals required to be processed by the court or the police.83
In their notable study of social classification, Bowker and Star suggest that if “a 
category did not exist contemporaneously, it should not be retroactively applied.”84 
The alternative, they argue, is to lose sight of dynamics related to how systems of 
classification emerged and evolved, or a unique window on politics, society, and 
history. On the eve of the 1949 revolution, ordinary Chinese had little reason to talk 
or think about “intellectuals,” let alone consider whether they personally belonged 
to this social category. Not long after the revolution, embodied subjects referred 
to as intellectuals were locatable across China. The registration drive described 
above captures the impact of the Yan’an approach to the intellectual on its ontolog-
ical transformation. The triumphant Mao regime wanted nationwide cooperation 
from usable but unreliable “intellectuals.” Before long, the Shanghai government 
began to use its symbolic power and administrative capability to locate jobless 
intellectuals. Looking to improve their lives or those of their families, many evalu-
ated whether they were intellectuals eligible for official assistance and nudged oth-
ers to do the same. The web of texts, conversations, and interactions that spread 
across the city during the registration drive turned it into a collective learning 
exercise, one that involved the intellectual as a classification of people. When the 
drive ended, every neighborhood had a new category of people—intellectuals—
albeit with the boundaries of this population remaining ambiguous.
At the same time, governance in Shanghai took on specific features because 
of the official view that some of the unemployed were usable but unreliable 
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intellectuals. For one thing, the municipal government spread its tentacles deep 
into neighborhoods and performed propaganda, liaison, training, and other tasks 
that served to strengthen its presence. Second, the government deployed large 
amounts of resources on surveillance because of worries that some unemployed 
intellectuals were saboteurs, criminals, or others who would wreak havoc in the 
workplace. Third, the government expanded ideological reeducation as means to 
transform as many unemployed intellectuals as possible into assets of socialist 
development. In a nutshell, as the registration drive objectified otherwise perfectly 
ordinary people into intellectuals, official deployment of mass surveillance, ideo-
logical reeducation, and workplace management by party cadres intensified under 
Chinese Communism.
92
5
Classification and Organization in a 
School System
For a while after [the 1949 War of] Liberation . . . even those intellectuals like 
ourselves from old liberated areas [in northern China] were able to shake off 
the [kinds of political] discrimination that we had long endured [within the 
Chinese Communist movement] and became “veteran cadres” . . . going from 
being persecuted to becoming persecutors.
—Wei Junyi, ca. 1991
During the mid-1930s, Wei Junyi (1917–2002) was a philosophy major and political 
activist at the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing. She was so inspired by 
what she learned in her spare time about the CCP and its resistance to the ongoing 
Japanese invasion of China that she joined the party in 1936 and went to Yan’an 
three years later. Like many young people in the remote town during this period, 
she specialized in literary and educational work, traveled with Red Army troops, 
and performed subsistence agricultural labor. That is, she became an “intellectual” 
under the Mao regime. When the Rectification Campaign sponsored by the regime 
descended during the 1940s into the Rescue Campaign (Qiangjiu yundong), a fero-
cious hunt for spies and traitors in the ranks of revolutionaries within the Shaan-
Gan-Ning base area, Wei was working in a town near Yan’an.1 She initially believed 
the extraordinary tales of conspiracy and betrayal reported by the local party lead-
ers, including their discovery of female students using sex and romance as bait to 
gather intelligence for the Guomindang and of enemy agents as young as six years 
of age. As close friends and eventually her husband were detained and identified 
as spies by the authorities, she realized that false accusations had been widespread. 
To avoid further punishment, her husband concocted self-incriminating stories 
with her support and, like many others, confessed publicly to trumped-up charges. 
With her trust in the local leadership shaken, Wei wrote to Chairman Mao to 
seek justice. Her husband even went to Yan’an to try to clear his name, only to 
find out that the abuses there had been still worse. Shortly afterward, Mao and his 
deputies issued public apologies for maltreating revolutionaries, which was small 
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consolation to Wei and her husband, who had lost their child to illness partly 
because of the strain and isolation suffered by the family when it was under attack.2
Anyone who expects that Wei’s loss and trauma as a Yan’an revolutionary would 
have hardened her into a noble woman daring to stand up against injustices under 
Chinese Communism will be disappointed. When she and her husband returned 
to Beijing during the late 1940s to assist in the CCP takeover, what they saw was 
a bizarre and depraved city, a far cry from how they had experienced the place 
before joining others in Yan’an. Filled with joy and confidence, they considered 
themselves part of the righteous forces that would remake Beijing from top to 
bottom. As successive punitive campaigns swept across the city during the first 
years of CCP rule, Wei, who worked in propaganda and literature, responded 
almost exactly as she had during her Yan’an years. At first, she believed the charges 
brought against others by the authorities. When the latter denounced her friends 
and colleagues, she recognized the baselessness, injustice, and even absurdity of 
the accusations. Nonetheless, she participated in and even led the persecution of 
colleagues of whose innocence she was certain. When she or her husband became 
a target of attack, they exploited their connections to higher officials to shield 
themselves from or minimize the resulting humiliation and punishment. In her 
own words, she “carried on the abominable practice of political persecution that 
the Mao regime deemed to be appropriate and beneficial to CCP rule.”3
In this chapter, we move our investigation of the mutual constitution of the 
intellectual and Chinese Communism into the postrevolutionary workplace. A 
Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, the Mao regime was determined to industrialize 
China. The regime appointed large numbers of CCP cadres officially classifiable 
as intellectuals, especially those who had joined the party before 1949, to colleges, 
newspapers, factories, and other establishments to oversee those whom it labeled 
intellectuals, while the state media unceasingly criticized the politics, knowledge, 
and character of such subjects. Management by party cadres, ideological reedu-
cation, and mass surveillance became features of such establishments and led to 
an unending flow of texts, signs, and cues that reproduced the official discourse 
of class. Ordinary professional workers (e.g., journalists, accountants, engineers) 
not only were objectified into usable but unreliable intellectuals for all to see; 
they were divided further into various subtypes for purposes of political control. 
To deflect their own stigmatization by the state, the cadres distanced themselves 
from the professional workers through various means. As Wei Junyi hinted in 
the epigraph, many represented themselves in words or deeds as “veteran cadres” 
(lao ganbu) by drawing attention to their loyalty to, sacrifices for, and knowledge 
of Chinese Communism. As the professional workers coped with official criti-
cisms of selfishness, indiscipline, and other failings and the often callous behav-
ior of the cadres, professional life became infected with fear and anger, shame 
and resentment, pretension and deception as well as antagonism, withdrawal, 
and humiliation. The domination, division, and demoralization impeded the 
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official goal of rallying party cadres and professional workers to build a success-
ful socialist polity together.
To use the terminology of the late sociologist Erving Goffman, the CCP take-
over of industry, education, and other sectors based on the official discourse of 
intellectuals created two vulnerable populations. The discredited comprised ordi-
nary professional workers, or those who fit precisely into the Marxian definition 
of intellectuals of the party. They were subjects of state disparagement and objects 
of political control. The discreditable included party cadres who were relatively 
educated and thus susceptible to being categorized as intellectuals by superiors 
and others. As members of the two populations engaged in stigma management, 
or efforts to reduce the damage that the classification would do to them, a culture 
of anxiety, distrust, and resentment grew increasingly to mar the workplace. This 
outcome could not but harm the prospect of Chinese Communism.4
To clarify these aspects of the intellectual and Chinese Communism under 
the early PRC, I discuss conditions within Shanghai secondary education as well 
as professional life in the city, especially during Thought Reform of Intellectuals. 
Twelve years ago, I published a book on the school system. The book illustrates 
the bureaucratic quagmire that developed in the workplace because of state con-
duct and the resulting challenges to official governance.5 As I turned my attention 
again to the postrevolutionary workplace with themes of this book in mind, I kept 
noticing dynamics similar to those obtaining in the school system in documents 
on higher education, industry, and other sectors that I came across in the munici-
pal archives of Shanghai and Beijing. I realized that with the wealth of material 
I had gathered on the school system over an eight-year period, I could offer a 
rich yet succinct example of how the workplace figured in the mutual constitu-
tion of the intellectual and Chinese Communism, while reminding the reader that 
any similar survey of another sector must take into consideration its institutional 
characteristics (such as division of labor, control mechanisms, and management 
decisions). The following account contains primarily data that did not appear in 
my previous book.
More specifically, I suggest that two interrelated bundles of administrative 
conduct saturated the urban workplace, served to objectify the intellectual, and 
shaped social relations and individual calculus. First, I use textual corroboration 
to refer to the multiple layers of documentation that party cadres maintained on 
the staff on the basis of the official discourse of class. The records appeared in 
many genres of text (e.g., staff registration, autobiographical narrative, perfor-
mance appraisal, police report, penalty statement), each corresponding to specific 
investigative efforts of the state. The records covered, to varying extents, the family 
background, occupational history, work performance, social connections, politi-
cal activities, and outlook and habits of the individual. The documents consistently 
described most professional workers as petty-bourgeois intellectuals and ascribed 
to these workers preconceived habits and dispositions from the official discourse. 
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They also identified a minority of such workers virtually as enemies of the state. 
Second, I use everyday signification to refer to the deluge of signs and cues initiated 
by the party cadres that reinforced the official representation of ordinary profes-
sional workers as petty-bourgeois intellectuals. Some of these signs and cues went 
together with mandated organizational reform; others arose as the cadres signaled 
that they were politically and morally superior to ordinary professional workers. 
Work arrangement, staff meetings, everyday interaction, and other workplace 
activities were impregnated with terms, meanings, and values from the official 
discourse of intellectuals, sometimes in a dramatic fashion.
CL ASSIFICATION IMPACT OF TEXTUAL 
C ORROB OR ATON
Sociologist Dorothy Smith argues that “textual reality” is integral to systemic 
domination. States and other organized powers create their own written accounts 
of people, things, and events. Built upon “the discourse of ruling” of these pow-
ers, or their political and administrative visions, the accounts produce “objectified 
forms of knowledge.” Issues are formulated, studied, and recorded “because they 
are administratively relevant, not because they are significant first in the experi-
ence of those who live them.”6 When the PLA entered Shanghai in mid-1949, the 
CCP had more than 700 underground agents serving as faculty or staff members 
across primary and secondary schools.7 These agents organized teacher associa-
tions, set up student groups, promoted street demonstrations, and conducted 
other activities on behalf of Chinese Communism.8 Some of these agents had pre-
pared reports on the character, performance, and politics of colleagues in antici-
pation of campus takeovers by the party. Composed under secrecy, such reports 
lacked substance and accuracy compared with material assembled later by party 
cadres through various means of official surveillance. The reports, nonetheless, 
marked the introduction of textual corroboration into the school systems, or the 
textual reality of the party based on its discourse of class.
Wuben Girls Secondary School (Wuben nüzi zhongxue), which was founded in 
1902, had the distinction of being China’s first secondary school for girls. The cam-
pus was quickly taken over by the CCP authorities after they seized control of the 
Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Education (hereafter SBE) (Shanghaishi jiaoyuju) 
in June 1949 and tasked it with reorganizing primary and secondary education 
and instructional programs of various kinds. A few weeks later, an underground 
agent who had taught at Wuben for two years delivered to the bureau a nine-
page report on the faculty and staff. This handwritten report, which was about 
7,000 characters long, focused on management personnel and whether they were 
fit to keep their jobs. School principal Yang Minghui, who had allegedly fled to 
Taiwan after purchasing an exquisite apartment there with embezzled money, 
was depicted as a villain and virtually part of the exploiting classes. She was a 
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“typical dirty party politician” of the Guomindang who had sat on its legislative 
and governing bodies and had obtained her campus position through ties to pow-
erful officials. She traveled ostentatiously by car or rickshaw, smoked heavily, wore 
expensive clothing and heavy makeup, and indulged herself in playing mahjong 
and other activities unbecoming of educators. Had Yang stayed on campus, the 
SBE would have removed her from her position and very possibly worked with 
other emerging state agencies to have her arrested. Forty other faculty or staff 
members appear in the report as usable but unreliable intellectuals, but also to 
different extents. Three components loom large in these brief assessments. First, 
appraisals of work performance, or the functional value of the individual to the 
institution of education, range from “well-learned” and “dedicated to students” to 
“indifferent” to their duties and “incompetent.” Second, descriptors of personal 
character, or the likelihood that the individual would heed the socialist message 
of the state, include, for example, kind-hearted, even-tempered, timid, and despi-
cable. Third, political judgments were constant, and sometimes expressed in stock 
phrases (such as “progressive in thinking” and “emphasizing personal safety first”) 
to signal how the person had reacted to public protests against the Japanese inva-
sion of China or Guomindang rule. Overall, the assessments hinted at how likely 
it was that the individual would support CCP rule. For example, physics teacher 
Yuan Chengming was presented as someone who could be trusted, because she 
was “open-minded” as well as “straightforward and kind” and did not exhibit the 
materialistic “styles typical of Shanghai people,” besides being an instructor well 
received by students. In contrast, part-time instructor of Chinese literature Zheng 
Yimei (1895–1992), though well respected in the local literary and art scenes, was 
depicted as an obstacle to revolutionary change, because he was arrogant, stub-
born, self-absorbed, and irresponsible, in addition to clinging to “outmoded ways 
of thinking” about gender, labor, and other issues.9
Within Shanghai secondary education, no event of the early 1950s was as 
influential as Thought Reform of Intellectuals in supplying a textual reality for 
objectifying faculty and staff members into “petty-bourgeois intellectuals.” The 
well-documented national campaign, which also targeted professors, writers, 
and other professional workers, was partly an outcome of textual material gath-
ered about these people by party cadres through investigations and mandated 
self-reports. The SBE had used pertinent records to identify supporters, remove 
others from their posts, and implement mechanisms of control on campuses. 
Thought Reform enabled the bureau to collect material on virtually every fac-
ulty and staff member. More than 7,000 of them participated in the campaign in 
three successive groups between July 1952 and March 1953.10 There is no need to 
detail the activities that defined the campaign, that is, mutual criticism and self-
criticism of the political, moral, and professional wrongdoing of the participants, 
their writing and rewriting of autobiographical narratives, publication of select 
compositions on site and in newspapers for instructional purposes, and study of 
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state policies and other preassigned topics. The activities were informed by the 
 discourse of intellectuals and the practice of ideological reeducation that the party 
had developed before taking power. The activities led to countless mentions of 
the intellectual by individuals and organizations, along with descriptions of what 
the state expected from such subjects and their supposedly undesirable and even 
 objectionable traits.11
The surge of textual material during Thought Reform enabled the SBE to char-
acterize and compare faculty and staff members as class subjects and to highlight 
the overall distribution of attributes of these “intellectuals.” Notwithstanding the 
presence of false and inaccurate information, the records furnished details of the 
political, occupational, and family backgrounds of the individuals and their habits 
and dispositions, social networks, political activities, and responses to CCP rule. 
Let us look at the main findings of the bureau, or what it most wanted to know 
about the faculty and staff. Virtually half had allegedly had ties to Guomindang 
organizations; at least 20 percent were former government officials, military offi-
cers, special agents, or political organizers. The SBE singled out some of these peo-
ple as potentially serious threats to its control of the campuses. These individuals 
had reportedly served in ranking positions, acted as undercover agents in schools, 
or participated directly in thwarting student movements against the Guomindang 
government. The SBE discovered others whom it regarded as former local bul-
lies, landlords, bandits, or religious sect leaders, or people who had used force or 
other means to take advantage of and even physically hurt others.12 On top of this 
picture of unacceptable political allegiances, outright criminality, and class-enemy 
backgrounds, the SBE reported large numbers of comparatively minor offenses 
and transgressions, some of which had occurred shortly before and even during 
Thought Reform. For example, at Yuedong Secondary School, which had twenty-
five faculty and staff members, eight confessed to corruption or other economic 
wrongdoing and twenty-three to illegal gambling or lending. Fourteen said that 
they had womanized or patronized dance halls, and ten reported that they had 
“abominable workstyles” that sometimes involved severe physical punishment of 
students. Prostitution and syphilis, drug addiction and trafficking, and tax evasion 
and theft were documented on other campuses.13
What happened to physics teacher Cao Qingjun demonstrates further how the 
textual reality of the SBE turned faculty and staff members into usable but unre-
liable intellectuals. Using material gathered during Thought Reform and other 
occasions, the bureau put together a portrait of Cao when seeking to impose pun-
ishment on those who had committed wrongdoing recently. First, Cao turned out 
to be a former Guomindang official. He had served as a military interpreter  during 
the Anti-Japanese War and received Song Meiling (1897–2003) when she visited 
the town where he worked. Song was the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, the leader 
of the Guomindang. Second, Cao was greedy, undisciplined, and untrustworthy. 
He had engaged in economic speculation before and after 1949. He owed money 
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to restaurants where he wined and dined, had taken money from students and col-
leagues, and had stolen from the schools where he worked. Third, Cao was as an 
unscrupulous instructor. He failed to grade students properly and made improper 
advances to female students, so much so that he had stolen examination papers 
and used them as bait to get close to teenagers whom he liked. Despite these find-
ings, the SBE merely issued Cao a formal warning (jinggao) for his behavior, which 
was one of the lightest sanctions that the bureau could administer.14 An almost 
twofold expansion of student enrollment within the school system between 1949 
and 1953 made the bureau reluctant to dismiss any instructors except those con-
sidered incorrigible.15 Moreover, Cao’s punishment, or the lack of it, suggests that 
he had been cooperative with the authorities during the investigations. In short, he 
remained usable from the bureau’s perspective.
As textual material on the faculty and staff accumulated because of state surveil-
lance, the SBE performed paidui, an official approach to control that was becoming 
increasingly common. Paidui literally means lining up people or things in order. 
Administrative documents use the term to refer to the division of a population 
into a sequence of political subcategories supplied by the higher authorities. The 
procedure enabled the state to experiment with various schemes of classification 
and accordingly formulate measures of supervision, punishment, encouragement, 
and so on. Within the school system, party cadres used gathered documentation 
and their observations to combine and recombine faculty and staff members into 
lineups of political subtypes—and therefore produced even more written records 
on these “intellectuals.” What happened at the reputed Nanyang Model Secondary 
School is instructive. It shows that while the state saw most schoolteachers as 
petty-bourgeois intellectuals, the use of paidui placed a small minority on the edge 
of the category of class enemies and even squarely inside it. In the spring of 1952, 
Nanyang’s faculty and staff took part in a pilot run of Thought Reform. After weeks 
of investigation and ideological reeducation, the cadres had collected sufficient 
material to place twenty-four of the fifty people into literally five subcategories 
according to the political activities of the individuals and their cooperation with 
the authorities, or how much of a threat they posed to the school system and the 
state. “The first category” included those who had in their backgrounds minor 
“historical problems” of aiding enemy regimes. A former diplomat and a former 
director of a Christian church were two of the five people assigned to this subcat-
egory. The authorities assigned another five people to “the third category,” which 
was reserved for individuals who had “serious problems in [their] political his-
tory” but “no current activities” against the state. Placed in this subcategory was 
a woman who had disclosed two decades of service to the Guomindang and ties 
to former key members of the collaborationist regime during the Anti-Japanese 
War. A former Guomindang official who reportedly had placed CCP cadres under 
arrest, engaged in criminal activities, and indirectly caused suicides among his 
victims was the single member of “the fifth category,” or people who had “a debt of 
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blood” or were involved in “existing activities” against the state and who had been 
evasive about such wrongdoing.16
After Thought Reform formally began within Shanghai secondary educa-
tion, faculty and staff members were separated into analytical and administrative 
subtypes by school party cadres, sometimes repeatedly, to facilitate reorganiza-
tion and management of the campuses. The principal lineup divided the faculty 
and staff into five segments—that is, “progressive,” “intermediate,” “backward,” 
“reactionary,” and “counterrevolutionary elements”—according to the political 
experience of the individuals and their willingness to support or submit to CCP 
instructions and standards, especially those publicized within the school system. 
The SBE made recommendations as to the proportion of the faculty and staff to 
be placed in each segments (for example, approximately 25 and 15 percent were 
to be designated as progressive and reactionary elements, respectively).17 Other 
political lineups and schemas of subcategories appeared. On the one hand, these 
instruments reflected official vigilance, or the view that intellectuals constituted 
a threat to Chinese Communism. On the other hand, they helped to justify the 
deployment of penal and other administrative measures within the school sys-
tem, especially the appointment of party cadres to management positions. For the 
state, the classification further captured the political and class character of some of 
the faculty and staff members. For instance, by September 1952, after roughly half 
of the faculty and staff had undergone Thought Reform, the SBE instructed the 
cadres in charge of the campaign to designate some as “key targets [of attention]” 
based on evidence or clues of involvement in counterrevolutionary activities or 
serious crimes. The targets were to be separated into “first,” “second,” and “third” 
types according to wrongdoing and willingness to cooperate with the authorities, 
before the administration of criminal punishment or administrative sanction, of 
which the bureau included immediate arrest, continual subjection to ideologi-
cal reeducation, deprivation of political rights, and other measures.18 The cadres 
were instructed to identify another four types of people for removal from cam-
pus, demotion, formal reprimand, or warning based on wrongdoing, poor work 
performance, insufficient remorsefulness, and other factors. Put differently, as 
Thought Reform proceeded, the bureau used gathered records to establish that 
some faculty and staff members were objectionable or incompetent, and yet some 
of them could still be used by the school system.19
After Thought Reform, textual material continued to build up within the school 
system, leaving none of the faculty or staff members an unchanging “intellectual.” 
As official investigation continued, previously unknown details of the political, 
professional, or other activities of these persons came to light. The state’s shift-
ing emphasis on the relations of intellectuals to socialist development affected 
how the SBE interpreted professional conduct and past activities. The state, fur-
thermore, introduced new schemes of political classification, for example, dur-
ing the mid-1950s Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries. As a 
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result, the bureau reassessed and reclassified faculty and staff members regularly, 
even though it continued to regard most of them as petty-bourgeois intellectu-
als. The vicissitudes of Zhu Shouzhong (1920–1970) illustrate how dramatically 
the CCP’s endless documentation of the background, thought, and behavior of 
so-called intellectuals altered some of these people’s class and political identities—
sometimes with life-and-death consequences. When the PLA entered Shanghai, 
Zhu was already a well-documented supporter of the socialist revolution. When 
he was a secondary student in the late 1930s, he participated in public protests 
against Guomindang policies and practices. He subsequently graduated from the 
Economics Department of the famous Fudan University, but chose to become 
a schoolteacher. During the civil war, he became an influential member of the 
Shanghai Secondary School Teachers Association, a front organization established 
by the CCP to rally support for the revolution. After the takeover, Zhu was one 
of the first Shanghai schoolteachers recruited into the CCP. His education, hard 
work, and service to the profession earned him the posts of school inspector and 
then deputy director of teacher-training programs at the SBE. In 1954, the bureau 
made him the deputy principal of a teachers’ college. If Zhu’s success exemplified 
from the official perspective what a supportive petty-bourgeois intellectual could 
achieve under CCP rule during the early 1950s, he discovered shortly afterward 
how other facets of his life, once documented officially, would destroy the career 
and lifestyle that he had worked for. When Land Reform reached his native place 
after the 1949 revolution, the authorities categorized Zhu as an absentee landlord 
because of land he had received from his father. We do not know how Zhu had 
handled the land prior to the campaign. But he did tell some colleagues about the 
worrisome classification. Nothing disturbing happened to him until the Campaign 
to Wipe Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries swept across education and other 
sectors. The record that he was an absentee landlord became the basis on which 
his CCP membership was revoked. During the Antirightist Movement roughly 
a year later, his landlord classification was brought up again at his expense. The 
SBE accused Zhu of having lied about his class background and sentenced him 
as “a class adversary who had infiltrated the party” (jieji yizi fenzi). He was reas-
signed with 500 other people from Shanghai’s cultural and educational sectors to 
the forbidding Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in northern China, where he was 
repeatedly denounced and finally executed in 1970.20 Once a trustworthy intellec-
tual to the state based on official documentation, Zhu became a class enemy from 
the official perspective, equally because of textual corroboration.
DYNAMICS OF EVERYDAY SIGNIFICATION
Following Lenin, the CCP leadership believed that if intellectuals were not placed 
under the supervision of the party after the socialist revolution, they would con-
tinue to use their knowledge and authority to serve the interests of the exploiting 
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classes. Using well-trained party cadres to take over banks, newspapers, univer-
sities, and other places where intellectuals normally work is vital to advancing 
socialist development, not to mention defeating any of their attempts at counter-
revolution. As soon as the PLA seized Shanghai, party cadres began to move into 
Shanghai secondary education. Their work engendered an abundance of signs and 
cues that reinforced the official representation as well as textual corroboration of 
faculty and staff members as usable but unreliable intellectuals. More concretely, 
the cadres turned the official understanding of intellectuals into distinct patterns 
of work, opportunity, and social association within the school system, or social 
boundaries saturated with the political meanings and moral values used by the 
party to define the subjects since the Yan’an phase of Chinese Communism. Three 
types of activity of the cadres were especially influential in this regard: their reas-
signment of roles and responsibilities, their enforcement of curriculum and other 
institutional changes, and their interaction with faculty and staff members.
The CCP takeover of the SBE during the summer of 1949 involved objectifying 
significations that would spread across the school system. The cadres assigned to 
the bureau were former underground agents of the party within the city or mem-
bers of the PLA contingent.21 Although the crumbling Guomindang government 
left behind 383 employees in the bureau, the cadres retained the service of only 54 
for accounting, mimeograph, and other technical tasks.22 The dismissal of the rest 
of the staff, which included educational program directors, campus inspectors, 
and other kinds of officers, cast the dismissed immediately as unfit for guiding 
socialist reform of the primary or secondary school system or other programs 
directed by the bureau. The latter’s treatment of the dismissed suggested further to 
these persons that, based on the Marxian thinking of the party, they were a variety 
of inferior class subjects. Reflecting the Mao regime’s concerns for social stability 
and political control with regard to the takeover of the city, the cadres arranged 
retraining and financial subsidies for almost three hundred people. This group 
underwent self-criticism, political study, and other ideological reeducation activi-
ties that targeted self-centeredness, materialism, and other habits and dispositions 
which the Mao regime alleged to be widely shared among intellectuals. After sev-
eral weeks, the SBE provided eighty-four people with placement assistance, half 
of them for positions outside Shanghai. In particular, nine were recommended 
for Russian-language training or enrollment in a “revolutionary university” estab-
lished by the party. These individuals were given exceptional assistance that prob-
ably allowed them to envision themselves serving the state again soon in some 
respectable capacity. By contrast, the SBE handed over the information of eight 
“reactionary elements” to the police for further investigation and even arrest, 
because “irrefutable evidence of repulsive activities” existed against these people. 
Based on their performance during retraining and other factors, the rest received 
dismissal subsidies (qiansan fe) or return-home subsidies (huixiang fe), or were 
put on a waiting list for job assignment.23
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Across the secondary schools, official reorganization of roles and responsibili-
ties signaled to faculty and staff members that the emerging state considered them 
heretofore allies of the exploiting classes. The SBE introduced management by 
CCP cadres through removing school principals from office or hollowing out their 
work and authority. The bureau’s plan was to have every campus led by at least 
one experienced party cadre with support from a score of junior cadres. By 1954, 
almost 430 party cadres served across the schools.24 Two years later, 73 percent 
of the 200 campuses had a party cadre serving as principal or deputy principal.25 
Ordinary faculty or staff members rarely enjoyed upward mobility during this 
period, even though the expansion of the school system created many manage-
rial positions. Even the small number of faculty and staff selected by the SBE for 
career development purposes because of their favorable background and quality 
of work, or those regarded by the bureau as most desirable among “progressive 
elements,” did not escape everyday stigmatization as usable but unreliable intel-
lectuals. Despite assumption of significant responsibilities after receiving official 
training and even recruitment into the party, few of these faculty or staff mem-
bers gained top campus positions, as they were usually reserved for party cadres 
assigned from elsewhere.26
On the campuses, other mandated changes embodied and expressed official 
criticism of the faculty and staff as previous partners of the exploiting classes and 
functionaries in their ruling apparatus. Swiftly abolished were curriculum items 
required, sponsored, or controlled by the Guomindang regime based on its politi-
cal, cultural, and moral visions, including the system of “character-development 
education” (xunyu zhidu) in public schools as well as scouting, military training, 
and civic instruction and their related classes, rituals, and events.27 As Robert Culp 
has noted, these programs and activities were introduced into the school system 
at various junctures of the Republican era (1912–1949). They were influenced by 
Continental European, Anglo-American, and traditional Chinese models of edu-
cation and “could variously be characterized as liberal, Confucian, authoritarian, 
or fascist.”28 Their elimination had symbolic impact inside and outside the school 
system, as did the official abolition of the teaching of Christianity, takeover of 
missionary schools, and reduction of English instruction as well as the mandated 
tuition cuts in the large numbers of private schools. The changes suggested that 
the ruling classes and even the imperialist powers had exploited the campuses and 
their workforces to propagate values and practices at the expense of Chinese soci-
ety. Likewise, the rapid expansion of student enrollment orchestrated by the SBE 
to include “children from peasant and worker families,” by relaxing age restrictions 
and academic standards, reinforced the official criticism that the faculty and staff 
had mostly organized the campuses to serve landlord, capitalist, and petty-bour-
geois families. Within three years after the CCP takeover of Shanghai, the pro-
portion of secondary students from underprivileged backgrounds had reportedly 
increased from 12 to 26 percent, or roughly from 9,000 to over 33,000.29
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Inside the schoolhouse, everyday interaction between CCP cadres and the fac-
ulty and staff signaled to these ordinary professional workers that they were at best 
petty-bourgeois intellectuals as described in official discourse. Let us briefly look 
at the backgrounds of the cadres, which was a main reason why they acted the 
way they did. The cadres did not take over campus management because of any of 
their conventionally acceptable qualifications (e.g., college education and teach-
ing experience), even when they had such qualifications; they were appointed by 
the state without consultation with the faculty and staff. In fact, the cadres gener-
ally lacked professional experience and academic credentials compared with the 
displaced school principals and administrators, an achievement gap exacerbated 
by the dearth of CCP cadres in the wake of the revolution as well as competition 
for their service across sectors.30 Equally significant, many of the campus cadres 
shared family and occupational backgrounds similar to those of faculty and staff 
members. The 39 cadres who took over the SBE were former schoolteachers, office 
workers, or secondary students.31 By 1958, even after efforts to improve the class 
composition of campus leaderships, the bureau noted, only 27 of 73 full-time party 
secretaries in secondary schools were from worker or poor-peasant families; the 
rest were raised in petty-bourgeois, bourgeois, or landlord families. Among 356 
school principals, over 70 percent of whom were party members, only 76 were 
from the “exploited” classes.32
To secure their newfound but problematic authority, the cadres often resorted 
to what Bourdieu identified as elementary forms of domination, or pointed, coarse, 
and even brutal tactics of management that commonly follow a dramatic change 
in the authority structure.33 The tactics allow rulers to reproduce conditions of 
domination (e.g., fear and retreat among the ruled) when objective mechanisms 
(such as law, convention, or consent) have yet to mature to the extent of normal-
izing the hierarchy. From early on, the SBE reported, the campus cadres tended 
to adopt a hostile approach toward the faculty and staff. They wanted to expose 
wrongdoers of all kinds and see them officially punished together with those who 
continued to promote the interests and ideas of the exploiting classes.34 The hostil-
ity served to produce symbolic profit35 for the cadres, or recognition on and even 
off campus that they were different from as well as superior to other faculty or staff 
members. Thought Reform and other state campaigns that targeted “intellectuals” 
and exposed their alleged wrongdoing and undesirable habits and dispositions 
apparently emboldened the cadres, even as the SBE repeatedly instructed them to 
act firm but collegial inside the schoolhouse. After Thought Reform, the bureau 
conducted a study of private secondary schools, which still accounted for roughly 
half of the campuses in the school system. It discovered that instances of party 
cadres violating the official policy of “uniting, educating, and reforming intellectu-
als” were “rather common as well as extremely serious.” Some cadres were full of 
“sentiments of arrogance and self-content.” They verbally abused faculty and staff 
members, labeling them “shameless” and “backward,” and even questioning their 
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presence in the teaching profession.36 Roughly a year later, the SBE reported that 
“the relations between the party and the masses [i.e., between school cadres and 
the ordinary faculty and staff] are generally not good.” The case of principal Ji Bin 
at Yangjing Secondary School suggests the extent to which some cadres would go 
to distinguish themselves from their colleagues. Ji’s “brutal” (cubao) treatment of 
faculty and staff members had been so unacceptable that both the district-level 
and the city-level commission set up by the party to investigate the conduct of its 
members had already forced him to undergo self-criticism and other educational 
activities. His behavior on campus changed little afterward, as he continued to 
“discriminate” and lashed out against “backward instructors.”37
Social distancing, which can be interpreted as “a kind of informal ostracism,”38 
was another common approach adopted by school party cadres toward the ordi-
nary faculty and staff. Like public condemnation, the conduct supported the 
image that the cadres were officials overseeing intellectuals. The primary tactic 
of social distancing was apparently refusal to participate in instructional matters, 
or the central function of a profession which the state described as filled with 
petty-bourgeois subjects. During the early 1950s, the SBE observed that “primary 
and secondary school principals [who were CCP members] generally do not take 
care of matters directly related to classroom instruction.”39 They concentrated on 
handling official campaigns, financial and construction issues, and hiring, dis-
cipline, and other personnel matters.40 To be sure, many of the national cam-
paigns that penetrated Shanghai secondary education led to multiple levels of 
investigation and cases of punishment. Appointment, budgeting, space, and other 
issues surged forth because of unprecedented increases in student enrollment. 
School principals justifiably complained to the SBE that there were “too many 
assignments with too little explanation, too-tight deadlines, and too numerous 
changes.”41 Meanwhile, lack of teaching experience could not but prompt some 
principals to avoid instructional matters. However, refusing to act in the role of 
schoolteacher was also another creative way for the cadres to enact social bound-
aries, or present themselves as different from other faculty or staff members. To 
the dismay of the SBE authorities, a follow-up survey of nine secondary schools 
conducted in the mid-1950s indicated that the school principals still failed “to go 
deep into classrooms or grade levels” to give lessons, advice, or study directions.42 
These party cadres, instead, let other party members take over instructional mat-
ters, with some of them exhibiting similar disaffection toward the responsibili-
ties. Consequently, some of the schools used instructors who were not favored 
by the bureau to provide pedagogical leadership. Even when the bureau asked 
leading campus cadres to take charge of the instruction of socialist politics and 
values for students’ benefits, a task that these party members were seemingly 
most qualified to perform, some cadres ignored that responsibility, too. At China 
Secondary School, for example, the cadres did not give any lectures on the topic. 
They employed, instead, “unreflective campaign-like approaches,” which included 
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bringing visitors to the campus to speak to students, as many as eleven times dur-
ing one recent semester.43
Other forms of social distancing orchestrated by school party cadres also 
served to objectify ordinary faculty and staff members into usable but unreliable 
intellectuals. Even though the party cadres had access to policy information and 
state resources through the SBE, some offered little advice or assistance to their 
colleagues, while the latter faced unfamiliar political and economic challenges as 
a result of the revolution. What reportedly occurred at Yan’an Secondary School 
during the mid-1950s is instructive. Six party cadres were present on this rela-
tively large campus, a number comparable to other schools of similar size. The 
cadres served as school principals, personnel executives, or instructors on social-
ist politics and held other influential posts. In political terms, the campus was 
hardly an extremely challenging place for management. Only 10 of the 73 people 
on the faculty and staff were “reactionary” or “backward elements.” Nonetheless, 
the bureau remarked, the cadres lacked “compassion, regard, and patience,” or 
proper sentiments deemed to be necessary for “assisting, educating, or nurturing” 
their colleagues in officially recommended ways. None of the 20 “progressive ele-
ments” on campus received training, support, or opportunities from management 
that would help them to become party members. The cadres, instead, “exploited” 
(shiying) the enthusiasm and energy of these people to help themselves run the 
campus.44
Using Yan’an Secondary School further as an example, the SBE emphasized two 
other areas in which the conduct of school party cadres was unsatisfactory. Faculty 
and staff members sometimes turned to the cadres for assistance when confronted 
with housing, subsistence, and other livelihood issues, since the state increasingly 
controlled job assignment as well as salaries and benefits within the school sys-
tem,. Regardless of merits of a given request, the bureau discovered, the cadres at 
Yan’an responded poorly. They withheld subsidies and other forms of assistance 
established by the bureau, labeled the applicants “backward,” and accused them 
of having a “purely economic perspective on life” (chun jingji guandian), which 
was a refrain used by the state to describe the petty bourgeoisie. A vice princi-
pal even stated that the campus had been “wasting money” by supporting an ill 
instructor with 60 percent of his salary. The other issue raised by the SBE had to 
do with ideological reeducation of the faculty and staff, which the state considered 
extremely important given that they interacted with students on a daily basis. The 
cadres at Yan’an, like those on other campuses, received official training periodi-
cally on how to help the faculty and staff to improve their political thinking and 
understanding of Chinese Communism. The bureau found out that the cadres did 
virtually nothing after returning to the campus from the training sessions. They 
passed on official directives during meetings with faculty and staff members with-
out providing any guidance on understanding the content, let alone practicing the 
recommendations. They did not organize on-campus activities or take advantage 
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of off-campus events for instructional purposes. When faculty or staff members 
asked for advice, the school principal told them to work harder to comprehend 
the material themselves. The bureau noted that some faculty, furthermore, had 
quite unpleasant interaction with the cadres. “[The cadres] cannot bear the sight 
of aged (laonian) teachers; they always highlight the backwardness of these teach-
ers and fail to recognize their strengths. Even when they see the strengths, they 
do not offer any praise. With the teachers who are classified backward, the cad-
res cannot hide their disgust. They give up educating these people and set them 
adrift.”45 Some of the cadres on the campus continued to tell others that punish-
ment was needed for the faculty or staff members who had cooperated with the 
Guomindang or other regimes.
In effect, the cadres who headed the campuses extended the class difference 
that CCP leaders had long constructed between themselves and other educated 
people—that is, proletarian revolutionaries versus petty-bourgeois intellectuals—
to their own everyday interaction with faculty and staff members. Like those of 
the party leaders, the efforts of the cadres to consecrate themselves as such revolu-
tionaries at the expense of colleagues were not always successful. The educational 
achievement of the cadres and their professional responsibilities in the school 
system made them vulnerable to attacks, especially from superiors who were 
engaged in their own self-consecration. These party officials attacked some of the 
campus cadres, similar to how the latter turned ordinary faculty and staff mem-
bers into targets. What happened to deputy principal Pan Lengyun of Dunhua 
Primary and Secondary School is an excellent example. In March 1955, together 
with two other commissions, the district-level CCP commission of disciplinary 
inspection that supervised her work issued a report after a “preliminary investiga-
tion.” The commissions criticized Pan for using the tactics of punishment, insult, 
and distancing mentioned above. Although the report did not label Pan a petty-
bourgeois intellectual, it included many complaints used by the party to describe 
such subjects since the Yan’an period of Chinese Communism, and therefore left 
little doubt with regard to how the authorities thought of her. After being trans-
ferred to the campus, Pan gradually became “very arrogant and complacent” as 
well as “subjective, inflexible, and irascible.” Above all, she displayed “the syn-
drome of a self-styled hero.” On the one hand, the commissions observed, Pan did 
not “rely on [the advice of] the party or its organizations.” She refused to study or 
implement official instructions on how to work with intellectuals. On the other 
hand, she was “divorced from the masses.” She brushed off even “well-grounded 
ideas and assessments” from faculty and staff members. What she wanted were 
“grandiose achievements to make herself noticeable” by peers and superiors. To 
rectify the situation, the commissions recommended “severe criticism” of Pan 
and the transfer of a few “capable” party cadres to the campus to restore proper 
control.46 In other words, the commissions regarded Pan as a flawed but usable 
intellectual.
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STR ATEGIES OF STIGMA MANAGEMENT
As a classification of people under the early PRC, the intellectual marked the 
 classified with what the state pronounced as class traits, or an assortment of 
so-called petty-bourgeois and bourgeois habits and dispositions deemed to be 
harmful to Chinese Communism. We have seen that the CCP cadres assigned to 
Shanghai secondary education were aware of their vulnerability to being treated 
by superiors and colleagues as petty-bourgeois intellectuals. Some exploited their 
official positions and authority to set themselves apart from the ordinary faculty 
and staff. Here we look at how the faculty and staff and other professional workers 
negotiated the stigma associated with their official classification as intellectuals. 
Compared with the cadres, these persons did not have symbolic resources based 
on active political participation in Chinese Communism or access to administra-
tive means to fend off the dubious classification. Nevertheless, stigma manage-
ment flourished within this discredited population of “intellectuals” due to their 
attempts to resist or test CCP rule or to benefit or protect themselves from it.
Let us return to the aftermath of the immediate dismissal of more than 300 SBE 
employees when the PLA seized Shanghai in 1949. Though shocked and dismayed, 
the majority of the dismissed enrolled in the retraining program offered by the 
bureau in hopes of receiving financial and employment assistance. They encoun-
tered for the first time ideological reeducation organized by the CCP, learning in a 
formal setting its interpretation of class and the latter’s relations to Chinese society 
and global history. In addition, they participated in self-criticism and other activi-
ties built upon the critical view of intellectuals of the party. The SBE’s analysis of 
how these former employees behaved during the retraining provides an otherwise 
unavailable glimpse at their initial reactions to stigmatization as usable but unreli-
able intellectuals. Former ranking officials turned out to be most defiant toward 
the denigration of their knowledge and experience. They took advantage of ongo-
ing uncertainty involving the CCP takeover of Shanghai and the mainland as well 
as their former professional status and understanding of the bureau to fight off 
stigmatization in general and ideological reeducation in particular. According to 
the bureau:
[The former ranking officials] assumed airs of superiority, considered themselves 
always in the right, and refused our [ideological] reform. They turned up at events 
to see whether there were opportunities [to rebuild their careers] . . . and listened to 
reports only when they did not reject the speakers. They indulged in high-sounding 
but meaningless talks, nitpicked at the words and phrases of others, and declared 
their own view to be “objective” and “above politics.” They [disputed what they were 
taught and] claimed that the Soviet Union is as imperialistic as the United States, 
and that [all] political parties and factions are tools of people who seek power and 
money. They pretended to be exploring political thought and doctrines and insulted 
and rejected our [teaching based on Marxist-Leninist] theory.47
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Other former SBE employees who underwent the retraining apparently submitted 
to official stigmatization without accepting its claims. The overwhelming major-
ity, the bureau stated, went along with the program but saw it merely as a path to 
return to work. A few used “every means” to present themselves as “progressive” to 
get the authorities’ attention. Some tried to “poison” the cadres’ minds with agree-
able words and deeds in attempts to conceal “evil acts” of exploitation or counter-
revolution that they had committed. Only a small number genuinely wanted to 
“reform” and “strengthen” their political thinking. Outnumbered by others, they 
“did not have the courage to debate or defend the truths [that they noticed in 
Marxist thought].”48
Within primary and secondary schools, similar defiance, manipulation, and 
acceptance of official stigmatization arose. Roughly a week after the PLA seized 
Shanghai, SBE officials met with some faculty and staff members about placing 
their campuses under the bureau’s control or direct supervision, thus signaling 
distrust of existing personnel. Some of those approached sided with the officials 
and even demanded in front of them the firing of public school principals, sei-
zure of private schools controlled by “reactionary elements,” and “exposure and 
condemnation of diploma mills.” These persons acted in what they considered a 
cooperative manner. While some continued to support the emerging state, others 
changed their minds or remained defiant after realizing that the official attack on 
intellectuals could harm their own careers and professional authority. Some even 
started to work with “backward elements” to resist mandated campus reforms.49 
As the bureau removed school principals, seized some campuses, and forced the 
closure of others, some continued to defy official instructions of reform. In March 
1950, the SBE formally launched political study classes within primary and sec-
ondary schools after months of sponsoring related instructional activities. The 
bureau’s goal was to gather faculty and staff members regularly on campus to study 
official material on class, politics, and history and learn about state policies and 
activities. Over thirty “study committees” staffed by 470 faculty and staff members 
were shortly formed across the city for supervisory and administrative purposes.50 
The bureau discovered that the faculty and staff on some campuses refused to 
meet with visiting members of the committees, while those on other campuses 
deliberately appointed persons with no instructional responsibilities to receive the 
representatives or disregarded their instructions and advice altogether. The repre-
sentatives had to return to some of the schools up to five or six times before seeing 
genuine efforts to set up political study properly. Elsewhere, the bureau observed, 
faculty and staff members approached political study with a “perfunctory atti-
tude.” They did not read the assigned texts or attend small-group meetings. They 
used instructional or administrative work as excuses for their absence, and even 
preferred to “waste their time on chitchats and watching [lewd] American ‘thigh’ 
movies.”51 Others attended the meetings but did not utter a single word. The SBE 
reported that reactions to political study in missionary schools were especially 
offensive. During discussion sessions, “backward” instructors received applause 
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for their “oppositional views” from colleagues who had otherwise remained silent. 
Some school principals and directors of instruction “adopted a hostile attitude” 
toward the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Campaign organized by the state after the 
Korean War broke out, and even declared that they had views about the war dif-
ferent from that of the state.52
When Thought Reform of Intellectuals started to spread across Shanghai’s cul-
tural and educational sectors in 1952, open defiance against official policies and 
measures by ordinary professional workers and against their stigmatization by the 
state as petty-bourgeois intellectuals was no longer a safe course of action. State 
violence during the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries had resulted 
in hundreds of execution and thousands of imprisonment in Shanghai.53 Across 
rural schools alone, the SBE reported in July 1951, ninety-nine people had been 
arrested and three sentenced to capital punishment.54 What Goffman termed as 
“covering” emerged as a major strategy of Thought Reform participants to cope 
with the stigma forced further upon them. While the participants did not dis-
pute or deny the selfishness, indiscipline, or other shortcomings alleged by the 
state, many sought to keep these attributes from “looming large,”55 that is, spot-
lighted by others to the extent of endangering their own careers, livelihoods, or 
safety. One common tactic of covering was redirection during self-criticism, or 
the steering away of negative attention from the self. Some participants reportedly 
brought up multiple problems in their personal outlook, lifestyle, and political 
thinking, but indicated that these were consequences of broader patterns of belief 
and practice, or conditions in their family, workplace, social networks, and even 
Chinese society.56 Some “dwelt on minor flaws” in their personality, sometimes 
in colorful terms, as means “to hide major wrongdoing” or their support of the 
exploiting classes.57 Some “mechanically repeated” phrases and ideas from self-
criticisms published in newspapers and avoided talking about their own back-
ground, activities, or thoughts.58 Some even changed their appearance to highlight 
their agreement with official ideology. Some schoolteachers, for example, “shaved 
their heads” and started wearing “running shoes” to project “the appearance of a 
veteran worker.”59 Like what revolutionaries had done in Yan’an, especially after the 
Rectification Campaign, these individuals covered up their previous appearance. 
Others worked together to prevent political or moral issues uncovered by the state 
from hurting one another, a method that the authorities derided as the “pursuit of 
collective harmony” (yituan heqi).60 The following exchange illustrated in Wenhui 
Daily was apparently common when college instructors were asked to read one 
another’s writings and identify and criticize ideological mistakes.
A: Professor X, did you not slander the Soviet Union in your work Y?
B: Where? Where? That’s not true.
C:  From what I know, it’s perhaps an overstatement to call it a slander. However, it’s 
completely obvious that it’s a criticism of the Soviet Union.
D: Hmm, yes.61
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Concealment of personal details, which often coexisted with redirection, was 
another tactic of covering used by professional workers to reduce stigma. Here the 
individuals sought to hide backgrounds in politics or other areas that they believed 
to be objectionable by official standards. They wanted to be recognized at worst as 
petty-bourgeois intellectuals. Zhu Shouzhong was an example. He was the CCP 
cadre who did not disclose to the higher authorities his official classification as an 
absentee landlord. While Thought Reform was underway, the Shanghai authorities 
found out that some participants “who are clearly from the landlord class by fam-
ily background insist nevertheless that their class status is at worst middle-peasant; 
others who obviously belong to the bureaucratic-capital class portray themselves 
blithely as members of the petty bourgeoisie.”62 Covering of personal details took 
other forms, too. Some Thought Reform participants reportedly glossed over 
various aspects of their background (e.g., political activities, friendships, hobbies) 
during self-criticism by offering vague or empty accounts.63 Some underreported 
their age in order to hide things they had done in the past. Some talked about their 
hardships, honesty, and charitable deeds to imply that they had not supported 
class exploitation. Some pinned “severe [ideological] labels” (da maozi) on them-
selves, such as extreme indiscipline or hedonism, to draw attention away from 
other conduct or activities of theirs.64 The SBE reported that when the last group 
of secondary school faculty and staff members took part in Thought Reform, com-
prising some 1,500 people, many arrived with prewritten autobiographical narra-
tives and self-criticism, wanting to ride out the campaign without fully disclosing 
their backgrounds, activities, or thoughts.65
During Thought Reform, “self-exposure” was another strategy used by pro-
fessional workers to negotiate their officially imposed stigma. Rather than bury 
details that would confirm shortcomings alleged by the state, some broadcast their 
mistakes and misdeeds with little prodding from party cadres. They wanted to 
convey comprehension of official ideology as well as cooperation and contrition, 
or be seen as working to turn over a new leaf. Although suitable for those who did 
not work closely with the Guomindang or other political regimes, self- exposure, 
like covering, was a difficult balancing act. The confessors had little control over 
how their cooperation was interpreted. The authorities sometimes saw the con-
fession as yet another routine in the self-serving repertoire of petty-bourgeois 
intellectuals. It was believed that some participants disclosed offensive beliefs and 
behavior, not because they wanted to reform themselves politically, but because 
they wanted to show everyone else how “courageous” and “honest” they were.66 
The authorities were unimpressed with others who allegedly resorted to histrion-
ics, through “crying their heart out” and declaring that “they deserved a thousand 
deaths for their crimes.” Other participants reportedly submitted themselves to 
criticism by choosing wrongly not to contest any complaints and even false accu-
sations leveled against them by colleagues.67
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While use of covering or self-exposure by ordinary professional workers to 
cope with official stigmatization reflected fear, anxiety, shame, confusion, or other 
emotions that they experienced, another strategy, “going on the attack,” not only 
involved some of these reactions; its deployment deepened conflict and resent-
ment within the workplace. With this approach, one played an aggressive role 
during mutual criticism or other activities to demonstrate cooperation with the 
state. Some Thought Reform participants reportedly adopted a “severe” and “left-
ist” attitude from early on. They loudly accused colleagues of multiple crimes and 
mistakes, “banged on the table and kicked the bench” to express their indignation, 
and used “severe labels” indiscriminately against the targets. The authorities were 
critical of such viciousness apparently as much as what they dismissed as insincere 
ready admission of wrongdoing. Some attackers, it was noted, “put on a show to 
deceive people” about who they really were, besides confounding facts with fiction 
in their complaints against others. For the state, even when the complaints were 
accurate and the attackers were forthcoming about their own wrongdoing, they 
still violated the intents and purposes of thought reform, which was “an endless 
and self-conscious process of discovery” of the truths in Marxist theory, work-
ing-class experience, and the Chinese socialist revolution. The state had multiple 
mechanisms in place to ensure that the reeducational activities introduced in the 
campaign would become “an integral part of the everyday life” of intellectuals, 
“much like eating, washing one’s face, and sleeping.”68 To the attacked, the expe-
rience was harrowing, even for those who had tried self-exposure. The attacked 
were “often flushed with shame and anger and were unhappy and dejected.” They 
felt that the badgering and embarrassment was unnecessary. Many “promptly 
despised” the attackers, believing that they were “too backward” and “too con-
fused” to understand thought reform and the consequences of their actions. Some 
confronted their attackers afterward. Some waited for their turn and took revenge. 
They hit the attacker with “a head-on blow,” “randomly reprimanded him,” and 
labeled him “reactionary.”69 To salvage their own reputation, some exaggerated the 
wrongdoing of the attackers and even gathered “trumped-up charges” to discredit 
these people.70
As Thought Reform proceeded, the authorities discovered another unpleasant 
trend. Ridicules, innuendos, and gossiping flourished, occurring regularly “over 
a cup of tea or after a few glasses of spirits” as the participants congregated dur-
ing recesses or after work. The participants mocked colleagues openly or behind 
their backs on the basis of the revelations about desire, dalliance, or deviance, for 
example, yearnings to be rich, affairs with neighbors, and acts of embezzlement. 
Some “added inflammatory details” to what they had heard or “stitched together 
fragments” of material to spread rumors about colleagues.71 We have seen this kind 
of finger-pointing behavior among veteran revolutionaries in Yan’an and school 
party cadres in Shanghai. When the subjects found themselves vulnerable to 
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stigmatization as petty-bourgeois intellectuals, they combined official values with 
those of their own to belittle colleagues as means of elevating themselves within 
their own minds, among their peers, and inside their profession.
Regardless of how Shanghai schoolteachers or other professional workers 
reacted to official stigmatization, the state’s interpretations of their conduct, as we 
have seen, reinforced their assigned status as usable but unreliable  intellectuals—
because of what Dorothy Smith identifies as “the circularity of the ideological 
process” commonly associated with hierarchical forms of administration. After 
publicizing widely the CCP discourse of class, the Shanghai authorities used 
this “predetermined conceptual framework” to illustrate in newspapers, inter-
nal reports, and other channels how professional workers responded or failed to 
respond to the requirements of Thought Reform and other ideological reeducation 
activities, or addressed self-centeredness, materialism, and other personal short-
comings. “Issues, questions, and experiences” that did not fit how the party under-
stood class were simply left out of the official analyses.72 Rendered illegible in these 
innumerable accounts were, especially, profound changes in work and governance 
because of the revolution and their impact on how the workers reacted to official 
stigmatization, not to mention personal, familial, and other factors.
Research has examined the urban workplace under the early PRC for good rea-
sons.73 The site was central to the CCP pursuit of socialist development. The 
accounts describe key mechanisms of official domination such as central plan-
ning, management by party cadres, and ideological reeducation. They illustrate 
major patterns of conflict, cooperation, and inequality (for example, those related 
to party cadres and between party cadres and the ordinary staff) as well as individ-
ual and collective responses to official governance (e.g., pride, criticism, protest). 
The scholarship, however, does not explain how classes portrayed in the official 
discourse became everyday recognizable populations inside the workplace, or how 
jobholders assumed legible class identities. In comparison, studies of the coun-
tryside have spotlighted how land reform produced “landlords,” “poor peasants,” 
and other Marxian categories of people paradoxically as the party abolished con-
ventional and capitalist economic relations. These studies underscore the role of 
official classification and pertinent institutional mediums (such as mandated self-
reporting, investigation, and mass assemblies orchestrated by the party) as well as 
ambiguities and manipulations involved in the process.74
With a focus on the creation of petty-bourgeois intellectuals in a postrevolution-
ary school system, this chapter has suggested that the urban workplace occupied 
the center of the production and reproduction of the social classes envisioned by 
the Mao regime. To borrow a metaphor from Foucault, the school system became 
“a sort of artificial and coercive theater,” one in which tens of thousands of ordinary 
people eventually assumed the character of the intellectual based on the Marxian 
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view of the state.75 Scripts, designs, props, and dramas, as it were, inundated the 
school system. The CCP discourse of intellectuals (the primary script) perme-
ated the system because of a variety of organizational rearrangements (or designs) 
mandated by the state, such as a new division of labor, thought reform, political 
lineups, and mass surveillance. The official use of multiple administrative tools (or 
props)—for example, official directives, personnel reports, statistical summaries, 
confessional statements, and autobiographical narratives—reproduced the dis-
course. An unending array of dramas with classification effects appeared: official 
accusations, self-consecrations, mutual antagonisms, judicial prosecutions, self-
deprecations, withdrawals, and so on. Everyone within the school system doubled 
as a cast member as well as an audience member in a thickening plot of class 
struggle prepared by the state, the punitive authority of which guaranteed the pro-
duction. Relearning about the self, colleagues, and Chinese society took place as 
the performance unfolded. Like official classification in the countryside, ambigui-
ties and manipulations with regard to class identity arose.
Equally important, we have seen that because the Mao regime pictured usable 
but unreliable intellectuals as an integral part of the workplace, management by 
CCP cadres, ideological reeducation, and mass surveillance flourished. The insti-
tutions became the official means to protect Chinese Communism from these sub-
jects as much as to cultivate it with their knowledge and skills. Within the school 
system, the institutions made possible the revision of academic curricula, the 
expansion of student enrollment, the reassignment of responsibilities, and, more 
generally, experimentations with socialist education. At the same time, the institu-
tions enabled the official condemnation and increasing suppression of the alter-
native political and moral views of the faculty and staff. In short, the institutions 
served to extend both the symbolic and the administrative capacity of the state.
What happened with the school system reveals that the objectification of the 
intellectual had seriously negative implications for Chinese Communism—by 
turning workplaces with professional workers into perpetual sites of official con-
cern as well as internally divided organizations. The practice of textual corrobora-
tion engendered an unceasing flow of what the authorities regarded as evidence 
of work deficiencies, moral transgressions, criminal conduct, and political wrong-
doing of professional workers, especially because the state repeatedly launched 
investigative and punitive campaigns. The practice of everyday signification pro-
duced and reproduced schisms, distrust, and resentment that undercut the poten-
tial of professional workers to cooperate with the state as well as with one another. 
Viewed in retrospect, the dynamics could not but lead to further turmoil.
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An Open Struggle of Redefinition
On May 1, 1957, the CCP launched another rectification campaign under Chairman 
Mao’s direction. Unlike the one that had engulfed Yan’an during the early 1940s, 
which turned those whom he referred to as intellectuals into the targets of attack, 
the new campaign sought criticism of the party’s governing performance from 
this category of people. Mao believed that the airing of criticism by intellectuals in 
the manner of “gentle breeze and mild rain” would help strengthen state-society 
relations and that the exercise was necessary to prevent political unrest such as 
those that had recently shaken socialist Poland and Hungary, in which students, 
workers, and others staged public protests, clashed with police, and demanded 
the removal of the government established by the communist parties. The new 
campaign followed eighteen months of high-level pronouncements and state mea-
sures aimed at improving relations with intellectuals, after they had been subjected 
to official disparagement and surveillance as well as reeducation and punishment 
since the 1949 revolution. Exclusive meetings with and encouragement from Mao 
and other party leaders gradually emboldened renowned writers, scientists, and 
other social notables to take the lead in providing critical evaluations of official 
policies, practices, and personnel. Professional workers, college students, and even 
factory hands, including some who were party members, then joined a growing 
protest at once condoned, encouraged, and to a large extent coordinated by the 
state.1 Dismayed by the hostility exhibited in some of the complaints and sugges-
tions, the Mao leadership ended the campaign abruptly in early June and started to 
orchestrate counterattacks. The state launched the Antirightist Movement (Fanyou 
yundong) shortly afterward with the aim of punishing those who had spoken out 
or supported unacceptable views. The population of intellectuals suffered further 
loss of prestige and autonomy, while CCP rule slid further down the path of coer-
cion, violence, and abuse.2
This chapter examines the 1957 Rectification Campaign and its aftermath in 
a new light—as an open struggle to redefine the intellectual as well as Chinese 
Communism. During those restive months, observations on challenges con-
fronting the revolutionary project blossomed, and so did recommendations for 
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change. Inside and outside the state, the crux of the debate was arguably the rela-
tions between the intellectual and Chinese Communism. Since 1949, economic 
nationalization and land reform had eroded the power of the urban and the rural 
economic elites. Mandated changes in the political, occupational, and educational 
systems had benefited industrial workers and other laborers, even though some of 
them were still dissatisfied, and for good reasons. Large numbers of scientists, writ-
ers, and other professional workers, however, had remained lukewarm toward CCP 
rule, especially after the Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries 
penetrated education, journalism, and other sectors and led to interrogations, 
demotions, imprisonments, and suicides.3 However fuzzy were the boundaries of 
the category of intellectuals, its members used the Rectification Campaign not 
only to air their criticisms of Chinese Communism and articulate alternative 
socialist visions; they tried to reconstruct their social identity to improve their 
status and influence and therefore what an intellectual was in Chinese society. The 
regime reacted to these challenges by expressing further its vision of the socialist 
project and the corresponding role of the intellectual.
Three major reinterpretations of the intellectual and Chinese Communism 
appeared. Championed by distinguished scholars and other social notables dur-
ing the Rectification Campaign, the first reinterpretation was built upon the 
Confucian literati tradition as much as the official acknowledgment of widespread 
problems of competence in socialist governance. The scholars and notables por-
trayed intellectuals as experts and professionals outside the party who had the 
vital knowledge and experience to be its governing partner. They called for an 
expanded involvement of intellectuals in politics, production, and administration 
to save Chinese Communism from potential ruin. Another major reinterpretation 
was promoted mainly by college students. The proponents demanded that intel-
lectuals redefine the socialist project in its totality. They combined contemporary 
ideas of democracy and equality with their reading of Marxism and Leninism to 
challenge how the revolutionary project had been formulated and executed by 
the Mao regime and the prerogative of the party to monopolize those tasks. In 
effect, the students and their allies redefined intellectuals as “legislators” of major 
social and political issues (to borrow an idea from Zygmunt Bauman) and archi-
tects of a different socialist China.4 When the Mao regime hit back, it drew on 
the Yan’an understanding of intellectuals and emphasized more than ever before 
the professional and political value of these people to Chinese Communism. The 
state introduced proposals to support the work and learning of professional work-
ers and college students as well as to strengthen their ideological reeducation. 
Also stressed was the nurturing of industrial workers and others of underprivi-
leged background into capable professional workers. The Mao regime pictured 
a surge of “red-and-expert” intellectuals who were dedicated to pushing Chinese 
Communism to new heights.
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The dominance of these perspectives not only indicates that the intellectual 
was quite objectified by the mid-1950s; it reveals that the intellectual had become 
the fulcrum with which the state and other forces organized their political visions 
and sought support. With each of the perspectives, symbolic boundaries were 
redrawn around the classification based on a specific set of experiences under 
the PRC. The scholars and notables who wanted to become partners in official 
governance had watched their influence and authority be eroded by CCP rule 
in general and workplace management by party cadres in particular. They repre-
sented themselves and other professional workers as intellectuals who were eager 
to serve the state and capable of improving Chinese Communism. The college 
students who advocated a complete overhaul of the socialist project combined 
political theories and ideas available in the university with the contemporary tra-
dition of student protest. In their eyes, intellectuals were “spokesmen for enlight-
enment”5 with obligations to expose systemic injustice and steer China onto a 
superior socialist path. Drawing on its experience of revolution and governance, 
the Mao regime persisted in portraying professional workers and college stu-
dents inside and outside the party as intellectuals as well as added workers with 
professional training to the social category. The regime’s intention was to pro-
duce as many usable and reliable intellectuals as possible on behalf of Chinese 
Communism.
To be sure, the three perspectives on the intellectual and Chinese Communism—
intellectuals as state partners, as legislators, and as red-and-expert personnel—are 
analytical constructs. During the Rectification Campaign,  analyses of  political and 
social problems under the PRC and proposals to tackle the challenges were com-
monplace. Even more abundant were ritual affirmations of CCP rule, praises of 
Mao and other party leaders, highly emotional complaints, and self-deprecating 
remarks, or repertoires found in the innumerable ideological reeducation classes 
sponsored by the state since the 1949 revolution. As the campaign proceeded, 
individuals doubled down on, retreated from, and even altered their positions. 
When the Mao regime reasserted political control, elements of its arguments were 
reinterpreted at various levels of the state. Each of the constructs, however, cap-
tures political interests, beliefs, and imaginations that tended to coalesce together 
under the young PRC: the influence, respectively, of the Confucian, May Fourth, 
and Yan’an traditions of political thinking. Although the traditions support 
incompatible models of governance, they each envisage an important role for the 
educated. In addition, each construct reflects the location of its proponents in the 
socialist political economy. The college students who promoted the most radi-
cal approach to change were much farther from the center of power than were 
either the scholars and notables who wanted an improved part in governance and 
management or, closer still, the official and quasi-official spokesmen of the red-
and-expert ideal.
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INTELLECTUALS AS STATE PARTNERS
I’ve only been exerting sixty percent of my strength and energy [when at 
work]. It’s not that I’m unwilling to do my best; there is no opportunity to do 
so, to become a soul mate of the party,
—Fu Ying, Professor of Chemistry at Peking University, April 27, 19576
During the 1957 Rectification Campaign, leaders of various minor political par-
ties approved by the state and scholars officially designated as higher (gaoji) intel-
lectuals were chief proponents of the view that intellectuals and the state should 
work closely together to advance Chinese Communism. These scholars and 
notables generally had privileged access to CCP leaders and state assemblies as 
well as enviable positions and benefits approved by the state, because of its united 
front policy designed to secure cooperation and support from the elites outside 
the party.7 Before the campaign began nationwide, party leaders, including Mao, 
had invited these scholars and notables to forums to discuss official governance.8 
During the campaign, the scholars and notables attended “airing-view” (ming-
fang) meetings sponsored by a variety of agencies, including central ministries, 
high-level CCP commissions, regional government offices, college party commit-
tees, and state-approved professional associations. They published their views on 
Chinese Communism in major newspapers and specialized journals. Because of 
their superior access to state affairs, the scholars and notables framed their criti-
cism around “the most authoritative sources,”9 all of which were based on Mao’s 
speeches delivered on the campaign’s behalf. There is no need to repeat his famously 
positive assessment of class struggle or its declining significance under the PRC, 
other than his concern with the continual maltreatment of intellectuals by party 
cadres, or what he denounced as “the three evils of bureaucratism, subjectivism, 
and sectarianism” harming the development of the socialist project.10 His criticism 
of the cadres became the foundation on which the scholars and notables pushed 
for involvement of intellectuals at all levels of governance and management, with 
the belief that this would strengthen fairness, justice, democracy, and efficiency 
nationwide. In other words, the proposal of the scholars and notables reflected the 
schism that had opened up between party cadres and other professional workers 
in the postrevolutionary workplace. If many cadres had escaped stigma by rep-
resenting themselves as dependable revolutionaries overseeing petty-bourgeois 
intellectuals, the stigmatized now tried to redefine the meaning of the intellectual 
to reclaim their lost status and authority.
The scholars and notables invoked to different extents the Confucian tradi-
tion of literati in using their learning and wisdom to serve the state. Although 
the maneuvers signaled support of CCP rule, they involved critical disagreement 
with the official understanding of intellectuals. The Mao regime had attacked 
intellectuals for their alleged selfishness, apathy, and other “petty-bourgeois” 
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and even “bourgeois” shortcomings, and considered these persons usable but 
unreliable when it came to developing Chinese Communism. For the regime, 
the Rectification Campaign of 1957 was merely another exercise that the state 
organized to tackle the undesirable values, ideas, and habits shared by intellectu-
als. The campaign offered intellectuals who were outside the party an opportu-
nity to help its cadres, a good number of whom were deemed to be intellectuals, 
improve their work. The scholars and notables downplayed the regime’s criticism 
of intellectuals, emphasizing instead their preparedness to serve the state as well 
as their untapped potential as a result of its unwise governing approaches. Huang 
Yaomian (1903–1987), a professor of Chinese language and literature at Beijing 
Normal University, was among those who recited this popular theme. In an essay 
published in People’s Daily (Renmin ribao), the official organ, he stated that intel-
lectuals were “bearers of the literati-official (shidafu) tradition” with “precious 
knowledge” acquired through “many years of labor” (laodong). The last phrase 
hinted at the discipline exhibited by intellectuals and their lack of connection 
to class exploitation, and therefore contradicted the official evaluation of such 
subjects. For Huang, intellectuals wanted badly to serve “the state and the coun-
try” and deserved respect, assistance, and direction from the authorities.11 Gong 
Canguang was the vice chancellor of Chongqing Teacher Training School as well as 
a member of the Sichuan Provincial Committee of the China Democratic League 
(CDL), a political party established during the Anti-Japanese War and operated 
under CCP auspices after 1949. He published a forceful defense of the political 
value of intellectuals for the Mao regime. He agreed with the official claim that 
a mutually expedient “employer-employee” relationship had been the primary 
dynamics between rulers and intellectuals before 1949. But he rejected the official 
view that intellectuals had been uninterested in politics, noting, instead, that they 
were knowledgeable and concerned about this dimension of social life through 
the ages. Even when they were “ruthlessly attacked” by the state and party cad-
res after 1949, they had been “perfectly happy” to study Marxist thought. He 
wanted the regime to adopt policies and practices that would help intellectuals 
recognize that they were “masters of their country” who could propose ideas to 
improve socialist development “without any future worries” of attacks and pun-
ishment.12 Feng Kexi (1922–2004) was another CDL member and an official in the 
Chongqing municipal government. He complained about the Mao regime’s dis-
trust of intellectuals and their abuse by party cadres. Unlike Huang and Gong, he 
argued that existing intellectuals were different from past generations of literati, 
who were derided by the regime as self-serving and corrupt. Intellectuals had 
made “substantial [political] improvements” before and more so after 1949, to the 
extent of parting with their wealth and risking their safety to “serve the people 
rather than the ruling classes.” Nonetheless, he invoked the tradition of literati 
serving the state to counsel the cultivation of “friendship and contact” between 
intellectuals and party cadres, workers, and peasants as means to improve the 
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involvement of imperfect and timid and yet loyal, talented, and dedicated intel-
lectuals in the socialist project.13
The proposal that the state and intellectuals build a partnership to advance 
Chinese Communism was daring on another level: it undercut the official ide-
ology of class struggle and decades of CCP denunciations of the complicity of 
intellectuals in this drama. For the Mao regime, the appointment of party cadres 
to authority positions after the 1949 revolution was as vital to the liquidation of 
the exploiting classes as land reform and nationalization of industry had been. 
Everyday management by veteran revolutionaries and other party cadres was the 
only means to bring the dictatorship of the proletariat to the local level. The setup 
was essential to keeping expropriated landlords and capitalists from regaining 
power through collusion with intellectuals, or to preventing the reproduction of 
the political and economic relations that these populations had shared before the 
revolution. The scholars and notables ignored and even challenged this official 
premise. They built upon Mao’s recent observations on the diminishing signifi-
cance of class struggle and his criticism of party cadres to argue against reliance on 
this population in governance and management. To the vice chancellor of Beijing 
Normal University, Fu Zhongsun, intellectuals were useful and reliable subjects. 
He stated that the official policy on intellectuals was “one of the CCP’s biggest 
misjudgments in recent years.” Attacking professors and other experts and profes-
sional workers as old-fashioned (jiu), bourgeois, or petty-bourgeois intellectuals 
led to widespread abuse against such persons and their distrust of the state, when 
“the era of class struggle” had already ended with the demise of landlords and 
capitalists and “the majority of intellectuals” had been supportive of the “goals of 
socialism and communism” of the state.14 Xu Zhongnian (1904–1981), a professor 
of French at the Shanghai Foreign Language Academy, took a comparatively subtle 
approach when criticizing the theory and practice of class struggle. He agreed with 
the official assessment that most intellectuals had “a dual character” (liangmian 
xing) under Chinese Communism—that is, they sometimes acted for and some-
times acted against the revolutionary project. However, this was also true with 
party cadres, because they, too, had come of age in “the old society” and had been 
influenced by its characteristic thoughts and habits. Even worse, Xu continued, 
many of the cadres had joined the CCP for self-serving purposes. Permitting the 
cadres to lord over and abuse intellectuals, especially those who deliberately stayed 
behind in China to contribute to Chinese Communism, would only harm its pros-
pect.15 In short, Xu questioned whether party cadres were any more politically reli-
able than intellectuals as the Mao leadership assumed.
After the high tide of the Rectification Campaign subsided in June 1957, 
Minister of Food and Grain Zhang Naiqi (1897–1977) continued to promote his 
sanguine interpretation of class struggle under the PRC, until pressured by the 
state to repudiate what he had said. Zhang was a founder of the China National 
Democratic Construction Association (Zhongguo minzhu jianguohui), another 
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political party that operated under CCP guidance after 1949, and a former busi-
nessman and college professor. While he acknowledged that class struggle is vital 
to any socialist revolution, he proclaimed that “no one [in China] wavers over the 
socialist path” anymore, not even the remnants of the capitalist class, who “cannot 
and will not rebel” against the CCP, still less return to power. Even when the state 
was gearing up to punish its critics, he defended critical viewpoints from airing-
view meetings and newspapers that had been labeled “counterrevolutionary” as 
mere “grumblings” from a few about their personal difficulties. Zhang continued 
to borrow from Mao when the Chairman had already changed his mind about 
the Rectification Campaign as a result of the avalanche of complaints against the 
state. Zhang noted that class struggle in general and ideological reeducation in 
particular had produced “tremendous results” for CCP rule since 1949, notwith-
standing some “negative consequences” among party cadres, intellectuals, and 
others, such as frictions and mistrust and feelings of superiority and inferiority. 
Furthering “class cooperation” under CCP leadership, or the inclusion of margin-
alized intellectuals in official governance, would improve state-society relations 
and economic development as well as extend and deepen socialist consciousness 
across classes.16
Research has shown that the measures of political reform promoted by the 
scholars and notables were consistent with their recommendation of expanding 
the role of intellectuals in politics, production, and administration. The schol-
ars and notables pressed for participation, voice, and authority under the exist-
ing framework of government. An important proposal was the strengthening of 
the political, legislative, and advisory functions of the National People’s Progress 
(NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the 
high-level official bodies which had strong representations of scholars and other 
educated people outside the party but little practical influence over state affairs. 
Other important measures included the incorporation of members of these bod-
ies into the investigation of wrongful convictions in previous political campaigns 
and the reduction of CCP involvement in everyday governance.17 A main vehicle 
with which the scholars and notables sought to realize these and other long-term 
changes was fazhi, which can be translated as rule of law. A negligible idea in the 
official discourse of the Rectification Campaign, fazhi has received little attention 
in research.18 The notion of rule of law, however, seemed no more nor less contro-
versial to the scholars or notables compared to their other proposed reforms. That 
this was the case indicates further the unbridgeable ideological gap between the 
Mao leadership and the scholars and notables as well as the extent to which these 
people sought to redefine the intellectual and Chinese Communism.
The scholars and notables, especially those with legal training, wanted to use 
law to establish structural constraints on the behavior of the CCP and the state. 
They wanted to realign governance away from management by party cadres, from 
campaign-style violence and justice, and from institutionalized discrimination 
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on the basis of class, politics, or other factors of personal background, especially 
against intellectuals. After 1949, the institution of law encountered dramatic reor-
ganization but not standardization in terms of rules, procedures, or staff compe-
tence.19 Huang Shaohong (1895–1966), a former Guomindang high official, was 
one of those who complained about the low “cultural level” and poor knowledge 
of the party cadres in the legal field and the lack of oversight in areas from leg-
islation, prosecution, and policing to verdicts, sentencing, and administration of 
penalties. He pressed for institutionalization of penal and civil codes, disciplinary 
codes for civil servants, economic laws, and regulations on organizations, among 
other instruments, to improve uniformity and transparency in the delivery of jus-
tice.20 His proposal, like others mentioned below, would work only when the legal 
field involved specialists and other educated people who had been excluded from 
it. The jurist Yang Zhaolong (1904–1979), who had been a prosecutor-general in 
the Guomindang government, similarly wanted promulgation of formal codes 
without further delay: “In many circumstances, ordinary people cannot tell what 
is legal from illegal, what a criminal offense is and the appropriate punishment 
and so on; even those involved in investigation, prosecution, and trials do not 
have a clear and uniform set of standards that they follow.” He criticized the state’s 
emphasis on the individual’s acquiring the correct proletarian “standpoint, per-
spective, and work style,” seeing this push based on official ideology as an impedi-
ment to using law broadly to advance democracy, stability, citizenship, and justice 
under CCP rule.21 Wu Jialin (1926–), who headed the teaching-research team on 
Chinese constitutional law at People’s University of China, stated that a lack of 
legal knowledge permeated even the highest CCP organs and resulted in wide-
spread infringements against the 1954 Chinese constitution at all levels. He listed 
examples that included “black palaces and government offices” where officehold-
ers had not gone through any proper appointment procedures. His recommenda-
tions to the leadership—strengthen the work of legislation and of legal education 
and research, act as a law-abiding model, and reorganize and clarify the roles of 
the party and the state—captured the legal reforms desired by the scholars and 
notables.22
The scholars and notables seldom promoted multiparty competition, direct 
election, or other sweeping changes to the existing political system. Instead, they 
wanted the CCP to adopt serious political, legal, administrative, and personnel 
reforms that would elevate first and foremost their participation in governance 
and management. Such a position reflected the close but unequal relations that 
the scholars and notables had shared with the party leaders under the PRC, as well 
as the intense official mobilization of these people to set examples in evaluating 
and criticizing official governance. The ideas and ideals of the scholars and nota-
bles betrayed their dismissiveness toward the official discourse of class and their 
disapproval of official denigration of intellectuals. In practice, the scholars and 
notables built upon Mao’s dissatisfaction with party cadres to improve their own 
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positions and those of the professional workers outside the party. The proposal 
from Minister of Transportation Zhang Bojun (1895–1969), a leader of two offi-
cially approved political parties, is a perfect example. He suggested that national 
issues be discussed and advised by such parties as well as by higher intellectu-
als and pertinent experts. He wanted reforms that would strengthen the advisory 
function of the NPC Standing Committee, the CPPCC, and the minor parties, all 
of these being establishments filled with educated people who had yet to acquire 
influence over state affairs. He did not discuss the role of workers or peasants in 
national political life, a ringing concern of the CCP since its inception, except to 
include “state-sponsored mass organizations” (renmin tuanti) together with the 
NPC, CPPCC, and minor political parties as a primary component in his pro-
posed “political design department,” a forum that would advise the leadership on 
all important matters.23 His recommendations were aimed at curbing rather than 
protecting the political participation of underprivileged populations.
In sum, the scholars and notables redefined intellectuals as experts and profes-
sional workers outside the CCP. This revision of the official view was borne out 
of a sense of frustration and concern about governance and management under 
the party, a material-cum-symbolic division between party cadres and ordinary 
educated people inside the workplace, as well as a protean tradition of Confucian 
thought. The scholars and notables emphasized the goodness of education for the 
individual and society and wanted the educated to be part of the governing elites 
effecting changes from within the state. The scholars and notables did not question 
the right of the CCP to rule, but disagreed with its disruption of the conventional 
order of prestige and influence. They did not oppose China’s pursuit of a modern 
socialist society, but rejected the official endorsement of class interest and class 
struggle as, respectively, the basis of societal divisions and means of their unifica-
tion. The future of Chinese Communism, they believed, hinged on the incorpora-
tion of intellectuals in political debates and deliberations as well as in governance 
and management. Their proposals embodied the Confucian preoccupation with 
hierarchy and harmony.24 Had the CCP leadership adopted the reforms proposed 
by the scholars and notables, Chinese Communism would involve patterns of 
value and authority quite familiar to the general population.
INTELLECTUALS AS LEGISL ATORS
Peking University is the birthplace of the May Fourth movement.  .  .  . We 
need to learn from our May Fourth elders the spirit of asking bold questions 
and forging daring creations, and to strive for truly socialist democracy and 
culture.
—A statement from the inaugural issue of The Square, a student 
publication at Peking University, May 21, 195725
An Open Struggle of Redefinition    123
In his 1987 book on intellectuals, Bauman describes the legislator as an enduring 
role that “men of letters” in Europe have played since the Age of Enlightenment. 
Here individuals claim intellectual authority on the basis of their expert knowl-
edge and its alleged objectivity, arbitrate controversies related to the social order 
in highly public manners, and provide aesthetic, moral, and political judgments. 
They see themselves as having “a right (and a duty) to address the nation on behalf 
of Reason, standing above partisan divisions and earth-bound sectarian inter-
ests.”26 During the 1957 Rectification Campaign, the role of the legislator was filled 
not so much by renowned scientists, writers, or artists as by college students. The 
leaders of these students were often from the distinguished Peking University (col-
loquially known as Beida). For decades, the campus had been a center of political 
protest and intellectual innovation and, by mid-century, one of the “most recog-
nizable symbols of opposition to autocracy.”27 Like the scholars and social notables 
discussed above, the students supported the building of a modern socialist China. 
But they challenged the philosophical, epistemological, and political justifications 
of CCP rule supplied by the Mao leadership. The protesters publicized their views 
in forms of posters, essays, poems, open letters, and speeches. Their idealized self-
image was that of an advocate of reason, equality, democracy, and justice, a bearer 
of the critical spirit of the May Fourth movement of the early twentieth century.28 
For this reason, some students consecrated their political protest by naming it the 
May Nineteenth movement, after the date when the first protest poster appeared 
in Beida.29 In the weeks that followed, the protesters framed their criticism of the 
state and proposals for change around the intellectual generally in tangential ways. 
Given the exclusive education the students were receiving and, as we shall see, 
their erudition, it was hard for their peers and instructors, as well as for party cad-
res and state leaders, not to see that the students were redefining the intellectual 
with Chinese Communism through their protest.
Some student protesters presented themselves as authoritative interpreters of 
Marxist thought. They took aim at what they regarded as inaccurate CCP interpre-
tations as well as at the people and organizations supporting those views, includ-
ing Chairman Mao and People’s Daily. One such protester was Beida student Tan 
Tianrong, a physics major who shot to fame during the Rectification Campaign. 
He produced a series of provocative and sometimes rambling essays, boldly titling 
them “poisonous weeds,” a metaphor that Mao had employed to denigrate political 
ideas unacceptable to the party leadership. What Tan considered poisonous, how-
ever, was the extent to which Lenin and Stalin—and the CCP—had misinterpreted 
Marxism and hence stifled its emancipatory potential. Drawing on the work of a 
professor at Nankai University, Tan contended that since Engels’s death in 1895, the 
“revisionism” and “dogmatism” of Lenin and Stalin had “absolutely dominated” 
Marxist political philosophy, leading to single-party rule, systemic political dis-
crimination, cults of personality, individualized attacks, and other forms of state 
124    chapter 6
abuse under the cover of the pursuit of communism.30 Tan criticized “More on 
the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” the influential 
essay published by the CCP in People’s Daily in December 1956. The essay was 
the party’s international response to the unexpected criticism of the recently 
deceased Stalin by Nikita Khrushchev, the head of state of the Soviet Union, as 
well as to the unrest in Poland and Hungary.31 The Mao leadership affirmed com-
munist party rule as essential for maintaining working-class control in socialist 
countries, and indicated that official abuses, including the types of murder perpe-
trated by Stalin’s regime, were preventable through the implementation of correct 
policies and methods of governance and the teaching and learning of appropriate 
work styles by officials.32 The leadership used the essay to support the launching of 
the Rectification Campaign. Tan criticized the essay for its “idealist” and “meta-
physical” thinking and its incompatibility with dialectical materialism.33 The lat-
ter school of thought, which stresses the impact of material conditions on social 
consciousness, had been extolled by the Mao leadership as the epistemological 
basis of CCP rule, Marxism, and valid knowledge. In effect, Tan accused the lead-
ership, the self-proclaimed arbiter of Marxist thought, of lacking understanding 
of its underlying philosophy. He attacked the leadership with terms that it had 
long used to discredit its ideological competitors (that is, revisionism, dogmatism, 
and idealism). He even predicted the failure of the campaign to improve state-
society relations. Yan Zhongqiang, another physics major at Beida, went further 
in his critical interpretation of Marxism and Chinese Communism. Using a com-
bination of Kantian and Lockean emphasis on human sensibility, experience, and 
understanding, he argued that the “theory of materialism” underlying Marxism 
had been proven useless for and unscientific in the natural sciences: the theory 
is but a form of “religious belief ” imbued with “class interests,” like Christian, 
Buddhist, or other religious thoughts. While Yan applauded the use of the “sharp 
knife” of materialism by the proletariat in class struggle, he suggested that ruling 
communist parties had been exploiting this “entirely disposable” weapon, using it 
“to deceive and lord over the people.” He expected that the people would rise up 
someday and teach the regimes a lesson.34
Other protesters combined their knowledge of Marxist thought and lived expe-
rience under CCP rule to dispute the official account of the class structure of the 
PRC and its alleged elimination of exploiting classes. No evidence suggests that the 
protesters had read Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas’s 1957 treatise on the rise of 
a ruling class of party officials under communist political rule.35 Their understand-
ing of the emergence of such a ruling class in China was probably inspired by Leon 
Trotsky’s famous indictment against the Soviet system in The Revolution Betrayed, 
a Chinese translation of which was available by the early 1940s.36 Zhou Dajue, a 
lecturer at the Beijing Aviation Academy, brought up Lenin’s and Engels’s defi-
nitions of social class to contest Mao’s recent observation that “non-antagonistic 
contradictions among the people” had replaced class struggle as the major form of 
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political conflict on the Mainland.37 Zhou observed that a new class of “important 
personages in the party, government, and military” who wielded redistributive 
power had appeared. These people, he said, enjoyed unwarranted compensation 
and had committed brutally repressive acts, by which he probably meant unjust 
sentences meted out to critics of CCP rule. Furthermore, an organized circle 
(jituan) of party officials had begun to take shape with the aim of gaining eco-
nomic, political, and other advantages over the rest of the population.38 For Zhou, 
class struggle was well and alive under the PRC, but the exploiters had changed. 
A history student at Beida, Pang Zhuoheng advanced his own class analysis which 
took into account “direct and indirect relations to the means of production” and 
“locations in production and distribution.” He contended that CCP rule had pro-
duced six classes with different collective interests. Party officials and members 
formed the core of the “leadership class,” and other classes, which included a class 
of intellectuals, were supportive of this leadership. However, even party leaders, 
like any members of the other classes, constantly struggled between following and 
transcending their self-serving habits and values. Pang’s rejection of the claim that 
the CCP leadership represents the interests of the working class led him to con-
clude that the party could become counterrevolutionary, especially when it uses 
violence to suppress the socialist demands of the rest of the classes.39
An important outcome of their theoretical and analytical challenges against 
the official discourse of class, party, and revolution was that the protesters dis-
puted whether China had established socialism based on the vision of Marx and 
Engels. Such skepticism was compounded by national publication of complaints 
about governing practices, including lack of due process, invasive surveillance, 
physical punishment, workplace abuses, wrongful convictions, and widespread 
discrimination in appointments and allocation of benefits and opportunities.40 
Zhou Dajue articulated a popular view held by the protesters: the “three evils” of 
workstyles that the state identified as common among party cadres, as well as the 
cult of Mao and the appearance of new types of economic and political inequality, 
revealed the “strong feudal color” (nonghou de fengjian zhuyi secai) of the existing 
political system.41 Like “revisionism,” “dogmatism,” and “idealism,” fengjian zhuyi 
(feudal thoughts) was a term that the CCP leadership had employed to attack its 
opponents and, especially, what it considered to be the obsolete and oppressive 
character of their ideas and conduct. Zhou deployed the term, instead, to indi-
cate that the constitution of Chinese Communism was more traditional than 
revolutionary, and its governing practices were exploitative rather than emanci-
patory. In a similar vein, Beida mathematics student Qian Ruping suggested that 
Marxism-Leninism, public ownership, and collective ownership were misleading 
“shop signs” erected by the state, behind which economic exploitation persisted, 
as “some had taken control of the labor of others.”42 Lin Xiling (1935–2009), who 
studied law at People’s University of China, became another leader of student pro-
testers. She questioned whether the Soviet Union, from which the Mao regime 
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borrowed its approach to socialist development, had actually become a Marxist-
type socialist society.43 In her opinion, the Soviet Union, not to mention China, 
was at best in a “transitional period” toward socialism.44 The protesters’ complaints 
against Chinese Communism, especially its philosophical basis, are not always 
comprehensible because of the speed with which the views were assembled dur-
ing the protest as well as the competition for intellectual sophistication on college 
campuses. Yet there is little doubt that some students and instructors saw sweeping 
change as indispensable for building a genuinely socialist China.
The young protesters demanded institutional reforms to expand political par-
ticipation, curb official abuses, and prevent the rise of a new exploiting class. 
Central to their demands were competitive elections. While the Mao regime 
feared that such elections would lead to the reintroduction of capitalist and other 
forms of exploitation and ultimately destroy Chinese Communism, the protesters 
held the opposite view. They believed that the postrevolutionary elimination of 
the capitalist and landowning classes as well as grave disparities in earnings from 
the political economy had created conditions for deepening working-class rule 
through competitive elections—and that such elections were vital to thwarting 
officials becoming unaccountable to the laboring masses.45 Despite limited offi-
cial news coverage of political reforms in Yugoslavia,46 the introduction there of 
self-government to replace centralization of political and economic management 
was widely hailed by the protesters as an example of socialist democracy.47 In a 
letter to a worker at Beida’s printing house, Long Yinghua, a philosophy major 
at the university, captured the depth of political participation that some protest-
ers wanted to achieve through competitive elections. Among other things, this 
blueprint, which echoed the concept of socialist democracy in Lenin’s famous 1917 
essay The State and Revolution, recommended that the factory choose its manag-
ers and other leaders through direct elections. The elected would be subject to 
recall and would be responsible for implementing collective decisions.48 Reacting 
against the existing official control of elections, others demanded that candidates 
should explain their principles and policies publicly before the elections, and that 
the elected report their work regularly to the workforce.49 A general belief was that 
direct election should be extended to the political realm, including the selection of 
provincial heads and members of all levels of the people’s congresses.50 Some even 
suggested that voting should be included in the process of recruitment and expul-
sion of CCP members to permit popular control of the membership.51 This last 
suggestion implies that the protesters wanted competitive elections to be imple-
mented broadly in the countryside, too, although their views rarely mentioned 
conditions in rural areas.52
If adopted, the reforms proposed by the protesters would reduce the CCP’s 
role in governance and management dramatically. Ma Yunfeng, who studied at 
the Beijing Aviation Academy, envisioned that the party’s domination of state 
and society through multiple layers of party cells would give way to “a system of 
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decision by the majority.” Within workplace management, party cadres and non-
party personnel would have equal status and authority. If no cadre occupied man-
agement positions, nonvoting delegates would be assigned to enable the party to 
publicize, explain, and provide leadership on policies and directions.53 A biology 
student at Beida, Jiang Xingren, saw the CCP becoming one of the political parties 
competing for management posts in the self-governing workplace.54 No one seems 
to have commented directly on the future role of Mao, but with the popularity of 
the notion of competitive elections and the criticism of cults of personality, it was 
evident that the protesters did not want him to wield supreme authority. Beida 
law student Li Shaolin, who supported electoral democracy at all levels, suggested 
what appears to have been the desired change when he proposed that the National 
People’s Congress become the highest ruling body through which “the people 
supervise and monitor the state apparatus and its personnel,” an arrangement that 
had been legally but not actually in effect.55
Unlike the scholars and notables introduced earlier in the chapter, the young 
protesters did not redraw the boundaries of the category of intellectuals explic-
itly. Nonetheless, they redefined what it meant to be an intellectual as much as 
the scholars and notables did, especially for their own generation of college stu-
dents. The protesters did not see themselves as heirs of Confucian literati, still less 
a cog in the state machine of socialist development. They placed critical reason 
above the political and class hierarchy enforced by the party and its demand for 
political submission and ideological reeducation. The protesters promoted per-
sonal autonomy, social equality, popular participation, and competitive election 
as preconditions for a truly socialist China—and considered CCP rule its main 
obstacle. They were inspired by those who had led the May Fourth movement 
decades before. When we consider content and context together, it is clear that 
the protesters also borrowed from the critical political analyses of the interven-
ing years and demonstrated exceptional political courage. As Edmund Fung has 
noted in his study of Chinese political thought, non-Marxist scholars continued 
to “rethink, reevaluate, and reformulate the Chinese past and articulate visions of 
Chinese modernity” before 1949.56 During the Rectification Campaign, the protes-
tors reintroduced into the public realm key political issues debated between the 
May Fourth movement and the CCP takeover of China, including the role of the 
state and political parties, law and constitutionalism, and individual rights and 
liberties. Their goal was to promote democratic values and institutions as means 
to prevent socialist development from being ravaged by what they saw as political 
despotism and state violence under the PRC. Unlike May Fourth or other political 
activists of the Republican era, these protesters confronted not ineffective ruling 
regimes with limited capacity to police and punish, but an unprecedentedly pow-
erful state which had penetrated the workplace, controlled livelihoods, exacted 
conformity, and even executed large numbers of “counterrevolutionaries.” Even 
taking into account relentless official appeals for criticism of the state during the 
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campaign, it is clear that the protesters stood up against a proven dictatorship and 
pointed toward another alternative path of socialist development.
INTELLECTUALS AS RED-AND-EXPERT PERSONNEL
In order to establish a fine socialist society, the party and the state have issued 
a call to intellectuals. Within ten years, the working class will have its own 
vast army of intellectuals. Let us work hard to reform ourselves, study and 
learn, and become working-class intellectuals.
—An editorial statement, Wenhui Daily, October 28, 1957
After abruptly ending the Rectification Campaign, the Mao regime orchestrated 
the Antirightist Movement to attack and punish critics of the CCP and the state, 
an episode that has been well documented.57 Here I focus on the official under-
standing of intellectuals expressed between July 1957 and January 1958, before the 
gravely anti-intellectual and ultimately disastrous Great Leap Forward engulfed 
China.58 Succinctly captured by the phrase “red and expert” (you hong you zhuan) 
and its variants, which began to saturate the media nationally during the last 
months of 1957, the official understanding reflected how the party leadership had 
conceptualized the intellectual since the Yan’an days of Chinese Communism—
with a newfound but short-lived optimism.59 We have seen the Yan’an approach to 
intellectuals in action in the last three chapters. On the one hand, the Mao regime 
sought to harness knowledge and skills for the revolutionary project as well as to 
protect it from any “petty-bourgeois” and “bourgeois” influence, or the agenda 
and behavior of writers, journalists, professors, and other educated people. On 
the other hand, the regime was determined to provide professional and educa-
tional opportunities to members of the underprivileged to enable them to become 
proficient in political, technical, and administrative work. After the Rectification 
Campaign, the regime reaffirmed commitment to this approach, even though it 
had produced deep tensions and divisions within Chinese society. The regime pro-
posed that a refinement of the approach would deliver to Chinese Communism 
large numbers of useful and reliable intellectuals.
On a theoretical level, the red-and-expert extension of the Yan’an approach to 
intellectuals shares some strong similarities with the writings of the Italian Marxist 
Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937). He believed that the communist party must play 
the leading role in the transition to socialism. Large numbers of “organic intel-
lectuals” must serve as conduits of socialist values and builders of the state and 
other robust socialist institutions. The development of such intellectuals, however, 
presents many challenges, because unbecoming values, beliefs, and habits from 
the prerevolutionary society will continue to loom large after the socialist revolu-
tion. On one level, Gramsci argued, the state must assimilate “existing categories 
of intellectuals” into the socialist project, because their knowledge and reputations 
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are valuable assets for governance and development. The targets include what 
he called traditional intellectuals (e.g., writers, artists, clergies) and what Lenin 
referred to as “bourgeois experts” (such as industrial managers, research scien-
tists, and urban planners). On another level, the state must provide training to 
“indigenous representatives of the proletariat,” people who have been deprived of 
educational and other opportunities. These individuals must be taught to combine 
Marxist thought with personal experience of labor and poverty to help “trans-
form the contradictory consciousness of the working class,” or the tendency of its 
members to sometimes support and sometimes resist change, into “revolutionary 
self-awareness.”60 After the Rectification Campaign, the Mao regime invested fur-
ther in the political and technical education of party cadres, professional workers, 
college students, and labor and peasant representatives. Of the three perspectives 
on the intellectual discussed in this chapter, the red-and-expert ideal was the only 
one pursued by the regime—and that, only for a very short while.
During the Antirightist Movement, the Mao leadership promoted further ratio-
nales and methods to intensify the ideological reeducation of professional workers 
and college students. Because members of these groups had complained about 
CCP rule and received wide support from their peers, the state now derided these 
populations in the media as “bourgeois intellectuals” (zichan jieji zhishifenzi), that 
is, intellectuals who wanted to restore class exploitation across China.61 As the 
state punished those whom it singled out as “rightists,” it also advanced proposals 
to rectify how professional workers and college students related to “the laboring 
masses.” The official goal was to turn such workers and students into “intellectu-
als of the working class” (gongren jieji zhishifenzi). Like before, the state argued 
that this would be a long and arduous process. Although thought reform, mass 
campaigns, and other forms of ideological reeducation had helped intellectuals 
improve their appreciation of Chinese Communism, “the overwhelming major-
ity” still did not understand the “thoughts and sentiments” of workers or poor 
peasants, let alone embrace their class interest as the interest of all. Among intel-
lectuals, including those who had joined the party, residual belief in bourgeois 
ideology, property, and individualism was commonplace, and manifested as self-
centeredness, careerism, condescension toward workers and peasants, and other 
undesirable habits and dispositions.62
For the Mao regime, most important for the future success of the ideological 
reeducation of intellectuals was their self-determination. “Intellectuals must make 
up their minds, even if it is painful, to unite with the laboring masses, starting 
with becoming one with the masses and integrating the individual into the col-
lective. They must draw a clear distinction between labor and exploitation and 
between who and what to love and hate. They must establish a correct under-
standing between the collective and the individual and work hard to overcome 
and guard against individualism.”63 Repeated abundantly in the media, this kind 
of demand on scientists, writers, and others epitomizes what Timothy Cheek 
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observes as the twin premises of governance under Mao. Epistemological elitism 
held that “legitimate answers” to ethics, politics, history, and development could 
only be provided by the CCP leadership; attitudinal fundamentalism put forth 
“attitudes as the prime mover of behavior” of all kinds.64 The Mao regime was 
confident with its existing approach to intellectuals. As class subjects, journalists, 
engineers, college students, and other educated people were politically unreliable, 
but not irredeemable.
Because the Mao regime used Marxist philosophy to argue that political con-
sciousness is intimately connected to practical activity, a host of organizational 
measures that would supposedly assist intellectuals to turn over a new leaf was 
quickly affirmed. The measures, some of which were already familiar to the gen-
eral public, included the deepening of self-criticism and mutual criticism among 
professional workers, the use of peasants and workers and their firsthand expe-
riences to help with the ideological reeducation of schoolteachers and students, 
and sending writers to “the midst of the masses” and assigning college graduates 
to stints of labor training to help these intellectuals understand the difficult lives 
of workers and peasants and their hopes and perseverance.65 Within six months 
after the Rectification Campaign’s conclusion, tens of thousands of writers, editors, 
schoolteachers, and officials from Beijing, Shanghai, and other places had traveled 
to various provinces to live and work with workers and peasants.66
For the Mao leadership, equally important was to rectify the relationship 
between intellectuals and science, or how to support the enterprise further on 
behalf of Chinese Communism. A major complaint from professors and others 
had been the state’s heavy-handedness and, especially, the vesting of management 
authority in ill-trained party cadres. A Yan’an revolutionary with a degree from 
Tsinghua University, Yu Guangyuan (1915–2015), worked at the CCP Department 
of Propaganda during the 1950s. Shortly after the Rectification Campaign, in an 
article in People’s Daily, he explained official thinking in a socialist country “like 
ours in which the development of science has been comparatively backward.” 
Yu reaffirmed that central planning and organization of research were necessary 
to thwart localized decision-making based on self-serving reasons. But he also 
pledged state support of universities and research institutes and mentioned the 
development of industrial zones and the introduction of science and industry 
to ethnic minority areas. He emphasized the limited role that the party foresaw 
for itself in the realm of science. The CCP wanted neither “to take up scien-
tific research” nor “to arrange work [in such detail] as scientists do with their 
[research] assistants.” The party, instead, would provide leadership in three areas: 
putting forward principles, policies, and plans to facilitate research and setting up 
the necessary systems of work; winning scientists over and giving them education 
in Marxism and Leninism; and mobilizing personnel and institutional support to 
improve working conditions. To foster scientific development, he remarked, the 
state would sometimes need to reassign scientists in ways requiring some to apply 
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their expertise in related intellectual areas, move to other geographical regions, 
and even temporarily endure taxing working and living conditions.67 To support 
scientific progress, the State Council soon approved four proposals related to the 
purchase of library books, reference works, equipment, and chemical reagents, 
partly because “the absolute majority” of suggestions recently voiced by scientists 
during the Rectification Campaign “should be affirmed.” Overall, the state noted 
that improving scientific performance would be a “complex and painstaking” task, 
but essential for the future.68
Jiang Nanxiang (1913–1988), a veteran CCP member, was the chancellor of 
Tsinghua University, which specialized in science and engineering education. 
His opening address to a campus symposium on science and his commence-
ment speech to the graduating class of 1957 suggest that the “red-and-expert” 
ideal was stressed across colleges. During the symposium, he strongly criticized 
“rightists” and intellectuals similar to what other authorities did, before address-
ing “bourgeois” habits and thinking in his workplace: “Quite a few [faculty still] 
emphasize scientific research in slanted and disconnected manners, seeing it as 
the only noble work above everything else.” Some faculty used science for personal 
advancement and belittled production and the laboring masses; others sneered at 
student instruction, administrative work, and thought reform for diverting their 
time and energy away from research. However, Jiang did not want research on his 
or other campuses to be downgraded, because it was of “utmost importance” to 
higher education. Rather, he wanted research to be strengthened to the extent that 
all instructors who had mastered teaching content and techniques would place 
scientific research on their “daily agendas.” Moreover, he wanted research to be 
redirected to serve public goals, of which he named two: producing “a national 
army of scientific and technical personnel” and contributing to “national con-
struction.” The first would require faculty to improve their research and teaching 
“in a complementary way.” The second would mean developing theory, not for its 
own sake, but to connect it to the practical needs of the country.69
In his commencement speech, Jiang warned Tsinghua graduates against their 
“individualism.” He complained that 503 graduates had requested to be assigned to 
a university, a research institute, a design department, or other comfortable profes-
sional establishments, while only 83 had listed factories, mines, or other demand-
ing sites as their choices. Over half of the graduates wanted to stay in Beijing; a 
total of 296 had asked for special consideration based on health or family reasons; 
only 16 were open to all assignments; and merely 2 had volunteered to work in the 
underdeveloped and formidable northeast region. Jiang chided the graduates for 
their selfish calculus and insisted that they “happily accept any assignment from 
the state.”70 He supported the assignment of college graduates to labor training to 
help them understand the socialist spirit. By the fall of 1957, Tsinghua faculty and 
students had begun to travel to nearby communes to assist in harvesting crops.71 
All the while, Jiang did not doubt that colleges should continue to improve “living 
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and learning conditions” and help to turn as many students as possible into scien-
tific and other experts.72
Based on its red-and-expert ideal, the state continued to promote professional 
education for former workers and peasants, as well as for party cadres of such back-
grounds. As before, it was assumed that these individuals had a high potential to 
comprehend class struggle and the purpose of Chinese Communism. With appro-
priate training, they would combine their professional knowledge and life experi-
ence to serve the socialist project, becoming what the state called “worker-peasant 
intellectuals” (gongnong zhishifenzi). Their professional and intellectual elevation 
would help to alleviate the entrenched separation and inequality between mental 
and manual labor in Chinese society. In practice, the state kept on expanding lit-
eracy training, unconventional enrollments in schools and colleges, and part-time 
education and other skill-based classes. Tsinghua University admitted hundreds 
of young soldiers and other atypical students to its regular academic programs in 
1958.73 The enrollment of cadres and students of underprivileged backgrounds in 
Shanghai’s higher education was projected to increase from 28 percent in 1957 to 
at least 40 percent in 1962 and 60 percent in 1967.74 In Sichuan Province, leaders of 
colleges and universities wanted to expand all sorts of programs through increas-
ing the enrollment of such students and using “minimum admission standards” 
to replace preferential enrollment for those who had achieved the same score as 
other candidates.75
At the national level, proposals were available on how to tackle challenges con-
fronting the training of CCP cadres and others of underprivileged background 
within higher education. Lu Ge (1913–1988), a veteran party member and official at 
the Ministry of Education, insisted that proper procedures be established to enroll 
those of genuinely underprivileged background, because others had misused the 
opportunities. Preference in admission should be given to underprivileged candi-
dates once they had achieved the required academic standards. To smooth their 
transition from work and address their academic underpreparedness, additional 
attention would be needed to place these persons in appropriate classes, including 
use of separate training programs, and to ensure proper financial and academic 
assistance. Family circumstances should be considered when assigning graduat-
ing students to new positions. The abruptly ended Rectification Campaign had 
revealed that existing students and professors resented the admission of uncon-
ventional candidates to colleges and, especially, elite universities.76 Lu wanted the 
state to refute opinions that unconventional enrollees should be educated outside 
existing campuses. He wanted colleges and universities to tackle everyday dis-
crimination against such enrollees.77
During its short-lived prominence, the red-and-expert ideal of the intellectual 
was an auspicious as well as ominous sign for Chinese Communism. It was auspi-
cious because the Mao regime, though confronted and embarrassed by unprec-
edented complaints from those whom it considered intellectuals, planned and 
implemented policies and measures not only to change the minds of these people, 
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but also to turn out others with knowledge and skills to advance the revolution-
ary project. The official pursuit of an educated, industrialized, and socialist China 
continued. But it was also ominous, because what was proposed or implemented 
to achieve the ideal involved little philosophical, political, and hence institutional 
innovation compared with what had already been done. The Mao regime simply 
reaffirmed its Yan’an approach to intellectuals, which had helped the CCP seize 
state power but was recently proven to be politically incendiary and socially divi-
sive under the PRC.
On a theoretical level, the proposed and implemented measures exposed key 
differences between the CCP’s Marxism and Gramsci’s Marxism. The divergence 
provides a valuable window on why the Mao regime would turn against the cat-
egory of intellectuals shortly afterward by denigrating the value of formal educa-
tion during the Great Leap Forward and then launching a wholesale attack on 
such people during the Cultural Revolution. The Mao leadership saw the develop-
ment of what Gramsci called organic intellectuals as vital to furthering Chinese 
Communism. Unlike Gramsci, however, the regime never once imagined using 
these persons to build “egalitarian social relations and democratic political forms” 
to support the socialist project.78 Instead, the leaders continued to consecrate 
themselves as proletarian revolutionaries, define most educated people as unreli-
able intellectuals, and rely on state tutelage to attain a unifying governing structure 
and culture with the CCP on top. Gramsci was aware that top-down cultivation of 
organic intellectuals may empower the latter to the extent that they would pursue 
their own political agendas. But he “was clearly willing to live with such risks” 
rather than embrace the attempt “to impose socialism from above.”79 The impo-
sition, he believed, would breed bureaucracy or tyranny or both at the expense 
of democracy. Not only did the Mao regime share no such reservations; even as 
it promoted the red-and-expert ideal, the state continued to vilify and dominate 
those whom it labeled intellectuals and even singled out some of these people for 
prosecution, labor reform, and other kinds of punishment. In retrospect, the ideal 
was the last gasp of the Yan’an approach to intellectuals under the PRC.
The 1957 debate on the intellectual and Chinese Communism reveals the full 
extent of their impact on each other under the early PRC. What the socialist 
project had become was inseparable from how it had defined the intellectual and 
from the institutional and political consequences that followed. Where the project 
would go depended on its redefinition of the intellectual and the roles and respon-
sibilities assigned to this subject. With each of the perspectives delineated above, 
important questions about China’s transition to a supposedly improved socialist 
society were unanswered. The young protesters who wanted to reinvent the social-
ist project, for example, failed to address why competitive elections based on the 
ideas and qualifications of the individual would serve to overcome the entrenched 
divide between mental and manual labor, let alone prevent the emergence of new 
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types of social inequality. The protesters also did not explain why CCP leaders 
and cadres would accept a greatly reduced role in governance and management 
or facilitate the expansion of political participation in all areas. Did the protesters 
want a violent revolution against CCP rule? How would official violence be used 
in the new society? Likewise, the scholars and notables who sought to be state 
partners did not clarify why elevating or returning scientists, lawyers, and other 
experts to positions of authority would improve the political or economic pros-
pect of traditionally underprivileged populations. What did these experts share in 
their backgrounds that made them fit to promote socialist values and habits? What 
was the place of workers and other laborers in such a socialist society? The issues 
that the state elided in its counterargument are equally obvious. How would the 
intensification of ideological reeducation improve the socialist consciousness of 
professors, writers, or others, given the deep dissatisfaction that they had already 
shown with CCP rule? How would the professional education and empowerment 
of select members of the underprivileged affect their loyalty to the latter popula-
tion? And what role in governance would the party play after creating an abun-
dance of red-and-expert personnel?
Notwithstanding their incompleteness, the three perspectives on the intellec-
tual and Chinese Communism are evidence that alternative directions of socialist 
development continued to exist after 1949. The perspectives were each based on 
a critique of existing political and social conditions. They addressed important 
concerns such as freedom, justice, equality, democracy, education, science, and 
productivity under the PRC. They received support from different sections of the 
general population, which indicate that they were not products of blithe utopia-
nism, but of burgeoning movements for social change. We will never know how 
China would have fared had any of the perspectives become the foundation of a 
national agenda of socialist development. Even had such a journey taken off, it 
would have been filled with challenges, complications, and setbacks. However, it 
is difficult to imagine that the collective experience of the alternative would have 
been as traumatic and deadly as that which unfolded afterward with the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution sponsored by the Mao regime. After all, each 
of the perspectives embraced as political and moral principles some combination 
of critical reason, personal autonomy, technical competence, and collectivism as 
well as shared governance, class cooperation, rule of law, and scientific develop-
ment. In contrast, what the state promoted in the following decade was the dis-
paragement of science and education, the cult of Mao, class struggle, and a search 
for class enemies. These official principles would lead to false imprisonment and 
torture on a mass scale as well as starvation, murders, mob rule, collective killings, 
and tens of millions of fatalities.80 The next chapter will look at reinterpretations of 
the intellectual between the late 1950s and the early 1960s and the central role that 
they played in the devastating atrocities.
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Ugly Intellectuals Everywhere
During the early 1960s, the musical drama Third Sister Liu (Liu Sanjie) took 
China’s cultural scene by storm. The musical was created in Guangxi Province, far 
removed from the PRC capital at Beijing. It drew on the folklore of Third Sister 
Liu, whose legend has permeated South China since the Tang dynasty (618–907). 
The performance features a peasant heroine of Zhuang minority origin using her 
ingenuity in singing and improvising mountain folksongs (shan’ge) to help poor 
villagers fight against predatory landlords and their hangers-on. The musical was 
staged in Beijing between July and September 1960, including four times inside the 
official compound of Zhongnanhai, where Chairman Mao and other CCP leaders 
worked and lived. After receiving praise from the leaders, the troupe toured no 
fewer than thirteen provinces and regions and some twenty cities, many of which 
staged their own productions of the play.1 By January 1961, radio and television 
stations nationwide were playing excerpts of the musical to ring in the Western 
and the Chinese New Year; gramophone recordings of the musical were avail-
able for sale and distribution. Later that year, Changchun Film Studio (Changchun 
dianying zhipian chang), one of the biggest in China, released Third Sister Liu as 
a musical feature film set along the banks of the Li River in spectacular Guilin in 
Guangxi. With an impressive score, witty lines, memorable characters, and supe-
rior cinematography, the movie was an instant hit. Productions of colored pictures 
of the actresses and actors as well as sheet music and artwork related to the movie 
followed, just in time for another New Year celebration. By the fall of 1962, the New 
China Bookstore, which was founded by the CCP when it was headquartered in 
Yan’an, had begun national sale of a ninety-page illustrated storybook on Third 
Sister Liu, an ideal keepsake for the family.2
Any mature audience member who watched Third Sister Liu then would rec-
ognize that it contained a severe rebuke of intellectuals by the state, thanks to the 
musical’s most famous and entertaining scene—the singing competition (duige). 
In the movie, the scene lasts for twenty minutes. It shows Liu, a talented, adorable 
young woman with an angelic voice, in a contest of improvised singing on the river 
136    chapter 7
bank. The narrative tension of the contest is intensified by Liu’s pledge to cease 
singing should she be beaten in her art. Her rival, the wicked local landlord, has 
hired three Confucian literati from nearby areas to handle the competition. These 
self-proclaimed “highly regarded scholars” arrive at the showdown with a boatful 
of songbooks and the intent of crushing a lowly woman. They are joined by two 
dozen sycophantic literati, some of whom are mostly attracted to the food and 
drink served by the landlord. On the other side, hundreds of villagers, including 
some from distant places, show up to support Liu. They are heartily amused by the 
literati’s failure to match her quick wit and artistry. They sing with her to expose 
the scholars’ ignorance of the simplest of agricultural labors. When the literati feel 
pressured during the competition, they state that they are followers of “ancient 
sages and virtuous men” and experts in Chinese classics, and try to abuse their 
opponents for lacking education. But Liu hits back every time when they boast 
of their achievements, criticizing further the uselessness of their learning, to the 
peasants’ delight. The singing competition is magnificent theater.
In this chapter I use theater and cinema as a window on the mutual constitution 
of the intellectual and Chinese Communism during the late 1950s and the early 
1960s. Since the revolutionary project entered its Yan’an phase, the CCP leader-
ship had portrayed “intellectuals” mainly as petty-bourgeois but usable subjects. 
Ideological reeducation was considered essential to helping these otherwise self-
serving persons recognize the virtues of Chinese Communism and overcome their 
shortcomings. A champion of this view, Mao began to question it after the party 
encountered a deluge of complaints against its policies, practices, and personnel 
during the 1957 Rectification Campaign. The official representation of the intellec-
tual as a former accomplice in class oppression and an enduring threat to Chinese 
Communism gathered strength afterward, epitomized by Mao’s revised claim 
that all intellectuals were “bourgeois intellectuals,”3 and by official punishment of 
critics with demotion, labor reform, and other measures during the Antirightist 
Movement. The state promoted further negative assessments of intellectuals dur-
ing the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) to spark “the enthusiasm and creativity 
of the masses” on behalf of the national production campaign.4 Sciences and other 
academic disciplines were neglected. Party cadres, professors, journalists, and oth-
ers were sent to the countryside to be taught “proletarian virtues” by peasants.5 
Third Sister Liu turned this heightened official disparagement of the intellectual, 
or the redrawing of the symbolic boundaries involving the subject, into popular 
entertainment. The musical reinforced the descent of Chinese Communism into 
what Andrew Walder calls “a centrally planned depression”6 that cost tens of mil-
lions of lives.
I use the production of Third Sister Liu to illustrate how the Mao regime mobi-
lized local populations to create, circulate, and consume degrading ideas, images, 
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and idioms about intellectuals. Well before the Leap, the state had gained control 
over theater and cinema. To put socialist development on an anti-intellectual path, 
the state, ironically, relied on educated CCP cadres, scriptwriters, and other pro-
fessional workers, or those classified or classifiable as intellectuals, to organize the 
performances, because these kinds of persons had the literary, artistic, technical, 
and organizational skills to deliver impactful works. Meanwhile, top-down mobi-
lization of society to support the Leap absorbed many others into the productions. 
As state and society partook in denouncing intellectuals, tensions and resentment 
between party cadres and ordinary professional workers deepened. To escape the 
growing stigma attached to the intellectual marker, cadres who oversaw the pro-
ductions presented themselves as superior to the professional workers who wrote, 
adapted, or staged the musical. To cope with their amplified humiliation by the 
state, some artists, critics, and even cadres contested in subtle fashions the official 
condemnation of intellectuals. In other words, as Chinese Communism featured 
the intellectual as a dangerous subject with limited use value during the Leap, the 
rift between educated party cadres and ordinary educated people, or the discredit-
able and the discredited, widened.
I then turn to Early Spring in February (Zaochun eryue) to illustrate the increas-
ingly strident struggle to redefine the intellectual and Chinese Communism 
before murder, corporal punishment, and other forms of abuse descended upon 
many identified as intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution. A star-studded 
film produced in 1963 under tight official control, Early Spring epitomized the 
post-Leap efforts of some of the CCP leaders to reemphasize the importance of 
intellectuals to socialist development. The movie features an educated couple in 
a small town during the 1920s coping with local poverty and parochialism amid 
their budding romance. They appear thoughtful and progressive compared with 
other educated people in their lives; they are willing to make sacrifices to help the 
poor and potentially for revolutionary struggles to improve Chinese society. The 
film is the ideological antithesis of Third Sister Liu. It challenged the Leap’s deni-
gration of intellectuals and even the Yan’an depiction of the subjects as selfish and 
untrustworthy. Even before Early Spring was released, it became a target of offi-
cial attacks. Mao and his supporters were regaining control over the direction of 
Chinese Communism. They stressed vigilance against capitalist restoration, espe-
cially efforts waged by “bourgeois intellectuals” within state and society. The film 
was spotlighted as a “poisonous weed” which glorified “bourgeois thinking” and 
“bourgeois intellectuals.” Another layer of virulent ideas, idioms, and imageries 
about the intellectual saturated the nation as the Cultural Revolution approached. 
Many movie audiences in Shanghai, however, rejected the official interpretation of 
the film, which prompted the state to reach deep into society, again, to propagate 
official denunciations of the intellectual.
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STAGING THIRD SISTER LIU  NATIONALLY
In the scene of the “singing competition,” the literati each wore an operatic 
makeup of an animal: one was a pig, another a dog, and the last one a fox. 
These men of letters had retractable necks [like turtles]; they bent and twisted 
their bodies and sang and spoke in a pretentious manner, behaving disgust-
ingly on stage.
—an observation on a local performance of Third Sister Liu7
In 1958, as CCP officials across China began to prepare for the tenth anniversary 
celebration of the PRC, the proposal to stage the folktale of Third Sister Liu sur-
faced in the city of Liuzhou in Guangxi Province in a meeting between party cad-
res and artists arranged by the local CCP department of propaganda.8 Although 
theater scripts and performances about Liu had been available, much work would 
be needed before a socialist rendition of her legend would emerge.9 In retrospect, 
the proposal was an ingenious idea. It suggests the cadres’ and artists’ astute 
understanding of art policy under the Great Leap Forward and capacity to bring 
together tradition, art, and politics to serve the state. For one thing, the state had 
initiated a mass campaign to collect and publicize folksongs, folktales, and folk 
poetry to extol the hard work, creativity, and artistry of peasants and workers on 
behalf of the Leap’s anti-intellectual approach to production.10 Liu’s legend as a 
“singing immortal” of folksongs was a potentially rich resource for such propa-
ganda. Second, the plan to use stories and songs related to Liu, many of them 
passed down from imperial times, fit perfectly with another decision of the Mao 
regime to rehabilitate theatrical and literary heritage to help popularize official 
ideas.11 Third, the state had been seeking to showcase the national minorities in 
the performing arts for political and educational purposes—and Liu’s legend was 
strongly rooted in the Zhuang population in Guangxi.12 Most important for our 
purposes, Liu’s legend features literati as central figures. These characters or, from 
the state’s perspective, models of intellectuals of the bygone era could be rewritten 
to lend support to the Leap’s anti-intellectualism.
After the musical drama was proposed, Liuzhou’s authorities organized art-
ists, workers, and others to travel across the province to speak with peasants and 
folksingers as well as hold forums to collect stories about Third Sister Liu and her 
songs. The travelers brought back some 20,000 folksongs, more than 200 folk-
tales, and many types of folk tunes.13 According to S. H. Chen, the gathering of 
folk poetry and songs during the Leap often went beyond existing material, or 
those rooted in the local population. The collectors included local schoolteach-
ers, college graduates, and others whose education impressed villagers and was 
vital to documenting their mostly oral testimonials. Channeling the lofty goals 
and rhetoric of the state, the collectors lauded the CCP’s revolutionary vision and 
achievements, paid homage to “labor heroes” and “model workers,” and praised 
activities in the locality, before rousing villagers into “a festive mood” of singing 
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and improvisation. New songs and poetry were invented and old ones collected or 
altered to suit the Leap’s purposes.14 Still, the stories, songs, and poetry about Third 
Sister Liu gathered from peasants and other sources reflected a central character-
istic of folklore. The content as a whole was full of inconsistencies and contradic-
tions, or diverse meanings and values from the contexts in which the legend was 
remembered, retold, or reinvented.15
The material places Liu in different dynasties, but mainly in Tang times. Some 
have her from a well-to-do family and well-versed in the classics and history 
from a young age. Some indicate that she was a loafer with many romantic affairs. 
Some see her as a poor village laborer. Some suggest that she was murdered by 
her brother. There are even debates about her ethnicity and provincial origin. 
Many accounts are essentially love stories or fairy tales.16 A principal aspect of 
the accounts is that Liu is involved in singing competitions with literati. In one 
well-known version, the contender is her admirer, a young and handsome scholar, 
and they sing for seven days and nights without producing a winner, before both 
turning into stone. In another version, they finally sing with one heart and voice 
and rise to heaven as immortals. In other versions, literati come from different 
places to challenge Liu but are all beaten by her majestic singing.17 None of the 
well-known versions depicts literati colluding with landlords to stop Liu from stir-
ring up local peasants. The version closest to this soon-to-appear revolutionary 
theme has a powerful magistrate hiring four scholars to take on Liu in a singing 
contest. They arrive with a boatload of books, and she is obliged to marry him if 
she loses the competition. The accounts show Liu as bantering with her opponents 
and asserting her independence as a woman. She is polite, addressing the scholars 
as “gentlemen” (xiansheng) and “elder brothers” (a’ge).18
Under official supervision and “repeated discussion and informal delibera-
tion,”19 Liuzhou’s scriptwriters and art workers produced a socialist rendition of the 
legend of Third Sister Liu. Liu appears as a feisty, sharp-witted peasant woman who 
fights with her musical talent against depraved landlords and slavish scholars. The 
work was staged as a caidiao opera in a province-wide theater event in April 1959. 
The authorities were so pleased with the performance that they sponsored fur-
ther research on the folklore and revisions of the musical drama. The authoritative 
script appeared a few months later. The singing competition scene was excerpted 
in the nationwide journal Scripts (Juben) in September 1959. Meanwhile, two com-
panies performed the musical under official auspices at various locations across 
Guangxi and received praise and support from local party leaders.20 By year-end, 
more than sixty professional and amateur companies had staged the performance 
across the province. The success prompted the Guangxi government to sponsor 
a festival of Third Sister Liu performances at the capital of Nanning, the location 
where Mao had first pressured his colleagues to accept the Leap as a national 
development project.21 During the festival, more than 1,400 people from all over 
the province performed the drama in eleven genres of traditional Chinese theater. 
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By then, some 1,200 “cultural work units” and almost 60,000 performers, some of 
whom were peasants and workers, had reportedly staged the play for 12 million 
people, or 60 percent of Guangxi’s population.22 After the festival, the scriptwriters 
and artists deliberated about the variations that they had seen across performances 
and polished the script further under official instructions and guidance, especially 
from the Guangxi Bureau of Culture and the Guangxi CCP Department of Culture 
and Education.23 A complete script was printed in Scripts in mid-1960 and later by 
the Chinese Theater Press. The Guangxi Folk Song and Dance Theater was offi-
cially established to take the play to Beijing and around the country.24
While Third Sister Liu was staged in Beijing, Wu Jinnan (1909–1999), the CCP 
secretary of Guangxi Province, stated in a People’s Daily article that tight official 
supervision had led to the production’s success.
The [Guangxi section of the] party not only supported this production; it provided 
frequent, detailed, and strong guidance on creative thinking, staffing, and material 
resources as well as on the script, music, and stage design and on the performances. 
The comrades in charge of the Guangxi Party Commission and other county, city, 
and district party commissions watched the performances repeatedly and offered 
ideas for improvement. Some district commissions organized special discussions of 
the script and the performances, to the extent of going over every song, every line of 
the lyrics, and every costume. Some members of the commissions even performed 
on stage and directed the production. The party commissions assumed leadership in 
tackling many problems of the performances. Under the uniform leadership of the 
commissions, various districts and departments as well as cultural and art organiza-
tions implemented mutual cooperation that guaranteed the smooth progress of the 
[Third Sister Liu artistic] movement and the ceaselessly improving quality of the 
performances.25
Wu was undoubtedly blowing his own trumpet, or that of the Guangxi’s party cad-
res for how well they had served the state during the Leap. Nonetheless, the cadres 
did combine organization and representation successfully to produce and promote 
the musical drama, which Mao declared “a revolutionary play” after watching it.26 
The success of Third Sister Liu in Beijing and the publicity garnered by the perfor-
mance prompted authorities elsewhere to remount the production and organize 
related events to demonstrate local support of the Leap and its anti-intellectualism.
Table 3 is a schedule of theater performances, television screenings, and radio 
broadcasts of Third Sister Liu in Shanghai between late 1960 and mid-1962, based 
on announcements from two major local newspapers. As the right-hand column 
shows, the singing competition was the first scene to be showcased on television. 
Unlike radio, television was not a common household possession. Only the privi-
leged, which included party and state officials, had access to a family television. 
The early broadcast of the scene to this population suggests that the Shanghai 
authorities supported the Leap’s denigration of intellectuals. The schedule of 
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theater productions confirms the intensity with which the play was promoted. 
By February 1961, seven months after Third Sister Liu debuted in Beijing, at least 
eight Shanghai companies had staged the musical in six genres of traditional the-
ater. We do not know how many performances the companies put on altogether. 
What the Shanghai Academy of Experimental Opera went through before stag-
ing Third Sister Liu suggests that the companies performed the play numerous 
times in a wide range of venues. Since the Antirightist Movement, the academy 
had been pressured by the government to perform more than usual. Its perfor-
mances had jumped from an average of 170 per year to 1,100 in 1958. Many of these 
performances were staged inside factories or military compounds or before village 
crowds.27
Information on the role of CCP cadres in organizing or supervising the Shanghai 
productions is not available, but the productions’ timing and the timeliness of 
related events suggest strong official intervention. The height of the 1961 produc-
tions coincided with New Year celebrations in both the Western and the Chinese 
calendar, excellent occasions for state propaganda. The musical was promoted in 
newspapers as actively as other cultural events sponsored by the local authorities, 
such as movies and exhibitions. The performances were staged in main theaters 
and local playhouses and in the city center as well as in workers’ neighborhoods. 
In other words, Shanghai virtually hosted its own Third Sister Liu performance 
festival. The climax of the events was the performance by the touring Guangxi 
Folk Song and Dance Theater. The company debuted in Shanghai on January 27, 
1961. The same day, China’s preeminent Peking Opera singer Mei Lanfang (1894–
1961) published a cheerful poem about Third Sister Liu in a major local newspaper, 
lauding her artistry, courage, and class consciousness—as well as the Leap.28 The 
 following night, the performance was aired on prime time television.29
In Shanghai, a host of cultural activities supporting the musical appeared and 
spread its images of dimwitted, shameless, and sycophantic literati, language of 
class struggle, and ideological support of the Leap. The most obvious of such activ-
ities were newspaper articles that introduced the play and the performing troupes. 
Once the performance began, congratulatory commentaries flourished, pictures 
and drawings of the characters were published, and actors and actresses wrote in 
the newspapers about the play and their participation in it. The Shanghai branch 
of the China Record Company produced gramophone records of Third Sister Liu 
to coincide with the productions. The album quickly became a bestseller, with the 
songs being played in bookstores.30 Images from the performances were included 
in photograph exhibitions. At Tongji University, students apparently performed 
scenes from Third Sister Liu, paradoxically enough, as part of the 1961 commemo-
ration of the May Fourth movement as well as created art works based on the 
newly minted socialist legend of the female singer.31
After three months of intense programming, the productions and broadcasts 
of Third Sister Liu began to peter out. This was not because the play had run its 
Date Activities Performing Organizations Remarks
1. The Western and Chinese New Year period, 1961
November–
December 1960
Theater 1.  Shanghai Academy of Experimental 
Opera
2. Jiading Xi Theater Company
December 20, 1960 Television 
broadcast
Jiading Xi Theater Company “Singing 
competition”
December 31, 1960 Television 
broadcast 
People’s Hu Theater Company “Singing 
competition”
January 1961 Theater 1.  Chuxin Yue Theater Company
2. Qunyi Hu Theater Company
3.  Guangxi Folk Song and Dance 
Theater Company
4.  Shanghai Yue Theater Company
January 1, 1961 Radio 
Broadcast
Jiading Xi Theater Company Songs from the 
play
January 28, 1961 Television 
broadcast 
Guangxi Folk Song and Dance 
Theater Company
February 1961 Theater 1.  Haiyang Comedy Theater  
Company
2.  Fenghuo Huai Theater Company
3.  Shanghai Academy of Experimental 
Opera 
“Singing 
competition”
February 13, 1961 Radio 
broadcast
Singers of Huangmei theater Two days before 
Chinese New Year’s 
Day; “singing 
competition”
2. Mid-1961
April 1961 Theater People’s Hu Theater Company
April 1, 1961 Television 
broadcast
Shanghai Academy of Experimental 
Opera 
May 4, 1961 Theater Fudan and other universities May Fourth 
commemoration
July 1, 1961 Radio 
broadcast
Singers of Hu Theater Songs from the 
play
August 1961 Theater Jiangsu Huai Theater Company
Table 3 Third Sister Liu Performances in Shanghai, 1960–1962
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Date Activities Performing Organizations Remarks
3. The Western and Chinese New Year period, 1962
January 1962 Theater Shanghai Academy of Experimental 
Opera
January–February 
1962
Movie shows 
in cinemas
Feature film Third Sister Liu
February 7, 1962 Television 
broadcast
Feature film Third Sister Liu Two days after 
Chinese New Year’s 
Day
4. Mid-1962
April 12, 1962 Television 
broadcast
Unknown
August 1962 Theater Ningxia Yue Theater Company
Sources: Electronic databases of Wenhui bao and Xinmin wanbao at Shanghai Municipal Library.
course as popular entertainment. With its size and rich history in the performing 
arts, the city had a huge audience for theater. Even before the performances began, 
the Leap was coming to an end. Against Mao and other leaders whose political 
position had been weakened by the production campaign’s failure, Premiers Zhou 
Enlai (1898–1976) and Chen Yi (1901–1972) and other officials had been pushing 
for renewal of official cooperation with “intellectuals” to improve national eco-
nomic performance.32 Full-fledged support of the anti-intellectual musical by the 
Shanghai authorities was probably withdrawn as soon as news of top-level policy 
and attitudinal change was confirmed in the city. Put differently, the Shanghai per-
formances mentioned above revealed that the authorities there, too, had impres-
sive capacity to combine organization and representation to serve the state.
When the movie Third Sister Liu was shown in Shanghai in 1962, screening 
was mainly organized by the municipal government and workplaces. The picture 
was quickly scheduled for television release, and mobile projection teams brought 
the film to rural Shanghai for viewing by peasants.33 Two reasons explain why 
the authorities continued to promote the musical and hence ideas, images, and 
idioms disparaging to the educated to an even broader audience. First, as Lydia 
Liu suggests, the artistic achievement of the production “seemed to lift the work 
above official propaganda and made it appealing to both children and grownups.”34 
Second, there was a soon-to-be-exposed, deep disagreement about the relations 
between the intellectual and Chinese Communism at the highest level of the state.
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REPRESENTING INTELLECTUALS IN CINEMA
In a reflection written some years later on the highly successful movie Third Sister 
Liu, an audience member aptly summarized the appearance of the three literati 
hired by the wicked landlord to compete with Liu in the singing competition: they 
look like a thug, a halfwit, and a whoremonger.35 Shortly after the Mao regime took 
power, cinema, like theater, became a primary medium of official propaganda. 
Characters based on the official view of class struggle dominated feature films, 
some of which featured educated people and their responses to war and revolution 
and played an important role in the objectification of the intellectual. Compared 
with the theater performances of Third Sister Liu in Guangxi, Shanghai, or else-
where, the movie version leaves behind an enduring record of the representations 
of the literati in the musical drama, or how the state used it to inscribe further 
negative meanings on the intellectual. Let us review some of the noteworthy por-
trayals of educated persons in postrevolutionary cinema and how the representa-
tions reflected and reinforced the development of Chinese Communism, before 
returning to the characterization of literati in the national hit.
The March of Democratic Youth (Minzhu qingnian jinxingqu) (1950), one of the 
first notable works of the state-controlled Beijing Film Studio, was completed dur-
ing the beginning of what has been officially termed the New Democracy period 
(1949–1953). A theme of official governance then was cross-class cooperation 
under CCP rule to rebuild and reform China. Notable scholars and other edu-
cated persons who had supported the 1949 revolution became CPPCC members 
and were appointed to ministerial positions, while the Mao regime criticized the 
politics and beliefs of the educated population.36 The state, as chapters 4 and 5 
have suggested, expended large amounts of symbolic and material resources to 
establish political control mechanisms in workplaces and local neighborhoods, 
including the assignment of educated party cadres to positions of authority. Under 
these circumstances, The March presented many faces of educated people in its 
depiction of student protest at Peking University on the eve of the revolution. In 
it, there are patient and understanding underground CCP members and a mixture 
of levelheaded, impulsive, muscular, frail, hard-working, and hedonistic students. 
Some students are economically privileged; others struggle to get by; a few are 
thuggish Guomindang agents in disguise. The film narrates the transformation of 
a handsome, stylish man from a diligent but politically indifferent student into a 
staunch supporter of the protest and then of the new republic. The movie also paid 
homage to those whom the state regarded as progressive intellectuals. The moral 
authority on screen is not so much the handful of indefatigable CCP members as 
an elderly professor, a participant in the May Fourth movement. In an early scene, 
this hoary, bespectacled scholar energizes student protest with an inspirational 
speech that attacks the Guomindang and the United States. The March captured 
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the optimism-cum-unease that made up the Yan’an approach to intellectuals of 
the Mao regime as well as its efforts to coopt well-known figures in academic, art, 
journalism, and other circles.
When the Mao regime launched Thought Reform of Intellectuals and then 
denounced Yu Pingbo (1900–1990), Liang Shuming (1893–1988), Hu Feng, and 
other notable writers for their “petty-bourgeois” and “bourgeois” thinking 
and  characters, cinematic criticism of intellectuals intensified.37 Yet, the Yan’an 
representation of the subjects as politically improvable and usable to the social-
ist project remained a staple in films, just as the assumption continued to inform 
everyday organization under CCP rule. The Diary of a Nurse (Hushi riji) (1957) 
is typical in these respects. The timing of the film, however, would earn it con-
demnations during the Antirightist Movement for exaggerating the significance 
of intellectuals to Chinese Communism. The movie features a good-looking nurs-
ing school graduate in Shanghai, Jian Suhua, who chooses to serve the socialist 
project by relocating to a remote and barren construction site, while most of her 
classmates long and fight for choice assignments within the city. Her lover, an 
ambitious and successful young surgeon, does not understand her selflessness, let 
alone the construction workers’ dedication to their work. Her supervising doctor 
is disagreeable, too: a womanizer who provides perfunctory care to the workers. 
In the end, her lover leaves her for his career, but her boss turns over a new leaf. 
This tripartite statement on intellectuals—the good, the bad, and the improv-
able—resembles the representation in The March with one important exception: 
none of the educated people featured in The Diary have moral authority in their 
own right. Jian is commendable because she does not act like her peers or other 
petty-bourgeois intellectuals, but possesses worker-like altruism.38
Products of the ill-fated political thaw sanctioned by the state that culminated 
in the 1957 Rectification Campaign, The Man Unconcerned with Details (Buju 
xiaojie de ren) (1956) and Unfinished Comedy (Wei wancheng de xiju) (1957) are 
unusual political satires in the history of cinema in the Mao era. Director Lü Ban 
(1913–1967) did not use his works to repeat the official interpretation of intellec-
tuals as usable but unreliable subjects. Instead, he took aim at CCP policies and 
authorities in the artistic circles and portrayed ordinary educated people as rea-
sonable and hard-working. In The Man Unconcerned with Details, the object of 
ridicule is an accomplished writer and advocate of satire who tours and lectures 
on its importance for art and literature. He is extremely self-absorbed and incon-
siderate (and probably a party member, from the deference that he is shown to 
command from his hosts). He litters in public, picks flowers in a park, smokes in 
a library, and talks loudly during a theater performance. Everyone else behaves 
properly.39 In Unfinished Comedy, the spoof goes even further. Lü’s target is an 
unkempt middle-aged man with absurdly thick glasses who is described as an 
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authority in literary and art criticism. This is a thinly disguised caricature of CCP 
cadres from rural areas (or perhaps even Yan’an revolutionaries). The man uses 
high-sounding political jargon and rhetoric, quotes Mao and Stalin, and speaks 
condescendingly to the film crew that receives him. He rejects out of hand any 
experimentation that deviates from the dogma articulated by Mao in the Yan’an 
Forum on Literature and Art.40 Both of these films were denounced during the 
Antirightist Movement. Unfinished Comedy was branded as “poisonous weed” and 
banned from release. Lü was sentenced to labor reform as a rightist.41 The authori-
ties in charge of cinema, however, did not discard the techniques of caricature and 
ridicule of educated people along with political satire. Instead, the techniques were 
redeployed to support CCP rule.42 Its incorporation in Third Sister Liu would take 
the attack against intellectuals in PRC cinema to a new height.
Singing competitions, the activity in the most memorable scene of Third Sister 
Liu, are a popular pastime in southern, southwest, and northwest China. During 
such a contest, the participants take turns to ask and answer questions using folk-
style singing. Because the subject matter is virtually unlimited, excellent knowl-
edge and improvisational skill are necessary for maintaining superiority.43 In the 
movie, the thug, the halfwit and the whoremonger each have physical and intel-
lectual characteristics spotlighted to insinuate the ugliness of intellectuals in the 
history of class struggle in China. The thug, the leader among the three, is played 
by a middle-aged, homely man with unusually high cheek bones and a mouthful 
of crooked and discolored teeth, an actor who specialized in playing dubious char-
acters. He serves as the adviser of the wicked landlord and plots with him to use 
violence and other means to control Liu and dominate the villagers. The whore-
monger, a pale, skinny man with a salacious grin, was cast to stress that literati 
lived off the labor of others and had decadent lifestyles. He acts condescendingly 
toward the villagers and disrespects women publicly. The halfwit is a comedic fig-
ure. His sincerity toward Liu does not help to conceal his stupidity, which he does 
not recognize. He stutters and moves awkwardly and depends on songbooks to 
compete with her. Even the landlord and other literati are embarrassed by his per-
formance (see figure 4).
In the singing competition scene, mutual antagonism between the competing 
parties in relation to the meaning of knowledge is obvious. Liu mocks the useless-
ness of the literati’s training in Confucian classics; the literati defend their educa-
tion as morally superior and look down upon their opponents. She derides them 
as imbeciles and tell them they are confused and deranged; they call her crazy 
and disrespectful. But there is no doubt who wins the contest. During part of the 
competition, the literati merely sing against villagers who are there to support Liu. 
The villagers hold their own against these men and even trip them up with simple 
riddles about agriculture. The film’s attack against the literati and their education 
reaches a climax when Liu responds after the landlord angrily snatches a songbook 
from the humiliated scholars and throws it into the river. She sings:
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This river is pure and clean,
Your songbook reeks.
Do not ditch your stinking book here,
For fear that it will soil the river.
Unable to tame Liu through the contest, the landlord kidnaps her afterward and 
tries to force her to become his concubine, all the while receiving support and 
advice from the literati, especially the thug. In the end, the villagers storm the 
landlord’s estate and rescue her so that she and her lover can leave the area.
Compared to the other films mentioned above, in Third Sister Liu three repre-
sentations of educated people have conspicuously vanished. First, the movie does 
not contain any educated person who is remotely decent: every literati portrayed is 
reprehensible or dishonorable in one way or another. Second, not one of the literati 
becomes a better person as the plot unfolds. Third, the value of formal education 
is not highlighted anywhere. Whereas Liuzhou’s and Guangxi’s authorities had 
skillfully staged and reinforced the Leap’s devaluation of education and suspicion 
Figure 4. The three literati in the film Third Sister Liu. From left to right: the “whoremon-
ger” (played by Xu Juntai), the “thug” (played by Ma Biao), and the “halfwit” (played by Li 
Wancheng).
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toward intellectuals by reorganizing Liu’s legend into a musical drama, the movie 
brought to a national audience theatrical images that suggested such people were 
slavish, scheming, and useless. In the process, the filmmakers had made changes 
to the musical drama. Specific phrases that Mao used to ridicule intellectuals and 
popularized during the Leap, such as “lazy bones” and “incapable of telling the 
five grains apart,” were inserted into the singing contest. And Liu’s imprisonment 
by the landlord with support from the literati was added to the movie to highlight 
their complicity in class oppression.44
CADRES’  AND ART WORKERS’  
REACTIONS TO THE MUSICAL
Tight supervision, multilayered organization, skillful storytelling, and ingenious 
artistic techniques orchestrated by the CCP transformed the folklore of Third 
Sister Liu into theatrical and cinematic representations that reinforced the anti-
intellectualism of the Great Leap Forward. Resistance to the official denigration of 
the intellectual, however, persisted throughout the creative process as well as the 
staging and screening of the performances, just as reinterpretations and manipu-
lations of the classification occurred amid its objectification under the CCP. Like 
their peers in science, education, or industry, the party cadres who oversaw the 
musical’s production in Liuzhou and Guangxi were generally classifiable as intel-
lectuals according to official definition. In fact, some were assigned to the produc-
tion because of their educational achievements and artistic or literary knowledge. 
How did such cadres navigate between their classification as intellectuals and the 
production’s anti-intellectualism? The above-mentioned newspaper article by 
Wu Jinnan suggests that some cadres sought to redefine the official meaning of 
intellectuals through finger-pointing. The latter, as chapters 3 and 5 have shown, 
involved party cadres exploiting their political and management authority to por-
tray themselves as dependable revolutionaries and stigmatize other educated peo-
ple as unreliable intellectuals. Wu’s conduct was an excellent example. According 
to him, the cadres in charge of Third Sister Liu insisted that scriptwriters and art-
ists follow the principles on art and literature articulated by Mao in Yan’an—or 
“using the past to serve the present” and “politics first, art second”—and highlight 
class struggle and restore the character of the legendary folksinger to a “spokes-
person” against class oppression. The cadres preached the use of “historical mate-
rialism” to remove “slanders” and “distortions” against Third Sister Liu based on 
“feudalist” and “bourgeois” thinking as well as “the large amounts of rubbish” in 
her folklore. The cadres, Wu reported, found out that the production teams tried 
to inject into the production “every hue of the thinking of the capitalist class.” 
The scriptwriters and artists focused on aesthetics, splendor, sentimentality, and 
other stage qualities. They drew on the “backward and conservative” features of 
the folktales and even argued that popular folksongs “lacked good taste” to be used 
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in a major performance. Some of the scriptwriters’ and artists’ ideas were prob-
ably attempts to rein in the production’s emerging and thinly disguised vilifica-
tions of intellectuals under the PRC. The cadres apparently rejected the ideas one 
after another, because their implementation would “water down the educational 
effect” of the musical drama.45 In short, Wu presented the cadres as revolutionaries 
who thwarted intellectuals from using Liu’s folklore to engage in class struggle on 
behalf of former exploiting classes.
This does not mean that the CCP cadres who supervised the production of Third 
Sister Liu were equally comfortable with its denigration of intellectuals. Although 
public condemnation of the production would have invited harsh punishment 
under the Leap’s severe political climate, tacit criticism remained an option. A 
writer and party member, Qiao Yu (1927–), went to Liuzhou in the fall of 1959 
with a music composer and a theater director under the auspices of the National 
Federation of Playwrights and the Central Academy of Experimental Opera to 
assist in the production of the musical drama.46 Qiao would turn the script into 
the movie’s screenplay. As the Guangxi Folksong and Dance Theater was touring 
the country, he penned a review of Third Sister Liu in the authoritative Literature 
and Art Gazette (Wenyi bao). After a ritualistic glowing assessment of the theme of 
class struggle and other aspects of the play, he suggested that the singing competi-
tion scene had no historical basis and that the contest had been inserted into the 
performance to highlight Liu as a peasant heroine.
Although there are many stories about singing competitions in the folklore, these 
accounts mainly convey Third Sister Liu’s wisdom and musical talent, and the fact 
that her opponents were motivated by their unwillingness to admit that they were 
inferior. Compared to these original stories, the singing competition was handled 
very differently in the musical drama, almost a change in essence . . . If we look 
at how life was lived, [we will recognize that] there were actually not that many 
literati who also liked to sing folksongs. Literati and folksongs were parts of two 
different worlds. I met a schoolteacher who has lived in the heart of folk sing-
ing in Guangxi for sixty to seventy years. When I mentioned folksongs to him, 
he was stunned and speechless, apparently not knowing that there are folksongs 
around . . . In the singing competition scene, the literati unexpectedly sang many 
folksongs. Even though the songs were of laughably inferior quality, they nonethe-
less did it. This was something almost impossible in reality, but it was made to be 
very believable in art.47
Qiao’s thinly veiled opposition to Third Sister Liu’s denigration of intellectuals was 
an exception. Rather than applauding or criticizing the singing competition scene, 
which would have respectively endorsed the Leap’s anti-intellectualism or put one’s 
career and safety at risk, other critics focused on the composition of other scenes, 
scene transitions, and musical arrangement and lyrics. Liu’s character received 
profuse attention and approbation and even minor complaints. Yet, a recurring 
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theme in the laudatory commentaries is their emphasis on the fictional nature 
of the musical, which can be understood as a form of subtle rejection of the pro-
duction’s vilification of intellectuals. In his review of the performance in Literary 
Review (Wenxue pinglun), He Qifang, a writer and party member whom we met in 
chapter 3, expressed approval of the modifications of Liu’s legend by Guangxi’s the-
ater crews. But he underlined that the “theme [of class struggle] and the rich and 
dramatic elements of the plot have required many decisions and deletions as well 
as much imagination and fabrication.” In contrast to Wu Jinnan, who claimed that 
the production recovered the historically accurate and revolutionary character of 
Liu, He Qifang stated that Third Sister Liu is “an original piece of creation built on 
the foundation of the folklore.”48 Cai Yi (1906–1992), a literary theorist and another 
party member, went even further in stressing the production’s fictional nature. He 
argued that White-Haired Girl (Bai mao nü), which portrays the cruelty of rural 
landlords, was the first milestone of PRC musical theater, and Third Sister Liu was 
the second one. Neither of the musicals would have made much sense if they were 
produced in the reverse order. Both productions reflected “the spirit of the time” 
and fulfilled their “historical missions.”49 In other words, they were timely prod-
ucts of CCP propaganda.
When the feature film Third Sister Liu was released in late 1961, the Leap 
had collapsed for all intents and purposes. The CCP leadership had readopted 
practical economic measures and checked the virulent anti-intellectualism in 
official ideology. By April 1962, the state had issued new policies on science, 
higher education, literature, art, and theater and cinema to promote local coop-
eration with scholars, teachers, scientists, and artists.50 This high-level change 
of heart about the role of intellectuals under Chinese Communism embold-
ened critics of the musical. They deployed their knowledge of art, literature, 
and history as well as their argumentative skills further to undermine the revo-
lutionary interpretation of the legend of Third Sister Liu, using in particular the 
well-known magazine Popular Cinema (Dazhong dianying) as a channel. The 
major criticism received by the film, the content of which closely resembled the 
Guangxi musical drama, was that Liu had been turned inappropriately from a 
mythical folk figure into an idealized contemporary revolutionary. The play-
wrights and screenwriters had imposed on the folksinger class consciousness, 
leadership skills, knowledge of political struggle, and other characteristics typi-
cal of someone wanting to lead a proletarian revolution. Such “modernizing” 
(xiandaihua) of Liu, some critics argued, made her look like a member of the 
Chinese Communist Youth League. The movie thus stripped from her folklore 
the multifaceted expressions of hope and pain, joy and anger, and ideas and 
ideals as well as the interlaced practical and magical qualities that were part 
of the stories. The critics claimed that such sentiments and thoughts not only 
reflected the past conditions of the laboring masses, but also served to produce 
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and reproduce the legend of Liu and enhance its popularity over time.51 One 
critic aptly summarized the complaints about the artistic approach in the pro-
duction: “In the search for the truth [about Third Sister Liu], what is true [about 
Chinese history and society] is left out.”52
Although the critics did not mention any CCP cadres or offices by name, the 
ultimate targets of the criticism were those who sanctioned and controlled the 
production of Third Sister Liu, and even the underlying Yan’an principles of art 
and literature promoted by the state. One critic stated that “using the past to 
serve the present” in the art was necessary, but “under no circumstances should 
[China’s] historical legacies be handled crudely and brutally” (cubao) by produc-
ers.53 The use of the term cubao, which signals vicious, rude, and even violent 
behavior, was especially poignant. The term had been used by scholars, school-
teachers, and others during the 1957 Rectification Campaign to criticize the 
behavior of party cadres toward colleagues outside the party. Here cubao conjures 
up the image of the party authorities violating history. Even Mao’s homage to the 
musical for being an emblem of the Chinese socialist revolution was no longer 
unassailable. One critic wrote that Liu “was a singing immortal and an idealized 
creation of the laboring masses—not a leader of peasant revolutions.”54Another 
indicated that historical materialism, the approach to knowledge sanctioned 
by the state for comprehending class struggle, was ignored completely in the 
production: the movie “confounds the past and present and turns them upside 
down, and thus possesses no basic historical value.”55 The scathing criticisms of 
the film put the folktale of Third Sister Liu back on its feet. Their publication 
was evidence of political change since the musical drama debuted in Beijing two 
years before.
Despite such intense criticism of Third Sister Liu, there is no evidence that any 
critic confronted the vehement anti-intellectualism of the musical head-on. As 
before, the singing competition scene and its caricature of the literati occupy a 
negligible part in the commentaries. Why did critics not dispute the musical’s dis-
paragement of intellectuals? Did they not want to speak out for themselves and all 
those regarded as intellectuals within state and society? The silence suggests that 
speaking on behalf of these people without official sanction was widely under-
stood to be risky business, given what had happened to those who tried during 
the Rectification Campaign. As we shall see, when prodded by higher authorities, 
some writers and artists did seek to represent the category of intellectuals in a 
favorable light. Before we move on, it is necessary to note that little evidence exists 
with regard to how ordinary theater or cinema audience members responded to 
the denigration of intellectuals in the musical drama. If what we discuss below 
offers any indication, it is that even when the state monopolized representations 
of the intellectual in theater, cinema, and other media, it had limited control over 
how ordinary people interpreted the ideas, images, or languages.
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PRODUCING AND DENOUNCING  
EARLY SPRING IN FEBRUARY
Some leaders running the [state’s] film production departments [who are 
 veteran CCP members] nonetheless approved the movie script and even 
spent much public money and used five-color film to shoot the picture. They 
artfully repackaged, promoted, and peddled as “artistic” mistaken thoughts 
and values that ought to be exposed and subjected to criticism. What did 
they want to achieve by doing so?
—a review of Early Spring in February in People’s Daily56
Research has described the power struggle within the CCP leadership and impor-
tant policy changes in the wake of the Great Leap Forward. For our purposes, 
the accounts show that the intellectual and Chinese Communism continued to 
constitute each other at multiple levels of Chinese society with twists and turns. 
On the one hand, President Liu Shaoqi, Premier Zhou Enlai, and other party 
leaders (and even Chairman Mao to some extent) reaffirmed the importance of 
the intellectual to socialist development. The state advanced measures to relax 
political control over the work of scientists, journalists, and other professional 
workers and to reintroduce rational economic planning. Under this climate, writ-
ers and artists close to the leadership produced works that criticized the Leap 
and even Mao. In art and literature, depictions of various kinds of social experi-
ence other than those constantly repeated in the official narrative of class struggle 
appeared.57 On the other hand, some party leaders held fast to the notion of class 
struggle and, before long, Mao reverted to promoting the view that intellectuals 
were real as well as potential enemies of Chinese Communism. Mao broadened 
the term “bourgeois intellectuals” popularized during the Antirightist Movement 
to include scientists, schoolteachers, and others who were trained under the PRC 
but who purportedly subscribed to values and beliefs promoted by the previous 
exploiting classes. Newly trained intellectuals, he believed, were often corrupted 
by the old ones, who continued to dominate education, art, and other sectors 
and even hold important positions within the party and the state. For Mao and 
his supporters, it was necessary to redeploy intense labor reeducation, political 
study, and rectification campaigns against intellectuals to protect and further the 
revolutionary project.58
What happened to the movie Early Spring in February captures the dynam-
ics of this volatile phase in the struggle to define the intellectual and Chinese 
Communism. In the film, Xiao Jianqiu, a teachers’ college graduate and a former 
May Fourth student activist, withdraws to a small town to teach in a friend’s school 
during the mid-1920s. He is a passionate reader of philosophy and literature and he 
dresses well and plays the piano, all of which are symbols of a privileged upbring-
ing. He meets his friend’s educated, elegant, and unorthodox sister Tao Lan and 
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introduces her to all kinds of writings, including the journal New Youth, which was 
then published by the CCP to promote Marxist and Leninist thought. Upon learn-
ing that a former classmate has died as a soldier and left behind a widow and two 
small children in dire poverty, Xiao supports her financially, takes her daughter 
to school, and helps the poor family in other ways. Led by a teacher who wants 
to marry Tao, Xiao’s colleagues spread rumors that he seeks a romantic relation-
ship with her and at the same time fornicates with the widow behind everyone’s 
back. In a desperate move to save the widow from committing suicide after her 
son passes away from illness, Xiao offers to marry her even though he is attracted 
to Tao. The widow hangs herself, leaving behind her daughter, for whom Tao and 
her family now take responsibility. Fed up with the town’s parochialism, tragedies, 
and inequalities, Xiao apparently decides to devote himself to revolution. The film 
ends with Tao learning of his departure and dashing out to find Xiao, implying 
that she might follow his path (see figure 5).
Like Third Sister Liu, Early Spring was produced under tight official supervision, 
this time in Beijing. The production received support from two deputy ministers 
of culture of the PRC: Xia Yan (1900–1995) and Chen Huangmei (1913–1996). A 
successful playwright, screenwriter, and essayist, Xia had participated in the May 
Fourth movement and joined the CCP in 1927. Similarly accomplished, Chen dou-
bled as the chief of the ministry’s film bureau. After the Leap, Xia, like Zhou Enlai, 
proclaimed that there was no need to be suspicious of intellectuals anymore.59 
Chen “carefully read” the novel from which the film was adapted and approved its 
production. Xia and Chen suggested revisions to the movie script and held “seri-
ous discussions” with the film crew. Xia even revised the shot-sequence script “in 
over one hundred places” to achieve the effects that he wanted.60 Consequently, 
the film’s portrayal of intellectuals is completely different from the thinly veiled 
attack on them in Third Sister Liu. Xiao Jianqiu and Tao Lan are played by a famous 
and conventionally good-looking actor and actress. They are kind and thoughtful. 
They are torn between tradition and ideals and dissatisfied with the status quo. 
They use their education to teach and nurture schoolchildren and make sacrifices 
to improve the lives of poor people. They wrestle with quandaries and controver-
sies that have no perfect solutions. The widow and other poor people in the film 
are significant only to the extent that they are examples of dispiriting poverty in 
Chinese society and the distance to which Xiao and Tao would go to help the 
underprivileged. True, Xiao’s and Tao’s colleagues are less than admirable: these 
intellectuals mock and sabotage Xiao as well as gossip and spread rumors about 
his relationship with Tao and his interaction with the widow. However, none of 
these characters are shown to be using their knowledge or status to help the politi-
cal or economic elites to exploit, dominate, or terrify the poor.
During the fall of 1964, Early Spring was screened nationwide, not as an updated 
view of what the intellectual meant to Chinese Communism, but as a “poisonous 
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weed” denounced by the state. When the film underwent official inspection in the 
previous November, Minister of Culture Mao Dun and other officials expressed 
excitement and appreciation after the screening. However, Deputy Minister 
of Culture Zhou Yang (1907–1989) reacted differently. Zhou, who was also vice 
director of the CCP’s Department of Propaganda, was the “chief guardian and top 
enforcer of the party’s cultural line.”61 He criticized Early Spring sternly for pro-
moting “humanitarianism of the petty bourgeoisie and the capitalist class.” The 
film buried the cruel and exploitative conduct of these classes of people by depict-
ing what seemed to be acts of kindness of a few of their members. Zhou’s criticism 
prompted Mao Dun and Chen Huangmei to introduce revisions to the film. By 
then, Chairman Mao and his high-level supporters had already decided to initiate 
another round of rectification to address what they saw as extensive political and 
ideological problems in art and literature circles. The Department of Propaganda 
Figure 5. Xiao Jianqiu (played by Sun Daolin) and Tao Lan (played by Xie Fang) in Early 
Spring in February.
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suspended proposed changes to Early Spring and included it along with other films 
for public screening and scathing criticism.62 In June 1964, Mao openly criticized 
veteran revolutionaries and party cadres in the circles for failing to implement 
CCP policies, “acting like bureaucrats and overlords” (zuoguan dang laoye) and 
teetering on “the edge of revisionism.”63 Official objections to Early Spring became 
a major vehicle deployed by the state to attack intellectuals.
Between mid-September and mid-November 1964, People’s Daily published 18 
essays that denounced Early Spring, while newspapers around the country fol-
lowed suit. In a nutshell, the criticism stressed that the film, through its positive 
representations of the values, beliefs, and behavior of Xiao Jianqiu and Tao Lan 
qua intellectuals, promoted “bourgeois individualism,” “bourgeois humanitari-
anism,” “bourgeois doctrine of class harmony,” and other objectionable views to 
life and politics that undercut the importance of class struggle in Chinese soci-
ety. First, the production pays no attention to the uprisings of workers, peasants, 
and students against class exploitation and their sacrifices during the 1920s, let 
alone the resulting ascent of the CCP. Second, while the film depicts economic 
inequality and poverty, there is no indication that class exploitation is the source 
of the problem. Third, even though the political choices of Xiao and Tao and their 
treatment of the poor as well as their romance, joy, and despair reveal self-absorp-
tion, indecisiveness, conceitedness, cowardice, and other shortcomings typical of 
intellectuals then and later, the production highlights kindness, decency, learned-
ness, and other apparently admirable qualities of the two characters. The mere 
fact that some playwrights, novelists, directors, and artists are CCP members, the 
first criticism of Early Spring in People’s Daily stated bluntly, does not mean that 
they would necessarily produce “proletarian” works; to the contrary, some of the 
works of these people are imbued with elements of bourgeois ideology.64 In other 
words, unreformed intellectuals had been working within the party to undermine 
Chinese Communism. Within a few months, Xia Yan and Chen Huangmei were 
removed from their positions. Chen was forced to admit that under his supervi-
sion “a complete and systematic anti-Party, antisocialist, and revisionist line” had 
taken shape in the film industry.65 The intense attack against Early Spring and its 
sponsors by the state proved that the critics of Third Sister Liu had been right about 
their muted resistance to the official denigration of intellectuals—speaking out 
for this category of people was dangerous, even for those who held high positions 
within the party or the state.
While the official denunciation of Early Spring signaled to state and society that 
bourgeois intellectuals had been dominating the film industry and, for that matter, 
other areas of the socialist political economy, screenings of the film showed that the 
struggle to define the intellectual and Chinese Communism, like before, reached 
deep into urban neighborhoods and everyday life, sometimes with results unpre-
dictable to the authorities. In Shanghai, Early Spring was released on September 
15, 1964, the same day when People’s Daily published the first of its criticisms of the 
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movie. Few people showed up at any of the six cinemas carrying the film. Thanks 
to the official condemnation of the movie, things changed completely the follow-
ing day. Even before the box office opened at Huaihai Cinema at 9 a.m., many 
people had queued up for tickets. At Grand Shanghai Cinema, 800 people had 
arrived by 9 a.m. Another 2,000 people, some of whom were scalpers, gathered in 
front of the cinema the following morning. Determined to control how the film 
would be understood, the municipal authorities in charge of propaganda quickly 
decided that tickets would not be sold to individuals, even though the original 
plan was to allot half of the tickets for such sale. Screening, instead, would be 
arranged by official agencies working together with workplaces and other organi-
zations. After the cinemas posted the official decision in front of their establish-
ments in the evening, the crowd did not disperse. Some demanded explanations 
from the staff; others asked that they be allowed to purchase tickets because of lack 
of official affiliation with any organizations. By the following morning, 400 to 500 
people were still in front of Huaihai Cinema. Some stated they would “hold on to 
the end” and pressured the staff to sell them tickets. At 9 a.m., the crowd increased 
to more than 1,000 people. No amount of explanation from the staff could calm 
some of these people down. The cinema called the police for help, who arrived 
shortly and detained five “unemployed youths” who were allegedly leaders of the 
agitated crowd.66
If unanticipated audience enthusiasm toward Early Spring indicated to the 
Shanghai authorities that many people would not accept the official interpreta-
tion of the film, initial reactions to the screenings confirmed that the authorities 
would need to do more than simply sponsor or publish criticisms of the film. Some 
audience members who had read the People’s Daily review stated that the movie 
was not as objectionable as depicted by the official organ. Some who had queued 
for hours to obtain tickets were disappointed at how unremarkable the film was. 
Others noted that there was nothing wrong with the movie.67 Even CCP cadres 
had difficulty grasping the denunciations leveled against Early Spring. A week after 
the film’s release, the authorities in charge of propaganda organized a screening 
for party cadres. The event was followed by a meeting during which the cadres 
worked together to summarize how the film spread bourgeois thought as well as 
disguised and distorted class struggle. Some cadres reported that the collabora-
tion helped them reflect on their lack of political vigilance, as they had not paid 
sufficient attention to ideological messages promoted in films, novels, and other 
works.68 The Leap and Third Sister Liu had put down intellectuals for all to see, but 
even party cadres needed official explanations before recognizing why the leader-
ship regarded Early Spring as dangerous propaganda promoted by bourgeois intel-
lectuals inside and outside the party. Although the Shanghai CCP Department 
of Propaganda would arrange further screenings for party cadres, it decided that 
professional workers in art, literature, cinema, and other media as well as college 
students in art and humanities would be the primary audience of the movie.69 
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Through their work these “intellectuals” had or would have access to their own 
audiences. They needed to understand the objectionable messages and representa-
tions in the film and, more generally, examine their own beliefs, ideas, and works 
with the perspective set down by the state.
Between September and October 1964, Shanghai cinemas screened Early Spring 
for a total of 364 times to an audience of 420,000 people. At least twelve universi-
ties and hospitals and other organizations also showed the movie to staff mem-
bers and students. As the screenings proceeded, the authorities developed what 
they called “decontamination” (xiaodu) work to help the audience understand 
the film according to the official interpretation. Before the show, the authorities 
arranged for the audience to listen to reports from the Department of Propaganda 
and read official assessments of the movie. After the show, some audience mem-
bers were required to participate in one or two one-hour sessions of follow-up 
discussion, or occasions that allowed the authorities to promote official views 
further and gauge individual responses. Despite the intervention, disagreements 
with the official interpretation of the film and the condemnation of the main char-
acters as objectionable intellectuals persisted. At Jiaotong University, a Chinese 
Communist Youth League member reportedly argued that Early Spring was not 
a poisonous weed, because what Xiao and Tao did in the movie was appropriate 
under the political climate of the 1920s, when the Chinese socialist revolution was 
merely a budding project and genuine understanding of Marxist thought was rare. 
At Shanghai People’s Number One Hospital, a student contended that the film’s 
director, contrary to the official attack against him, was critical of Xiao’s and Tao’s 
bourgeois humanitarianism and actually showed its futility as a means to protect 
the poor. Others stated that the film opposed China’s “feudalist traditions” and 
was therefore politically progressive. At Shanghai Girls Secondary School Number 
Six, some students questioned why the denouncement of the behavior of Xiao 
was so intense even if it was improper. They reasoned that he was not a member 
of the CCP or its youth league and thus naturally did not have the political train-
ing to do the right things. At East China Normal University, some students alleg-
edly focused on the performance of the actress who played Tao and her attractive 
appearance. At Shongshan Secondary School, even students who had not seen the 
film began to talk about it, with some wanting to watch the performance of the 
movie stars and their beautiful costumes.70 In other words, these young men and 
women did not believe that people like Xiao and Tao, still less the producers and 
directors of the film, were bourgeois intellectuals intending to undermine Chinese 
Communism, as the state indicated—or they simply did not care about the state’s 
interpretation of the movie.
Third Sister Liu and Early Spring in February were prominent signposts of the 
mutual constitution of the intellectual and Chinese Communism under the PRC. 
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The works each brought to the surface of official discourse disturbing meanings 
that the state invested in the classification. The propagation of each set of mean-
ings coincided with a severe phase of the revolutionary project. From the mid-
1930s to the mid-1950s, the Yan’an understanding of intellectuals dominated CCP 
thinking of this social category. Intellectuals were mainly usable but unreliable 
professional workers; they were not intransigent class enemies as some party lead-
ers had implied earlier. During the late 1950s, Third Sister Liu suggested that intel-
lectuals had been slavish and even criminal sidekicks of the exploiting classes with 
knowledge and skills worthless for actual production activities. The view reflected 
and reinforced the Great Leap Forward’s disregard of rational planning and sci-
entific knowledge which ultimately led to widespread famine. A few years later, 
the official condemnation of Early Spring hinted that an assault on intellectuals 
working within the party, the state, and other establishments would be necessary 
for saving Chinese Communism from a capitalist counterrevolution. Unreformed 
intellectuals purportedly had been using their knowledge and authority as well 
as access to resources and opportunities to promote bourgeois values, beliefs, 
and behavior. Shortly afterward, Mao and his deputies marched China into the 
Cultural Revolution. From the production of Third Sister Liu to the denunciation 
of Early Spring, the official assessment of intellectuals had gone from class enemies 
of the past with feeble influence on the present to a powerful and imminent threat 
to China’s socialist development.
This is not to say that the increasingly severe official rebuke of intellectuals 
caused the abuse of writers, scientists, journalists, and other educated people 
during the Cultural Revolution, still less the murders of party cadres like Bian 
Zhongyun, the Beijing school principal who was beaten to death shortly after 
the campaign began. As we have seen, the official representations of intellectu-
als in Third Sister Liu and Early Spring elicited resistance, redirection, skepti-
cism, confusion, and disbelief at various levels of state and society, or multivalent 
responses that had always accompanied the objectification of the intellectual 
under Chinese Communism. At the same time, however, the productions, per-
formances, and reviews of Third Sister Liu and the screenings, denunciations, and 
audience workshops tied to Early Spring demonstrate that combustible condi-
tions involving the objectification continued to build up between the Great Leap 
Forward and the eve of the Cultural Revolution. For one thing, state and society 
participated in the officially orchestrated creation, circulation, and consump-
tion of yet further layers of ideas, images, and idioms that attacked intellectuals. 
Second, even as educated party leaders and cadres were implicated by the inten-
sifying official attacks, they continued to target others whom they denounced as 
untrustworthy intellectuals. Third, amid the growing assault, the boundaries of 
the population of intellectuals were not any clearer than they had been since the 
inception of Chinese Communism, even though professors, writers, scientists, 
and others were widely regarded as intellectuals across state and society.
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In other words, after four decades of the objectification of the intellectual under 
Chinese Communism, intellectuals were locatable virtually everywhere under the 
PRC. To be sure, what they stood for, who they were, and how they should be 
treated remained debatable. Yet, this objectified population was connected more 
than ever to a vitriolic rhetoric of blame and betrayal, a multipronged system of 
official domination, and a variety of tactics and strategies of stigma management. 
That is to say, repertoires of violence in the forms of political ideas, administrative 
measures, and internecine struggle were abundantly available to be set ablaze by 
Mao and his supporters on behalf of their political vision and political gains.
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The Intellectual and Chinese Society
From Past to Present
The most profound achievement of the Chinese Communist Party after it took 
power in the 1949 revolution was the reordering of Chinese society according 
to the Marxian images of the party leadership, or political thinking based on a 
foreign system of thought. The success, which required persistent mobilization 
and organization of symbolic and material resources, reveals at once the intel-
lectual prowess, political skills, and governing capacity of the Mao regime. Within 
a decade, the state literally reclassified hundreds of millions of people in a com-
plex industrializing society as members of a relatively small number of predefined 
social classes and categories, such as capitalists, poor peasants, workers, rightists, 
and counterrevolutionaries. To borrow an insight from Sheila Fitzpatrick, the CCP 
created entirely new “collective social entities whose members had not previously 
had a common identity, status, or consciousness but acquired them through their 
experience” under the socialist state.1
This book has offered an account of this CCP invention of Marxian classes and 
categories—off the beaten path. For the party leadership, intellectuals constitute 
a major segment of society with critical influence on both the socialist revolution 
and the transition to socialism. Yet, no previous study has illustrated how the party 
identified members of this population in practice, let alone with the same rigor as 
has been mustered to describe the appearance of landlords or other classes or cate-
gories of people under CCP rule. To be sure, the existing research on the intellectual 
and Chinese Communism is highly valuable. The scholarship has illustrated ideas 
and interests, institutions and organizations, conflict and cooperation, and other 
social and political experiences before and after 1949. By predefining intellectuals 
as critical thinkers, professional experts, or other social types, the scholarship none-
theless has obscured one of the most creative, productive, and transformative acts 
of the party—that is, its deployment of the intellectual as a classification of people.
To put this in broader analytical terms, the existing scholarship involves a dou-
ble erasure of history. The accounts begin with concepts of intellectuals that first 
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appeared in Western Europe or the United States based on the works of Julien 
Benda, Karl Mannheim, Talcott Parsons, and other notable scholars.2 Little con-
sideration is given to the historical conditions that produced or supported the con-
cepts, what Bourdieu would describe as the “classification struggles”3 that occurred 
inside as well as outside academia and determined how the intellectual was defined 
and apprehended. The accounts, instead, recombine the ingredients making up the 
concepts (that is, the social function, work responsibility, and moral performance 
of the individual) to grasp the intellectual under Chinese Communism. Reliance 
on such a priori definitions has resulted in the masking of a classification struggle 
that has no parallel in the history of Western Europe or the United States. From 
the early 1920s to the mid-1950s, zhishifenzi evolved from a little-known term, even 
within the CCP, to a primary social identity of many across state and society. Under 
Chinese Communism or, for that matter, in any historical context, the intellectual 
has no ontological existence prior to being defined by the political or academic 
elites. It is a classification of people deployed by such elites to organize society 
on paper or in practice. The existing literature on the intellectual and Chinese 
Communism obscures as much as illuminates the nature of their relations.
At the dawn of Chinese Communism, few people if any identified themselves or 
categorized others as intellectuals. The heated debate on the intellectual class and 
Chinese society during the May Fourth movement was similar to the one on les 
intellectuels and French society during the Dreyfus affair. Writers, college students, 
and other educated people, including leaders of the budding CCP, used their liter-
ary and analytical skills, access to newspapers and magazines, and understanding 
of different traditions of political thinking to advance their own view of the intel-
lectual class, especially its role in the disorder and the renewal of Chinese society. 
After embracing Marxism and Leninism as their guiding political thought, the 
CCP elites redefined the intellectual class as part of the petty bourgeoisie as well 
as the most formidable ideological enemy of Chinese Communism. Before long, 
the leaders discontinued their use of the term “the intellectual class.” From then 
on, “intellectuals” became an integral component of the CCP schema of classes.
What happened thereafter with the intellectual and Chinese Communism is 
nothing short of historic. An apparatus in the Foucauldian sense, or a dispersed 
structure of programs, measures, and routines linked to the classification, arose 
and grew with the revolutionary project.4 The apparatus contained a multiplicity 
of elements: official announcements, instructions, statistics, and reports; regula-
tions on recruitment, appointment, training, and compensation; revolutionary 
universities, mass campaigns, and political study classes; offices, meetings, and 
registration forms; films, plays, and newspaper headlines and articles; surveillance 
techniques and confessional protocols; and various forms of punishment as well as 
other discursive and organizational practices promoted, sanctioned, or condoned 
by the CCP. The apparatus was the cumulative result of “the prevalent influence 
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of a strategic objective”5 that persisted within the party leadership—or its resolve 
to exploit the knowledge and skills of intellectuals for Chinese Communism but 
curb the deleterious impact of their values, beliefs, and habits. Even at the peaks of 
its denunciation of the intellectual, the leadership did not abandon this objective 
informed by the Leninist approach to the building of a modern socialist society 
through class struggle. The leadership, instead, altered the content of its gover-
nance to fit its evolving priorities. The elements of the apparatus each played a role 
in shaping ways of thinking, seeing, feeling, and acting from the most didactic 
to the least transparent manner. The apparatus ultimately turned a diversity of 
people into “intellectuals” within local society, or class subjects purportedly pos-
sessing knowledge and skills as well as attributes such as vanity, materialism, and 
indiscipline.
In practice, fuzzy boundaries and unstable meanings were ubiquitous char-
acteristics of the objectified population of intellectuals. The heterogeneous ele-
ments of the above apparatus developed unevenly across time and space due to 
many political, administrative, and pragmatic reasons. The elements shared rela-
tions from complementarity and interdependence to conflict and contradiction. 
Their existence created space for different interpretations of who the intellectuals 
were and what they represented at all levels of CCP governance. Even the party 
leadership repeatedly redefined the intellectual and its significance to Chinese 
Communism. No fewer than twelve types of people that appeared in the previ-
ous chapters were regarded as intellectuals within the local context: educated CCP 
leaders; educated party cadres; former workers or peasants who received formal 
education; novelists, playwrights, and other writers; scientists, professors, and 
other experts; schoolteachers, artists, and other professional workers; clerical and 
other office workers; former state officials, Guomindang organizers, and military 
and police officers with academic qualifications; college students; senior high 
school graduates; junior high school graduates; and individuals with some junior 
high education. The local boundaries of the category of intellectuals and its impli-
cations for the revolutionary project were complicated further by a protean culture 
of informal negotiation of social identity, as individuals identified or identifiable as 
such subjects adopted various tactics and strategies of self-refashioning to navigate 
between risks and opportunities.
Three notable events that occurred under the PRC capture the widely differ-
ent implications for the individual resulting from the CCP’s deployment of the 
intellectual as a classification of people. Shortly before the state launched Thought 
Reform of Intellectuals in late 1951, Premier Zhou Enlai personally adopted the 
classification to convince professors and college students to embrace their own 
ideological reeducation. He stated that he was always striving to learn and embrace 
“the standpoint of the working class,” and that he wanted his audience to follow his 
example.6 In Zhou’s hands, the classification became a tool for political domina-
tion. During the 1957 Rectification Campaign, some professors and writers used 
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the intellectual as a badge of honor in contradistinction to the negative meanings 
officially inscribed on the marker. They emphasized their professional, political, 
and moral values to the state and attacked CCP cadres as oppressors of intellectu-
als and obstacles of socialist development. In her attackers’ eyes, Bian Zhongyun, 
the dedicated educator and party cadre brutally murdered during the Cultural 
Revolution, was a bourgeois intellectual who had wormed her way into the party to 
do harm to Chinese Communism. For Bian and others, the classification morphed 
into a painful death sentence. Under the revolutionary project, the intellectual was 
a classification of people used for multiple purposes. The intellectual was never 
any particular type of person.
Once the CCP leadership pronounced “intellectuals” as an integral section of 
Chinese society, Chinese Communism developed prominently between two poles 
until its decline. The first pole featured the party seeking to extract and exploit the 
knowledge and skills of the educated, or efforts to build a modern socialist society. 
The other pole centered on the party controlling these people politically, or using 
class struggle as a method. The apparatus that objectified the intellectual thus 
always contained two clusters of principles and mechanisms, the proportions of 
which shifted with the leadership’s priorities. Around one pole, the party assigned 
privileges, positions, and responsibilities to educated people and even provided 
them with social and political authority to induce their cooperation and support. 
It took over, established, and expanded systems of education to ensure the avail-
ability of intellectuals to Chinese Communism. Around the other pole, educated 
people were subject to criticism and denunciation, supervision and investigation, 
and ideological training and punishment. The party sought to control every estab-
lishment that required professional knowledge and skills to function. The goal was 
to discipline intellectuals to the extent of rooting out their corruptive impact on 
the revolutionary project.
The CCP’s deployment of the intellectual as a classification of people there-
fore shaped Chinese Communism as a bureaucratic enterprise as much as the lat-
ter turned otherwise perfectly ordinary people into intellectuals to be used and 
abused in specific ways. The party increasingly exploited channels and resources to 
attack the values, ideas, and habits of intellectuals. Workplace supervision by party 
cadres, ideological reeducation, and mass surveillance were deemed necessary for 
preventing subversion of the revolutionary projects by intellectuals. Systems of 
classifications and structures of reward and punishment grew as the party leader-
ship sought to handle each intellectual in government, industry, education, art, 
and other sectors in proper political, professional, and moral terms. In brief, the 
CCP imperative of controlling and utilizing intellectuals engendered methods of 
representation, reorganization, reeducation, and repression that eventually spread 
across the Chinese political economy.
The structure of domination thus emerged could not but influence social rela-
tions and individual calculus. Educated persons responded in myriad ways. No 
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common understanding of moral obligation, occupational responsibility, or politi-
cal interest informed the reactions. The latter were often based on the discourse 
and practice established around the intellectual by the CCP, or how individuals 
situated themselves within its schema of classes and the local context of risks and 
opportunities. A cacophony of conduct surfaced. We have seen that well-educated 
party leaders exploited their revolutionary credentials and command of organi-
zational resources to separate themselves from other educated people. As Mao 
rose to the top, he acted exactly like his predecessors and attacked other party 
leaders as unreliable intellectuals. At lower levels, party cadres likewise acted out 
the role of proletarian revolutionary to distance themselves from educated col-
leagues. Unemployed persons identified themselves as intellectuals in hopes of 
landing a job. Writers and scholars promoted themselves as trustworthy intel-
lectuals when contesting state domination. Playwrights and artists produced or 
supported anti-intellectual propaganda that undercut their own prestige and even 
denounced favorable portrayals of intellectuals. College and secondary school stu-
dents objected to the official condemnation of intellectuals, which they regarded 
as unreasonable, especially when that label was applied to them. These and other 
responses not only served to objectify the intellectual; they intensified the ruptures 
within the objectified population. The objectification of the intellectual under 
Chinese Communism had structural as well as cultural consequences.
Overall, this book has merely captured a thin slice of the mutual constitution of 
the intellectual and Chinese Communism, dynamics that spread across multiple 
levels of Chinese society for at least six decades. My intention has been to point 
out that seeing the intellectual as a classification of people allows us to delve fur-
ther into the workings of the revolutionary project, because the classification was 
both an outcome and a driver of the project’s organization. My analysis has been 
arranged to spotlight underexamined discursive and organizational practices of 
the CCP, the formation of local populations of intellectuals, and consequences for 
individuals, organizations, and Chinese society. Besides the themes and episodes 
covered here, many other questions await exploration, as the reader probably 
realizes by now. How did the intellectual classification take root and reconsti-
tute authority and social relations in the countryside? How did the classification 
extend across industry, the military, and other sectors where professional as well as 
manual labor was important for operation? Did ethnic traditions modify how the 
classification was deployed in minority regions? How did educated and expropri-
ated capitalists and newly educated workers position themselves in relation to the 
classification? How did the classification influence friendship, romance, and mar-
riage? Not least, how did the deployment of the classification affect the Cultural 
Revolution and vice versa? If we accept that the intellectual as an embodied subject 
does not exist by virtue of any features possessed by the person, a host of origi-
nal questions on politics and society under Chinese Communism can be raised. 
To address the questions, it is important to consider dynamics of representation, 
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methods of identification, and negotiations of social identity. The results would 
serve to deepen understanding of central and local governance, conflict and coop-
eration, and, in general, social life under the CCP, issues that have animated the 
literature on the intellectual and Chinese Communism in the first place.
The decline of Chinese Communism, especially its emphasis on class struggle, 
since the early 1980s has led to dramatic changes in Chinese society. The CCP 
regime has reinterpreted in unorthodox fashions how Marxism applies to China 
and abandoned, for all intents and purposes, Marxian systems of social classifica-
tion. Megacities and conspicuous consumption, powerful Chinese multinationals 
and rapid technological growth, imposing government buildings, world-renowned 
universities, and global traveling officials, executives, and students have become 
unmistakable features of twenty-first-century China, as have rising social inequal-
ity, rampant official corruption, environmental degradation, urban slums, sex 
work, and mistreatment of migrants. Meanwhile, the population of educated 
Chinese continues to grow, thanks to state investment in higher education and 
professional development. Many of them have careers in the diverse, influential, 
and expanding private sector, and hence are free from the direct supervision of 
the state. Does the intellectual as a classification of people still matter in such a 
globalized China? Any satisfactory answer to this and other puzzles regarding 
the status and use of the classification and its impact on Chinese society would 
require a book-length response based on ethnographic, literary, and other kinds 
of research. In this concluding section of the book, I draw on readily available as 
well as recent examples to suggest that China’s struggle to define the intellectual 
not only remains alive and well but still differs markedly from those occurring in 
Western Europe and the United States. The objectification of the intellectual in the 
last century has left behind a powerful legacy that affects ways of seeing, thinking, 
feeling, and acting on multiple levels.
Since the demise of Chinese Communism, the CCP leadership has continued 
to regard intellectuals as a major segment of Chinese society as well as assign a 
diversity of people to the social category. The leadership still subscribes to the 
Leninist imperative of utilizing and controlling intellectuals as a principle of offi-
cial governance, even though the party has long since discarded class struggle as 
a method of rule. For the leadership, intellectuals are both vital assets and potent 
threats to China’s social stability, economic growth, and international ascension. 
Official conduct therefore continues to objectify some into subjects widely recog-
nized as intellectuals. In March 2017, for example, President Xi Jinping (1953–) reit-
erated the first half of the modified Leninist imperative during the meeting of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. He stressed that China “needs 
the contribution of intellectuals to increase the power and wealth of the nation, 
to revitalize the Chinese race [minzu zhenxing], and to improve the well-being 
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of the Chinese people.” He lauded intellectuals as “the elites of society, the pil-
lar of the nation, and the pride of the people.”7 For more than three decades, the 
state has been revising its incentive structures to reward professional knowledge 
and expertise, or those whom it considers intellectuals, with status, money, and 
authority. Shortly after Xi’s speech, People’s Daily added a supposedly inspirational 
special column titled “The Elegance and Refinement of Intellectuals” (Zhishifenzi 
de fengcai) to promote further to the nation the importance of such people. Within 
three months, the official organ featured the achievements of forty individuals and 
their roads to success. Thirty-eight are technical experts in the roles of university 
chancellors or deans, researchers in fields such as medicine, ecology, astrophysics, 
and agriculture, or engineers in aerospace, computer science, transportation, or 
other areas. Some of these people double as entrepreneurs. Featured, too, were the 
successes of a veteran primary school teacher and a classical music conductor.8 
Moreover, the state continues to elect persons whom it deems to be notable and 
cooperative intellectuals to serve as CPPCC delegates.9
As with public adulation, prestigious appointment, and material rewards, state 
measures of control targeted at scientists, schoolteachers, and others based on the 
other half of the modified Leninist imperative also reproduce symbolic and social 
boundaries that serve to objectify these people as “intellectuals.” On one level, the 
state continues to deploy management by party cadres within research institutes, 
universities, and schools as well as newspapers, radio stations, and other estab-
lishments where intellectuals are said to cluster. An important official goal is to 
prevent the professional workers from using their status, knowledge, and authority 
to undermine official governance, especially through organizing and supporting 
oppositional movements. A few months after Xi Jinping praised intellectuals in 
the above speech, for example, the state instructed top universities to strengthen 
supervision of the teaching staff and their ideological education.10 Professors and 
instructors are regarded, like before, as usable but unreliable intellectuals. Under 
the supervision of the CCP Department of Propaganda, “offices for working with 
intellectuals outside the party” (dangwai zhishifenzi gongzuochu) have been estab-
lished across the country. The offices organize policy- and theory-training classes 
and other activities for lawyers, engineers, journalists, and others to garner their 
cooperation with the state and compliance with its decisions. Furthermore, the 
state is determined to punish those whom it regards as wayward intellectuals with 
change of work responsibility, demotion, layoff, prosecution, and imprisonment 
because of their leadership in or support of protests or challenges against the state. 
Under the Xi regime, official prosecution and imprisonment of human rights law-
yers and other political activists who expose official abuse and corruption have 
been on the rise.11
The extent to which the CCP still perceives the intellectual as a serious threat to 
its rule was on full display during the last days of Liu Xiaobo, the former university 
lecturer who became the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate because of his leadership 
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in democracy movements. During late spring of 2017, the state disclosed that Liu, 
who had been imprisoned since the late 2000s, had late-stage liver cancer, but pro-
hibited him from receiving treatment abroad. It kept Liu under guard until he died 
and then orchestrated his funeral, cremation, and sea burial, all the while censor-
ing news of his illness and death on domestic social media and news outlets.12 For 
the Xi regime, it was not enough to silence the dying Liu and even hide his death. 
The regime has actively tried to remove everything about this intellectual it finds 
unacceptable from the national political consciousness. Baidu, the largest internet 
search engine in China, has been censoring news about Liu as well as his pictures 
and all of his writings even for overseas users. The remaining items about Liu on 
Baidu portray him as a highly educated man and a political criminal who worked 
to undermine the Chinese nation and who probably worked with the United States 
government to do so.13 For his ideas and activism, Liu is vilified by the state as a 
traitor who received from it magnanimous treatment at his death.
The CCP’s reappropriation of the Leninist imperative of controlling and uti-
lizing intellectuals after the decline of Chinese Communism reproduces the 
entrenched divide that educated party leaders have forged between themselves 
and the rest of the educated population. Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, Mao Zedong, 
and other leaders exploited their positions and authority to consecrate themselves 
as genuine socialist revolutionaries, even though some of them only had tempo-
rary success. Since the 1980s, the party elites have been portraying themselves as 
architects and defenders of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and identify-
ing other educated people as intellectuals to be governed. The elites sometimes 
include party cadres with management authority on their side, precisely the kind 
of officials who expended much energy during the Mao era to present themselves 
as politically and morally superior to ordinary professional and white-collar work-
ers. These symbolic boundaries, though as fuzzy and unstable as before, were reaf-
firmed by President Xi when he explained the appropriate relationship between 
the CCP and intellectuals. “Leading [party] cadres at various levels,” he stated, 
should learn to “maintain contacts” and “become intimate friends and truthful 
friends” with “intellectuals.” They should learn to “fully trust” these people and 
seek their “proposals and opinions” on important work and decisions. And they 
must welcome and adopt their well-intentioned criticism, forgive them for their 
erroneous views, and help them concentrate on their work.14
In other words, although the CCP regime no longer uses class struggle as a 
political-cum-analytical foundation to define and degrade the intellectual, the 
leadership still relies on the structural and functional assumptions of Marxism 
and Leninism as well as the experience of Chinese Communism to handle this 
subject. A heterogeneous population of educated people—in terms of training, 
occupation, income, politics, age, and other backgrounds—has thus reappeared 
in official discourse as a single social category, the intellectuals. These persons, 
some of whom have joined the party, are considered vital to national development; 
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their productivity and compliance have been and will be managed through praise, 
trust, and incentives as well as through assistance, supervision, and punishment. 
This official treatment of the intellectual is only somewhat different from or, more 
appropriately, an extension of the Yan’an method.
On the level of society, profound changes have occurred in the use of the intel-
lectual as a classification of people since the 1980s. Thanks to state-sponsored 
political, market, educational, and other reforms, scholars and writers enjoy 
unprecedented latitude to invest the classification with moral and other mean-
ings different from those promoted by the state under Chinese Communism and 
even afterward. During the last two decades, hundreds of books and thousands of 
articles on intellectuals were published. The enthusiasm of the writers and readers 
reflects the extent to which the intellectual has been objectified under the Mao 
regime; it also serves to reproduce the objectification with new symbolic boundar-
ies. Some of the works discuss the origins of the term zhishifenzi and explore its 
connection to the French, Russian, and Confucian intellectual traditions. Some 
introduce influential Euro-American analyses of intellectuals, such as the work of 
Antonio Gramsci, Alvin Gouldner, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Zygmunt 
Bauman, and Russell Jacoby, each of whom promoted a different understanding 
of the subjects and their role in contemporary society. Some are translations of 
books written by these scholars or others. Many of the works combine elements 
from various analytical frameworks, explicitly or implicitly, to examine the lives 
of scholars and writers in twentieth-century China.15 In particular, researchers use 
biographical, statistical, literary, and organizational data to study educated people 
under CCP rule, including the political courage and ideas of those who stood up 
to the party, such as Wang Shiwei (1906–1947), who was executed by the Mao 
regime, and Hu Feng, who was imprisoned for two decades not long after the PRC 
was established.16
The scholarship has not only served to rescue the intellectual from the igno-
miny incurred under Chinese Communism; some of the works have challenged 
the ongoing official understanding of the subject. The best example is the notable 
debate on the public intellectual (gonggong zhishifenzi) that occurred during the 
early 2000s. Maurizio Marinelli has shown that scholars and writers combined 
ideas from Chinese intellectual traditions and Western accounts of intellectuals 
to examine how the concept of the public intellectual would apply to contempo-
rary China.17 The debate reached its height when Southern Personalities Weekly 
(Nanfang renwu zhoukan), a popular magazine, selected, published, and celebrated 
a list of the fifty most influential Chinese public intellectuals. For the magazine, 
these individuals were not only professional experts who participated actively in 
public life and public debate; more importantly, they were “idealists” (lixiang zhe) 
with “critical spirits” whose work advanced “the onerous pursuit of social justice” 
(daoyi).18 Proponents of this and similar politically charged concepts of the public 
intellectual encountered the wrath of the state. People’s Daily published a scathing 
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rebuttal that ignored the ideas and analyses the scholars and writers had drawn 
from Chinese history and philosophy to support their understanding of the pub-
lic intellectual. The rebuttal, instead, stressed what it noted as the foreign, self-
serving, and elitist nature of the notion. The author accused the proponents of 
seeking to “lure intellectuals on to an evil path” of working against the party and 
the Chinese people.19 The state then used censorship, detention, and blacklisting 
of scholars and writers as tactics to halt the debate.20 Nonetheless, the debate on 
the public intellectual persists within academic circles, albeit in a muted form, and 
continues online.21
The struggle to define the intellectual in the last three decades, like the one 
that occurred under Chinese Communism, has a prominent linguistic dimen-
sion. As the state ended its Marxian emphasis on class struggle and use of related 
classifications of people, other terms denoting educated persons and populations 
reemerged from under the umbrella classification of zhishifenzi. Table 4 summa-
rizes the usage of various terms in People’s Daily at ten-year intervals since the 
death of Chairman Mao in 1976. Even as the number of articles has increased dra-
matically in the official organ, for instance, from roughly 1,200 articles in January 
1976 to 4,000 articles in January 2003, the usage of zhishifenzi has continued to 
decline. Meanwhile, the words xuezhe (scholars) and zhuanjia (experts), both of 
which carry positive meanings of knowledge, status, and influence, have become 
very popular in the newspaper, thanks to the CCP’s emphasis on economic growth, 
technological development, and higher education. Other terms referring to edu-
cated persons have also seen varying degrees of revival.
Some scholars and writers have even chosen to replace zhishifenzi in their writ-
ings altogether with a term rarely used in the past. The term, zhishi ren, which 
literally means persons with knowledge, is part of the Japanese language and, like 
zhishifenzi, can serve as a singular, plural, or collective noun. Zhishi ren has been 
used in various kinds of analysis of Chinese society and even research on other 
societies. Between 1997 and 2006, at least 60 journal and newspaper articles used 
zhishi ren in their titles. The number increased to 149 in the following decade.22 
The term even appears occasionally in People’s Daily.23 Two of the early adopters 
offered an explanation of why they used zhishi ren instead of zhishifenzi. They 
argue correctly that the latter is a historically specific term, one that developed 
during China’s transition to socialism. The term signals the inferior political and 
sometimes social status of the educated population. To these authors, it is there-
fore an obstacle to understanding that educated people have become the back-
bone of a “knowledge-based economy” that has since emerged on the Mainland.24 
More recently, another scholar has furnished a completely different reason for his 
switch to zhishi ren when writing about Chinese history. He associates the use 
of zhishifenzi, not with the Mao era or the project of Chinese Communism, but 
with the Dreyfus affair and the pursuit of social justice, the defense of human dig-
nity, and other positive meanings embedded in the French term les intellectuels. 
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Table 4 Numbers of People’s Daily Articles with Specific Terms for Educated Persons, 1976–2016
1976 1986 1996 2006 2016
Zhishifenzi (intellectuals) 565 536 243 197 205
Xuezhe (scholars) 67 842 987 1,215 1,821
Zhuanjia (experts) 440 2,036 2,402 3,551 3,480
Wenren (literati) 48 71 76 79 134
Wenhua ren (cultural personnel) 4 16 28 31 79
Dushu ren (men of letters) 4 8 20 16 57
Source: People’s Daily–Renmin Ribao (1946–Present).
He contends that premodern China did not have many zhishifenzi because its 
political and social environment did not promote the above critical qualities in 
the individual. Literati were merely zhishi ren, or educated men; they were not 
intellectuals.25 Other scholars and writers who use zhishi ren in their works rarely 
explain this linguistic choice of theirs. Nonetheless, they, too, alter the use of zhi-
shifenzi through removing the social classification from their analysis of Chinese 
and other societies.
Finally, it is not difficult to find scholars and writers who regard themselves 
as intellectuals and, at the same time, attack this category of people for what they 
have been doing since the decline of Chinese Communism. Unlike their peers, 
these scholars and writers apparently refuse to redefine intellectuals as a mor-
ally responsible or politically mistreated group of people or even as indispensable 
to China’s development. Like the critics of the intellectual class during the May 
Fourth movement, they observe that greed and selfishness as well as political apa-
thy and cowardice plague the population of intellectuals. Their complaints, like 
those that appeared a century ago, are indictments of what they see as a wretched 
state of Chinese politics, culture, and society. The state encourages professional-
ization and consumerism, condones economic inequality and corruption, and 
suppresses social activism and political dissent. Under these circumstances, many 
intellectuals seek to profit themselves first and foremost. The latest example of such 
attacks comes from a sensational essay, “Ten Symptoms of Depravity of Chinese 
Intellectuals,” which has been reposted repeatedly on the internet since 2016.26 An 
excerpt from a recent novel, the essay features virtually all of the criticisms pre-
viously leveled against the intellectual class almost a century ago. Intellectuals, 
especially those who are highly educated, brag about their advanced degrees, 
professional expertise, and individual talents. They emphasize that they are sensi-
tive, principled, and compassionate. Some highlight their intellectual innovations, 
comprehension of cutting-edge research, or love and grasp of Chinese culture. 
As a matter of fact, the author claims, China’s intellectuals generally lack honesty, 
sincerity, social conscience, and ability. They produce little scholarship of value 
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and add little understanding to anything, let alone Chinese culture. The author 
does not mention how CCP rule, past or present, contributes to this state of affairs. 
However, there is no mistaking that he thinks the regretable behavior of intellectu-
als is an outcome of a system of governance that rewards precisely braggadocio, 
self-aggrandizement, and deceitfulness.
To sum up, the struggle to define the intellectual in twenty-first-century China 
involves, once again, official representation and identification of the subject as 
well as unofficial reinterpretations of what the intellectual represents, even though 
the content of each of these three dimensions has changed dramatically since the 
demise of Chinese Communism. The struggle continues to affect official gover-
nance, social identity, and political resistance. No one knows how far into the 
future the classification will continue to have critical impact on Chinese politics, 
culture, and society, let alone whether the classification will regain life-and-death 
implications or become once more a rallying cry against official domination and 
even CCP rule. Nor can anyone tell whether the future of the classification will 
converge with what has happened to its counterparts in Western Europe or the 
United States, that is, zhishifenzi becomes a multifarious concept deployed primar-
ily within academic circles for analytical purposes. One thing is clear, though. The 
intellectual as a classification of people has traveled a distinct path in China since 
the CCP’s founding. A century later, the impact of the classification on Chinese 
society is still quite visible.
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CHARACTER GLOSSARY
PINYIN CHINESE CHARCTERS
a’ge 阿哥
Ai Qing 艾青
Bai mao nü 白毛女
Beida 北大
benren chushen 本人出身
Bian Zhongyun 卞仲耘
biji 笔记
Bo Gu 博古
Buju xiaojie de ren 不拘小节的人
Cai Yi 蔡仪
caidiao 彩调
canguan tuan 参观团
Changchun dianying zhipian chang 长春电影制片厂
Chen Chengze 陈承泽
Chen Duxiu 陈独秀
Chen Huangmei 陈荒煤
Chen Xuezhao 陈学昭
Chen Yi 陈毅
Cheng Fangwu 成仿吾
chengfen 成分
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chun jingji guandian 纯经济观点
Cihai 辞海
cubao 粗暴
da maozi 大帽子
dangwai zhishifenzi gongzuochu 党外知识分子工作处
daoyi 道义
Dazhong dianying 大众电影
Dongbei renmin zhengfu 东北人民政府
Dongfang zazhi 东方杂志
duige 对歌
dushu ren 读书人
eba 恶霸
fanxing biji 反省笔记
Fanyou yundong 反右运动
fazhi 法治
Fei Xiaotong 费孝通
Feng Kexi 冯克熙
fengjian zhuyi 封建主义
fenzi 分子
Fu Sinian 傅斯年
fu xiangzhang 副乡长
Fu Zhongsun 傅钟孙
ganbu gongrenhua 幹部工人化
gaoji 高级
geming de zhishi jieji 革命的知识阶级
geming de zhishifenzi 革命的知识分子
geming junren 革命军人
geren yingxiong zhuyi 个人英雄主义
Gong Canguang 龚灿光
Gongchandang 共产党
gonggong zhishifenzi 公共知识分子
gongnong zhishifenzi 工农知识分子
gongren 工人
gongren jieji zhishifenzi 工人阶级知识分子
He Qifang 何其芳
hongjun zhanshi 红军战士
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Hu 沪
Hu Feng 胡风
Huadong junzheng daxue 华东军政大学
Huadong renmin geming daxue 华东人民革命大学
Huai 淮
Huang Shaohong 黄绍竑
Huang Yaomian 黄药眠
Huangmei 黄梅
huixiang fe 回乡费
Hushi riji 护士日记
Jiang Nanxiang 蒋南翔
Jiang Tingfu 蒋廷黻
Jiang Xingren 蒋兴仁
jiao laoshi 较老实
jiaorou de zuozuo 
jiating chengfen 家庭成分
jie 界
Jiefang ribao 解放日报
jieji 阶级
jieji yizifenzi 阶级异己分子
jinggao 警告
jishu renyuan 技术人员
jituan 集团
jiu 旧
jizhong ying 集中营
Juben 剧本
juewu 觉悟
junren 军人
Kang Sheng 康生
lao ganbu 老干部
laodong 劳动
laonian 老年
li 里
Li Dazhao 李大钊
Li Shaolin 李绍林
Liang Shuming 梁漱溟
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liangmian xing 两面性
lianxi huiyi 联席会议
lilong shiye renyuan dengji weiyuanhui 里弄失业人员登记委员会
Lin Xiling 林希翎
Liu Sanjie 刘三姐
Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇
Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波
Liuzhou 柳州
lixiang zhe 理想者
Long Yinghua 龙英华
Lu Ge 鲁歌
Lü Ban 吕班
Lu Xun yishu xueyuan 鲁迅艺术学院
Ma Hong 马洪
Ma Yunfeng 马云风
Mei Lanfang 梅兰芳
Malie xueyuan 马列学院
Mao Dun 茅盾
Mao Zedong 毛泽东
mingfang 鸣放
Minzhu qingnian jinxingqu 民主青年进行曲
minzu zhenxing 民族振兴
Nanfang renwu zhoukan 南方人物周刊
ningque wulan 宁缺毋滥
nonghou de fengjian zhuyi secai 浓厚的封建主义色彩
nongmin 农民
pa chiku 怕吃苦
paidui 排队
Pang Zhuoheng 庞卓恒
Peng Pai 澎湃
Peng Shuzhi 彭述之
pingyi 评议
Qian Ruping 钱如平
Qiangjiu yundong 抢救运动
qiansan fe 遣散费
qianzhuang 钱庄
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Qiao Yu 乔羽
Qingliang shan 清凉山
Qingnian zazhi 青年杂志
Qu 区
Qu Qiubai 瞿秋白
qunzhong luxian 群众路线
Renmin ribao 人民日报
renmin tuanti 人民团体
Shaanbei gongxue 陕北公学
shangdian 商店
shan’ge 山歌
Shanghai ganbu xuexiao 上海干部学校
Shanghai xinjiaoyu xueyuan 上海新教育学院
Shanghaishi chuli shiye zhishifenzi weiyuanhui 上海市处理失业知识分子委员会
Shanghaishi jiaoyuju 上海市教育局
shehui guanxi 社会关系
Shen Xia 沈霞
shi 士
shidafu 士大夫
shiye gongren 失业工人
shiye renyuan tongyi dengji 失业人员统一登记
shiye zhishifenzi 失业知识分子
shiying 使用
Sibu 四部
sishu 私塾
sixiang jie 思想界
sixiang luohou 思想落后
sixiang qingkuang 思想情况
Song Meiling 宋美龄
Subei 苏北
Sun Yatsen 孫逸仙/孫中山
Tan Tianrong 谭天荣
tanbai 坦白
tanbai congyan yinman congkuan 坦白从严, 隐瞒从宽
Tao Lan 陶岚
toujiang 投降
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Wang Guangqi 王光祈
Wang Ming 王明
Wang Shiwei 王实味
Wei Jingsheng 魏京生
Wei Junyi 韦君宜
Wei wancheng de xiju 未完成的喜剧
Wenhua gou 文化沟
wenhua ren 文化人
Wenhui bao 文汇报
wenren 文人
Wenxue pinglun 文学评论
Wenyi bao 文艺报
Wo sui siqu 我虽死去
Wu Jialin 吴家麟
Wu Jinnan 伍晋南
Wuben nüzi zhongxue 务本女子中学
wunü 舞女
Xi 锡
Xi Jinping 习近平
Xia Yan 夏衍
xiandaihua 现代化
xiang wenshu 乡文书
xiansheng 先生
Xiao Jianqiu 萧涧秋
xiao zichan jieji qingtiao jiaonong 小资产阶级情调较浓
xiaodu 消毒
Xin qingnian 新青年
xinggan 性感
xingqing jizao 性情急躁
xinwen jie 新闻界
Xu Jilin 许纪霖
Xu Yixin 徐一新
Xu Zhongnian 徐仲年
xueshu jie 学术界
xuexi renzhen 学习认真
xuezhe 学者
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xunshi tuan 巡视团
xunyu zhidu 训育制度
Yan Fu 严复
Yan Zhongqiang 严仲强
Yan’an zhongyang yiyuan 延安中央医院
Yang Guangchi 杨光池
Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆
Yang Zhaolong 杨兆龙
yaoqiu jinbu 要求进步
yituan heqi 一团和气
yixue jie 医学界
youhong youzhuan 又红又专
Yu Guangyuan 于光远
Yu Jie 余杰
Yu Pingbo 俞平伯
Yue 越
Yun Daiying 恽代英
Zaochun eryue 早春二月
Zhang Bojun 章伯钧
Zhang Dongsun 张东荪
Zhang Guotao 张国焘
Zhang Naiqi 章乃器
Zhang Ruxin 张如心
Zhang Taiyan 章太炎
Zhang Wentian 张闻天
Zhao Chaogou 赵超构
Zheng Yimei 郑逸梅
Zheng Zhenduo 郑振铎
Zhengfeng yundong 整风运动
zhengzhi qingkuang 政治情况
zhishi 知识
zhishifenzi 知识分子
zhishifenzi de fengcai 知识分子的风采
zhishi jieji 知识阶级
zhishi qingnian 知识青年
zhishi ren 知识人
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Zhonggong zhongyang zhong xuexi weiyuanhui 中共中央总学习委员会
Zhongguo guomindang 中国国民党
Zhongguo minzhu cujinhui 中国民主促进会
Zhongguo minzhu jianguohui 中国民主建国会
Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng 中国民主同盟
Zhongguo renmin kangri junshi zhengzhi daxue 中国人民抗日军事政治大学
Zhongnanhai 中南海
Zhongyang dangxiao 中央党校
Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao 中央陆军军官学校
Zhongyang shuiwu xuexiao 中央税务学校
Zhou Dajue 周大觉
Zhou Enlai 周恩来
Zhou Yang 周扬
Zhu De 朱德
Zhu Shouzhong 朱守忠
zhuanjia 专家
zhuguan zhuyi 主观主义
zhuti 主体
zichan jieji zhishifenzi 资产阶级知识分子
zijue 自觉
zizhuan 自传
zuofeng zhengpai 作风正派
zuoguan dang laoye 做官当老爷
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Creating the Intellectual redefines how we understand relations between intellectuals 
and the Chinese socialist revolution of the last century. Under the Chinese Communist 
Party, “the intellectual” was first and foremost a widening classification of individuals 
based on Marxist thought. The party turned revolutionaries and otherwise ordinary 
people into subjects identified as usable but untrustworthy intellectuals, an identifica-
tion that profoundly affected patterns of domination, interaction, and rupture within the 
revolutionary enterprise. Drawing on a wide range of data, Eddy U takes the reader 
on a journey that examines political discourses, revolutionary strategies, rural activities, 
urban registrations, workplace arrangements, organized protests, and theater produc-
tions. He lays out in colorful detail the formation of new identities in Chinese society 
as well as new forms of organization and association. The outcome is a compelling 
picture of the mutual constitution of the intellectual and the Chinese socialist revolu-
tion, the legacy of which still affects ways of seeing, thinking, acting, and feeling in 
what is now a globalized China.
“This is an illuminating study of how the introduction in early twentieth-century China 
of the new category of ‘intellectual’ not only altered the status of millions of edu-
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tionship between the Chinese Communist Party and these individuals, one that would 
have catastrophic consequences during the Cultural Revolution.” ANDREW WALDER, 
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